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ABSTRACT
Executive Order No. 215 serves to withhold certain kinds of
state discretionary funding from municipalities found to be
"unreasonably restrictive of new housing growth." This
withholding practice was explicitly designed to help induce local
land use policy reform. This paper concludes that the prospects
for achieving this goal are extremely limited.
Chapter I examines the formulation and implementation of the
215 withholding policy from its historical roots to the present.
Several case studies are included to illustrate 215 in practice.
Chapter II analyzes the legal context of the executive order and
concludes that while the withholding practice appears to be
legal, significant legal obstacles remain as to what this
practice can achieve. Chapter III examines the multifarious
goals behind the executive order and the various strategies that
the state has attempted to use to achieve these goals. It argues
that 215 has not and probably could not have been used as a true
bargaining mechanism to induce communities to be less restrictive
in their land use policies.
Chapter IV begins a rethinking of the issue of state
encouragement of local land use policy reform. It analyzes the
degree to which housing allocation formulae are a prerequisite to
effective state intervention. Chapter IV argues that the
conceptual and political problems inherent in determining a
community's "fair share" may well be overwhelming, and that the
concerns that underlie a theory of fair share might better be
served through other mechanisms.
i
Chapter V examines the range of intervention options
potentially available to the state based on the inclusion of
outside interests into the local regulatory process. It argues
that bargaining schemes based on obtaining commitments from local
officials as to future actions can be self-deluding, and that
compensation mechanisms should be based on past growth and/or
current restrictiveness. It concludes that a mixture of devices
designed to test the legitimacy of local regulation with
incentive mechanisms designed to alter is needed as neither
strategy can be successful on its own.
Chapter VI begins with an examination of some of the
institutional problems encountered in the formulation and
implementation of the 215 process. It argues that the goal of
demonstrating that the intervention worked tended to overshadow
the goals that the intervention was designed to achieve. The
chapter concludes by offering suggestions of how to formulate
more effective policies.
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Introduction
Executive Order No. 215 embodies a state practice of with-
holding discretionary funding from municipalities found to be
"unreasonably restrictive of new housing growth."1 This paper
will examine the prospects for and limitations of this practice
as a mechanism for inducing local land use policy reform. While
the discussion focuses on the context of growth policy in
Massachusetts, much of it is relevant elsewhere.
The first three chapters comprise a critique of the execu-
tive order. Chapter I will examine the factual background of
215, including a look at its historical roots and several case
studies illustrating the executive order in practice. Chapter II
will assess the legality of 215 as well as the legal constraints
on its implementation. Chapter III will examine the goals behind
the executive order and the strategies by which the state
attempts to achieve these goals.
lExecutive Order No. 215 (1982), 304 Mass. Admin. Reg.
28,29.
1
The second three chapters attempt a rethinking of the issue
of state encouragement of local policy reform. Chapter IV
examines the question of to what extent a resolution of a
community's "fair share" is needed to underlie state interven-
tion. Chapter V will examine the range of intervention options
available to the state of the type necessary to effect substantial
local reform. Last, Chapter VI will give some summary remarks
and offer some concrete recommendations as to what actions should
follow.
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CHAPTER I
Factual Background
A. 12Th Historical Context Qf Growth Policy la Massachusetts
In Massachusetts, land use and housing policy is primarily
committed to local governments. While the procedural aspects of
local decision-making are carefully prescribed by statute, with a
few notable exceptions municipalities are essentially free to set
the substance of their regulatory policy. 2 The result of this
atomistic structure is a collection of local policies which taken
2See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40A §1 et seq. (West
1979)(zoning enabling act); ch.41 §81K et seq.(West 1979)(sub-
division control enabling act); ch. 23B § § 16-23 (West 1981)
ch. 143 §1 et seq. (West 1981) (state building code); ch. 131
40,40A (West 1981)(wetlands regulation); ch.lll § 127A et seq.
(West 1971)(State sanitary code). For a discussion of the state
standards constraining local policy in the zoning and subdivision
control enabling acts, e& p. 139 infra. Note that Massachu-
setts' state building code is a notable exception to local
prerogative. Even here there is some local role, localities can
petition the state commission for more restrictive standards. ch.
23B §21.
3
individually or as a whole are often perceived as conflicting
with state-wide goals. Most importantly, the policies of some
communities are commonly believed to restrict the supply of
housing, raise the price of available housing, and/or create an
unfair distribution of the costs associated with housing develop-
ment.3 In the past fifteen years, there have been several
attempts to increase the state role in the local regulatory
process.
The first major incident of state intervention was the
passage of the so-called "Anti-Snob Zoning Act," 1969 Mass. Acts
ch. 774.4 This act allows for the overriding of local policy
that might otherwise restrict the development of subsidized
housing. In short, the act works as follows:
1. Public, non-profit, and limited dividend
developers of subsidized housing are given the
opportunity to apply for a comprehensive permit from
the local zoning board of appeals (ZBA). This proce-
dure takes the place of all other local permitting.
2. If the local ZBA disapproves the proposal or
approves it with conditions that render it economical-
ly infeasible, the developer has the right to appeal
the decision to the Housing Appeals Committee (HAC),
an independent, quasi-judicial body included for ad-
ministrative purposes within the Executive Office of
Communities and Development (EOCD).
3. Municipalities are in effect exempted from the
over-ride process if they meet one of three criteria
relating to:
332& enerally Chapter III infra and citations therein.
4Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40B H§ 20-23 (West 1979)
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- the relative amount of subsidized housing
already within the community
- the relative land coverage of the subsidized
housing already within the community
- the relative and absolute increase in land
coverage that the proposed subsidized housing
would entail. 5
The scope of ch. 774 is limited in several ways. First, it
deals only with the siting of subsidized housing and not with
the reform of local policy generally. 6 Second, the statute can
be described as a "passive" mode of intervention. 7 The process
5.Id.. ch. 40B §§20,23 (West 1979). The exact standards are
as follows:
(1) low or moderate income housing which is in
excess of ten per cent of the housing units
reported in the latest decennial census of the city
or town or on sites comprising one and one half per
cent or more of the total land area zoned for resi-
dential, commercial or industrial use or (2) the
application before the board would result in the
commencement of construction of such housing on
sites comprising more than three tenths of one per
cent of such land area or ten acres, whichever is
larger, in any one calendar year; provided, how-
ever, that land area owned by the United States,
the commonwealth or any political subdivision
thereof, the metropolitan district commission or
any public authority shall be excluded from the
total land area referred to above when making such
determination of consistency with local needs.
If one of these standards is meet, a developer can still apply to
the local board of appeals for a comprehensive permit, but the
HAC is limited in its powers of review.
6
"Low or moderate income housing" is defined as "any housing
subsidized by the federal or state government under any program
to assist the construction of low or moderate income housing as
defined in the applicable federal or state statute, whether built
or operated by any public agency or an nonprofit or limited
dividend organization." .I,., ch. 40B 920.
7J. Breagy, Overridin j2be Suburbs: State Intervention fQc
Housing Through jbe Massachusetts Appeals Process, 2,3 (Citizens
Housing and Planning Ass'n, 1976).
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incorporated within the statute is only triggered upon the appli-
cation of the developer, and the state seeks to achieve its
reform goals through providing an avenue of appeal rather than
through direct intervention. Lastly, there is no absolute pre-
emption of local authority, but a process that attempts to incor-
porate local boards and accommodate local policies. 8
The passage of ch. 774 has been traced to an anomalous
coalition of pro-housing liberals and urban conservatives seeking
revenge against the suburbs for the passage of a school desegre-
gation bill the previous year. 9 Still, despite the "illegitimacy"
of its birth, the statute has survived many attempts at its repeal. 1 0
In the period 1970 -1978, 111 applications were made under
8The decision of the local board of appeals must be "consis-
tent with local needs." The definition of this term restricts
local considerations to health or safety--general welfare is not
included--the promotion of "better site and building design," and
the preservation of open spaces. Moreover, any such requirements
must be "applied as equally as possible to both subsidized and
unsubsidized housing," and are to be balanced against the region-
al need for low and moderate income housing. Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 40B §20 (West 1979). Courts have interpreted the
balancing test as heavily weighted toward allowing the housing to
be built. See e.g., 4.Q. f Appeals _ Maynard v. Housing Appeals
fCQimittee 370 Mass. 64, 345 N.E.2d 382 (1976).(HAC ruling upheld
despite certain planning objections). For an explanation of the
workings of the HAC, Zg& Breagy, supra n.7 at 31,38.
9 Breagy, supra n. 7 at 9.
101d. at 1.
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ch. 774 amounting to 14,639 dwelling units (d.u.'s).ll Of these,
9,717 units eventually received comprehensive permits and 3,362
were built. 1 2 During the same period, some 340,000 d.u. of all
types were built, of which some 57,000 were subsidized housing
units not using the ch. 774 process. 1 3 Much of the subsidized
housing that was built within and outside of the ch. 774 process
was elderly and not "family" housing. 1 4
The next major incident in the saga of state intervention in
local land use policy was the passage of the Growth Policy
1 1 E. Ruben & C. Williams, Comprehensive Permits f1..Qr Housing
Lower Income Households in Massachusetts, 2 (Citizens Housing and
Planning Ass'n. 1979). Note, the data includes some applications
from 1979 and not all applications made in 1978.
12.d.. at 14,16,17.
1 3 Data compiled by Philip Herr, Planner, from U.S. Census
materials. For a critique of the statute arguing that its ef-
fects have been "inconsequential", .e E.F. Reed,, Tilting _.t
WIndmills: The Massachusetts LAwnd Moderate Income Housing Agt,
4 W. New England L. R. 105 (1981).
1 4 Note, for example, that of the 3,362 built under ch. 774
through 1978, 1,215 were for family housing compared to 1,337 for
elderly housing even though the need for family housing is
believed to be much greater. The remaining units were in mixed
family-elderly developments for which no breakdown was given.
Ruben & Williams, n. 11 supra at 2. It is unclear to what extent
more elderly housing has been built in the attempt by communities
to meet one of the exemptions of ch. 774. The differential
between family and elderly housing built can possibly be ex-
plained simply by the fact that elderly housing faces less local
resistance. But even if the elderly "loophole" has not in fact
allowed communities to escape the workings of the statutory
override, it may have an important psychological effect as an
imprimatur to the local belief tha the community's regional
housing responsibilities are being met as long as elderly housing
development is approved.
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Development Act of 1975 (GPDA). 1 5 The purpose of this bill was
to create a process through which a state growth policy would
emerge. The planning process was to be guided by the Office of
State Planning (OSP)--created by recently elected Governor
Dukakis--which was given the job of encouraging the formation of
Local Growth Policy Committees (LGPC's) within each municipal-
ity. 1 6 The formation and participation of the LGPC's was manda-
tory, but no sanctions were specified for non-participation. 1 7
The function of the LGPC's was to generate a local growth
policy statement through a process of public hearings based on a
questionnaire written by OSP.1 8 Eventually 320 LGPC's were
formed, of which 301 submitted growth policy statements. 1 9 These
statements were then condensed into regional growth policy state-
ments by the thirteen regional planning agencies. OSP then
reviewed the local and regional policy statements and transformed
151975 Mass. Acts ch. 807.
16,dt.
171.L ch. 807 § 3. Some communities undoubtedly felt the
implied threat of a stronger form of state intervention.
1811.. for a critique of the GPDA process and the attempt to
implement the policies derived through the process in proposed
legislation, ._e V. Welles, Tb Consideration _QJ Implementation
Issues in .he Drafof Public Policy: An Interdisciplinary
Analysis -o jb& Massachusetts Balanced Growt An.d Development AQt-
(unpublished MIT Master's thesis, 1981).
1 9 Welles, n. 18 supra, at 49.
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them into a single document. 2 0 The "findings" of the report were
then tested in a series of local public hearings. 2 1
The OSP report emphasized increasing growth planning and
channeling growth into areas already developed. 2 2 It endorsed a
level of growth sufficient "to provide job and housing opportun-
ities for all [Massachusetts] citizens," but at the same time
reaffirmed local prerogative in land use and growth policy
decisions. 2 3 Direct local growth phasing and management were to
be encouraged, but such management should not only restrict
undesirable growth, it should "stress facilitating desirable
growth." 2 4 The "action recommendations" section proposed a
system of local growth programs whereby each community would
voluntarily plan for how much growth it could "reasonably accom-
modate." 2 5 Upon state approval of the local progam, the
municipality would be allowed to restrict growth beyond this
amount. 2 6 The report also recommended that state sewer and water
funding be used "to make certain that local development policies
20Mass. Office of State Planning, City and Town Centers: A
Progran igr Growth (Sept. 1977).
2 1 Welles, n. 18 supra at 51.
22Se Mass. Office of State Planning, supra n. 20, "Recom-
mendations," 59-85.
23 at 61-62.
241d. at 61.
2513 at 7 8-79.
26
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are maintained." 2 7
The GPDA was based on a theory of "bottom-up" policy formu-
lation advanced by certain MIT academics directly involved in the
work of the Growth Policy Commission, the legislative commission
that drafted the bill. 2 8 This theory is thought to generate a
policy more responsive to local needs and desires and at the same
time to generate a consensus to support implementation of the
policy. 2 9 After the bottom-up formulation process was over, the
task that faced the proponents of state growth policy was how
specifically to implement the derived policy.
On June 29, 1978, the Growth Policy Commission published its
third interim report which recommended that legislation be
drafted to implement the state growth policy. 3 0 While the final
product of the Commission's efforts would not emerge for over two
years, the basic structure of the proposed state intervention was
271A. at 80.
2 8The official name of the Growth Policy Commission was the
"Special Commission of the Effects of Growth Patterns on the
Quality of Life in the Commonwealth," created by 1973 Mass. Acts
ch. 98. Lawrence Susskind who was at the time an associate
professor and head of the Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning
(DUSP) served on the Commission. Charles Perry who was at the
time a doctoral candidate at DUSP served as staff for the Commis-
sion. Susskind and Perry wrote an article examining the theory
underlying the GPDA and evaluating the success of the process.
Susskind and Perry, Th Dynamics .Qf Growth Policy Formulation
and Implementation: A Massachusetts Cas Study, 43:2 Law and Con-
temp. Probs. 145 (1979).
29.d& at 166-171.
3 0 Welles, n. 18 supr at 54,59.
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set from almost the start. 3 1 The state would encourage
localities to follow desired "state-wide" goals through incentive
mechanisms.
That Fall, Michael Dukakis lost the Democratic primary to Ed
King, who later won the general election. Almost immediately
after taking office, King dissolved the OSP and with it the
centralized planning perspective that OSP entailed. 3 2 Joe
Flatley, Project Coordinator of the growth planning process with-
in OSP, survived the change in administrations and moved on to
EOCD. From his new position, Flatley was able to assist in the
continuing efforts of the Growth Policy Commission. 3 3
In the Spring of 1981, the Growth Policy Commission finally
produced a draft bill, the proposed Balanced Growth and Develop-
ment Act (BG&DA). 3 4 The LGPC's were to be reconstituted to
formulate local growth plans which would include the mapping of
districts in which housing development would be "fast-
3 1lIndeed, the Commission's proposals did not substantially
differ from the "action recommendations" of the OSP report. Egg
nn 25,26 supra.
3 2 Welles n. 18 supra at 61.
3 3 E.g., Flatley was able to funnel the Commission $25,000 to
pay for outside legal counsel and other expenses. Note, Flatley
joined EOCD as an Administrator of the Office of Policy Develop-
ment and was appointed Assistant Secretary in 1981, a position he
still holds.
34Balanced Growth and Development Act, (hereinafter BGD&A)
(Final Draft, Implementation Sub-Committee of the Growth Policy
Commission, 1981).
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tracked." 3 5 These growth districts were to be designed in order
to ensure that the community would accept a specified number of
new dwelling units per year, that number to be specified by the
state but subject to negotiation. 3 6
Local participation in the program was essentially voluntary
but would be encouraged by the availability of the following
benefits that could be obtained through buying into the process:
- priority in the disbursement of state discretionary
funding
- technical assistance grants to help pay for the
planning
- growth control authorization
- agreement by the state not to stimulate development
within Environmentally Sensitive Zones.37
Under the BG&DA, communities could control their growth directly
if they gave some assurance that they would otherwise accept
their "fair share." They could choose not to participate in the
process--perhaps controlling their growth through other means--
but would lose the incentives offered.
In order for the BG&DA process to be successful, at least
the following three assumptions would have to be true:
- the incentives would induce local participation
- state determination of each municipality's "fair
share" was technically and politically feasible
- "fast-tracking" would induce the desired housing
growth
35Developers could apply for comprehensive permits within
the so-called "Planned Development Zones." §15. The proposed act
would have also endorsed the mapping of "Environmentally Sensi-
tive Zones" where growth would be discouraged. §4.
3 6 BG&DA H§11,12.
3 7 BG&DA §14.
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These assumptions never got tested in practice. By 1981, the
momentum begun some six years earlier had died. With no legisla-
tor to "champion" the bill, the Balanced Growth and Development
Act "died in committee."38
Meanwhile, Flatley had become impatient with the legislative
process and sought ways to "network" existing programs to achieve
similar goals. The solution he fixed upon was to find state
funding that could be withheld through administrative discretion
until localities complied with certain desired practices. 3 9 This
withholding policy was first implemented through a "memorandum of
understanding" between EOCD and the Executive Office of Environ-
mental Affairs (EOEA). 4 0 Under this agreement -- described in
detail below -- open space acquisition funding was withheld from
communities determined to be "unreasonably restrictive of new
housing growth." A procedure was established through which the
communities could then agree to take certain
3 8 Interview with Lawrence Susskind, former member of the
Growth Policy Commission (April ll, 1983).
39Memorandum 2I Understanding between ±tl Executive Office
2f Environmental Affairs A-d ±ib Executive Office -Qf EComQnitie
and Development (Oct. 10, 1979), discussed below in detail begin-
ning at p. 15.
40The Federal government had begun a structurally similar
process earlier by including local housing issues in the A-95
regional review process for the disbursement of Federal funding
for certain kinds of development assistance. Office of Management
& Budget, Circular No. A-95 (1971), se 24 C.F.R. §52.101 et seq.
(1982). One. commentator labelled this process one of the only
major "fair share" tools that has been implemented. T. Muller,
"Issues in Land use Policies and Housing," in Housing Costs And
Housing Needs, Greendale & Knock, eds. 1976).
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actions and thereby obtain their funding. In 1982, this policy
was expanded through the promulgation of Executive Order No. 215
to apply to potentially all development related discretionary
funding. Executive Order No. 215 is the only state intervention
in the local land use planning process other than ch. 774.
The withholding policy proposed by Flatley and now incor-
porated into Executive Order No. 215 differs in many ways from
the statutory intervention that had been proposed. Gone was any
hope of the backing of a state-wide consensus building process or
even that of the consensus that is normally worked out through
legislative debate. Moreover, unlike the BG&DA, Executive Order
215 does not even have the appearance of a comprehensive policy
directly applicable to all municipalities. Instead, the policy
applied only to communities as they applied for development
assistance and in practice only applied to suburbs. Thus, the
Executive Order became in effect an administrative complement to
ch. 774's efforts to open the suburbs. Further, while the
inducement offered by 215 is structurally identical to one of
those of the BG&DA, in appearance they are quite different. The
built-in prioritization incentive of the BG&DA was replaced by
the administrative withholding of funds appropriated by the
legislature for other purposes. The positive-oriented incentive
had become a sanction. 4 1
41For a more detailed analysis of the distinction between
sanctions and incentives, jag p. 153 infra.
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Given the obstacles to legislative change, Flatley's switch
to executive fiat is perfectly understandable. But what of his
product? How has 215 worked in practice? Could it be improved?
These are the questions of this paper.
B. General History Df 2lU
On October 10, 1979, the Secretaries of the Executive Office
of Environmental Affairs (EOEA) and the Executive Office of
Communities and Development (EOCD) executed a "memorandum of
understanding" concerning the disbursement of so-called "Self-
Help" funds to municipalities. These funds are to be used
towards open space acquisition within the communities. 4 2 EOEA
agreed to withhold Self-Help funds from municipalities found to
be "unreasonably restrictive of new housing growth" by EOCD. 4 3
In practice the withholding process worked as follows:
1) EOCD reviewed local policies upon the municipality's
application for funding. EOCD used a complex building permit
index which compared the community's percentage of growth for the
period 1970-79 (adjusted by a bonus for subsidized housing con-
structed) to the adjusted percentage of growth of the region in
which the community was situated. If this index were below a
certain standard, EOCD would recommend that funds be withheld. 4 4
4 2Authorized by Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 132A §1 (West Supp.
1981).
4 3Memorandum Qf Understanding between Zla Executive Office
_Qf Environmental Affairs and Jh Executive Office Qf -CaQmunities
And Development (Oct. 10, 1979).
4 4 EOCD settled on this formula early in the process of
administration of the Memorandum of Understanding after trying
certain variations. Interview with John F. Loehr, EOCD Planner
(Dec. 7, 1982). For a more complete discussion of this formula
and its administration, s p. 131 infra.
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2) The communities were then given a chance to show special
circumstances, peculigities about the town that could explain
its low growth index.
3) If EOCD were not satisfied with the municipality's
explanation, it would recommend that the funds be withheld until
the municipality signed an agreement specifying what actions it
would take towards making its policies less restrictive.
Normally, EOCD proposed an initial draf of the agreement
followed by some bargaining over terms.
The agreements usually had two parts. The first part was a
commitment by the municipality to apply for low or moderate
income housing or an agreement not to block subsidized housing
already proposed or -- in its strongest form -- a commitment to
make every reasonable effort to develop such housing. 4 7 The
second part of the agreement entailed review of the locality's
land use regulations generally. In one form of this provision,
selectmen agreed to support proposals made by the local planning
boards as to the use of innovative land use techniques (such as
density bonuses) "where appropriate." 4 8 In another for m,gelect-
men agreed to urge such proposals on the planning boards.
4) When the appropriate local officials signed the agree-
ment, EOC Owould recommend that the Self-Help funding be
released. The only enforcement mechanism available to the
state was the threat of reprisal against the municipalities in
future funding rounds.
4 5ds. Specifically, the municipalities were given a ques-
tionnaire which probed the community's land use policies and also
allowed them the opportunity to show how the EOCD formula was
misapplied.
46EOCD initially had hoped that workable proposals would be
initiated by the municipalities themselves. Bgg e.g., Lincoln
case study infra p. 20. When this hope was not substantiated,
EOCD began a practice of proposing all initial agreements itself.
4 7 Seg generally, the case studies that follow beginning at
p. 20.
48e e.g., Reading case study at p. 32.
49Se e.g., Topfield case study at p. 37.
5022 e.g., Groveland case study at p. 44.
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During Fiscal Years 80 and 81, there were 64 applications
for Self-Help funding. 5 1 EOCD sent letters to 12 municipalities
indicating that they appeared to be unreasonably restrictive and
briefly explaining the process of review.5 2 Of these 12, six
were able to show special circumstances or to convince EOCD in
some other way that they were not being unduly restrictive. 5 3
Five of the remaining communities signed agreements, leaving only
one town that refused to cooperate. 5 4
The withholding policies of the EOCD-EOEA memorandum of
understanding were greatly augmented by Executive Order No. 215,
signed into law on March 15, 1982.55 The process by which the
funds were withheld remained essentially the same, though the
executive order did entail two major changes. First of all, the
withholding process could now be applied to all "development-
related financial assistance to cities and towns." 5 6 The order
specifies certain programs that this definition "may include (but
5 1lInterview with John F. Loehr, Policy Planner, EOCD (Dec.
7, 1982); gQ also, Memorandum from Joseph L. Flatley, Ass't
Sec'y, EOCD to Andy Dabilis, United Press International (March
22, 1982) in re "Summary of 'Self-Help' Housing Review."
52
53,5*
541d& The Town of Needham could in fact have passed EOCD's
standards based on its present housing policies, but decided not
to pursue its funding application when it became angered at
EOCD's intervention and initial withholding. Interview with John
F. Loehr, EOCD Policy Planner (Feb. 3, 1983).
55304 Mass. Admin. Reg. 28.
561 Idat 29.
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is not limited to) and explicitly states that "local aid fund
reimbursement or distributions" (so-called "local aid" or "state
aid") are not included. 5 7 There is no indication within the
executive order as to how the decision of what is to be included
within "development-related financial assistance" is to be made.
At present, the order is applied to several programs within EOEA,
four within EOCD, and one within the Executive Office of Trans-
portation and Construction (EOTC). 5 8
Secondly, the executive order changed the institutional and
legal structure of how the withholding policy was implemented.
The earlier memorandum of understanding was a voluntary agreement
by EOEA to abide by EOCD's recommendations. The executive order,
on the other hand, is a mandate from the governor to all relevant
agencies. The exact nature of this mandate, however, is some-
what ambiguous. The order states that all such agencies
57
5 8These programs include the following (listed with the
state agencies that administer them): "Small Cities" Community
Development Block Grants (EOCD), 42 U.S.C. §53(06); Land & Water
Conservation Grants (EOEA), Pub. 2. No. 88-578, 78 Stat. 897
(1964); Sewer Collection Systems Grants (EOEA), Mass. Gen Laws
Ann. ch. 21 §30A (West 1981); Commercial Area Revitalization
District Designation (EOCD), Mass. Gen Laws Ann. ch. 40D §12
(West 1979); Community Development Action Grants (EOCD), Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 121B §57A (West Supp. 1981); Self-Help Open
Space Acquisition Funds (EOEA), Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 132A §11
(West Supp. 1981); Public Works Economic Development Grants
(EOTC), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 161C §4 (West Supp. 1981); Elderly
Housing Grants (EOCD), 1954 Mass. Acts ch. 667 (as reauthorized);
Clean Lakes Program Grants (EOEA), 1982 Mass. Acts ch. 826;
Groundwater Site Acquisition (EOEA), 1982 Mass. Acts ch. 826;
Urban Self-Help Open Space Acquisition Grants, 1977 Mass. Acts
ch. 933.
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should consider, in making such discretionary awards, the
applicant city's or town's housing policies and prac-
tices....[Ilt shoul be .the general policv Qf All state
agencies not to award discretionary funds to cities or
towns which have been determined to be unreasonably
restrictive of new housing growth." [emphasis added] 59
The rest of the order requires EOCD to make determinations of
whether the municipalities have been "unreasonably restrictive" and
specifies procedural aspects of these determinations, including a
codification of the bargaining process through which EOCD "signs
off". 6 0 Thus, the intent of the executive order would appear to be
to bind the affected funding agencies by EOCD's determinations.
However, there is no explicit requirement that the funding agencies
even withhold funding. In practice, these agencies have agreed to
EOCD's determinations. 6 1
One other change took place at about the time 215 was adopted,
though it was not brought about by the order. EOCD decided to
change the standard of restrictiveness that triggered the initial
withholding of funds. 6 2 The agency now focuses only on the presence
of subsidized family housing built within the community. 6 3 An
absence of such housing will normally trigger withholding.
59304 Mass. Admin. Reg. at 29.
601,& at 30.
6 Se generally, the case studies beginning at p. 20 infra.
6 2 Interview with John F. Loehr, Policy Planner, EOCD (Dec. 7,
1982). For a discussion of why the standard was changed, see p. 134
infra.
6 31j
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Since the passage of 215, 20 communities have been notified
that they were being considered "unreasonably restrictive."6 4 Seven
of these communities have already signed agreements, nine have had
their grant applications held up for other reasons, three towns are
reported to be well along in the bargaining-agreement process, and
one town escaped further review when the state decided that 215
should not apply under the circumstances. 6 5
C. Case Studies
To understand 215 more fully, we need to take a closer look at
how the executive order works in practice. This section includes
six case studies each of which raises important issues and questions
as to the effectiveness of the order and its implementation. These
issues and questions are noted at the end of each section and will
be readdressed later in the paper.
1) Lincoln: An AggressivseILs I _he Withholding Policy
Under .the Former Self-Help Memorandum Qf Understanding
In January of 1980, EOEA notified the town of Lincoln that two
grants totalling $286,000 in Self-Help funds had been conditionally
approved to be used towards the purchase of the so-called Adams and
Umbrello properties. 6 6 The town had already approved the purchase
641d
6 5 Interview with John F. Loehr, Policy Planner, EOCD (Dec. 7,
1982; March 24, 1983). For a discussion of the town that escaped
review when it was determined that 215 should not apply, ge&
Lynnfield case study, p. 38 infra.
66Concord Journal, March 15, 1980, at 1.
20
of the parcels which were being held by the Rural Land Foundation
(RLF), a private land-banking organization. 6 7 Housing development
had been mentioned as one of the proposed uses of the Umbrello
parcel prior to the town vote approving its purchase, but no
specific development plans had been proposed or approved at the time
the state intervened. 6 8 Lincoln does have a reputation for creative
land development, including the mixture of open space preservation
and subsidized housing development.69
Final disbursement of the Self-Help grants was made dependent
on the town's satisfying the concerns of EOCD and the Mass. Commis-
sion Against Discrimination (MCAD) that Lincoln was "unduly
restrictive of housing growth." 7 0 The town was invited to prepare a
proposal to demonstrate that it had met these concerns. 7 1 The
resulting proposal was insufficiently specific to satisfy EOCD and
EOCD responded with a draft of its own. 7 2 Accompanying this draft
was a letter from Joe Flatley chastising the town for its lack of
initiative. The letter reads in part:
One of my principal concerns is that, in effect, 2e
67Telephone interview with Robert Lemire, former Chairman of
the Lincoln Conservation Commission, Feb 13, 1982.
68,
69See, e.g., R. Lemire, Creative Land Development: A Bridge to
he Future (1979).
70Concord Journal, March 15, 1980, at 1. MCAD no longer plays
this direct role in reviewing housing policy.
71 a 1
71 at 1,16.
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have devised a housing plan for the Town, when in fact
the Town should have articulated a balanced housing
plan of its own.
If the Town is serious about its commitment to
accommodate its fair share of housing growth, some
meaningful changes in policy must be made in the near
future. Those changes should be made by the Town
itself. Toward that end, I would be pleased to dis-
cuss further this Memorandum of Agreement, and how we
might proceed.'1
The draft agreement itself proposed certain specific conditions
that the town should satisfy. These included agreements to
- relax certain zoning and design regulations generally
- support the use of density incentive bonuses
- pursue the application of scattered-s ite family housing
funding under 1966 Mass. Acts ch. 705.7k
By far the most controversial condition, however, was that the town
develop at least 30 units of low and moderate income housing on one
of the parcels. 7 5 The composition of these units was to conform to
the ratios of 1/6 elderly to 1/2 small family to 1/3 large family
housing. 7 6 The development condition was to be implemented through
a series of separate written agreements between relevant local
bodies including the following:
73.S= letter from Joseph Flatley, EOCD, to Robert Lemire,
Chairman of the Lincoln Conservation Commission (Feb. 25, 1980).
74C o Journal, March 15, 1980, at 16.
761,.. Note these ratios were taken from the Area-wide Housing
Opportunity Plan (AHOP) which Lincoln had acceptedd. Communities
were required to agree to AHOP plans as a condition of receiving
certain kinds of federal housing aid. See 24 C.F.R. 9891.101 et seq.
(1982). Ses generally, Housing and Community Development Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633, (1974).
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- an agreement transferring ownership of the parcel
from the Rural Land Foundation to the Housing
Commission (HC)
- an agreement between the HC and the town to develop
the parcel as specified
- an agreement between the Planning Board (PB) and the
Board of Selectmen (BoS) "that all necessary pf mits
and variances will be expeditiously granted."
The Lincoln Conservation Commission (CC), the body that was
seeking the funds, and the HC held a joint meeting in March to
respond to the Flatley memo.7 8 Local reaction was generally sharply
resentful and focused in three areas:
- the perceived offensive tone of the Flatley letter
- the specificity of the proposed conditions, espe-
cially as to the development of the Umbrello parcel
- the perceived interference with local prerogative
that the individual agreements entailed.'9
Many local officials were particularly upset that the state was
tying the two grants together. 8 0 The Adams parcel-- which accounted
for $242,000 of the total--was composed of 87 acres on the Lincoln-
Concord border that was adjacent to Walden Pond and functionally
separate from Lincoln. 8 1 The purchase of this parcel was in its
final stages and the state's withholding of funds threatened the
77Concord Journal, March 15, 1980, at 16.
78g~
79g
8 0 Telephone interview with Robert Lemire, zte, n. 67 supra
81gaq
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whole deal. 8 2 In the view of the proponents of the project, the
Adams piece--arguably of great regional but little local significance--
was being hostage to the issue of housing on the other parcel.83
Some attending the meeting challenged the legality of the
proposed agreements as well as the initial withholding of the funds
itself.84 Despite this local reaction, attention began to refocus
on how the agreements might be redrafted so as to obtain the
funding. One of the forces behind this reorientation was Rick
Paris, a member of the HC that knew Joe Flatley. 8 5 He announced
at the meeting that
I called him [Joe Flatley] to find out what he was
looking for. The state wants a commitment from the
town to address, in every possible way, provisions for
low and moderate income housing. His position is that
he's not so concerned about specifics as about a
general agreement between the state and the town.
It's an extremely flexible document. 8 6
He added later
The issue about whether the state should link funding
decisions with other departments won't be successfully
challenged. We want to be helpful in doing what's
needed to get the funds. The issue is to tell the
state the things they want to hear in a fashion which
expresses commitment and is flexible. 8 7
821_
831a
84 o Journal, March 15, 1980, at 16.
85 JA
861t
87A
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Another member of the HC suggested redrafting the proposed agreement
by removing:
- "mention of the town from throughout and say that
the Housing Commission will recommend these things"
- "any reference to relaxing standards or granting
lien allowances"
- "specific commitment to ratios on the Umbrello
land. "8
The meeting adjourned with the consensus that the HC should redraft
a more general statement of housing policy.89
Eventually, the town resubmitted a revised housing policy plan
to EOCD by way of the BoS. 9 0 MCAD reviewed the plan and recommended
against approval. 9 1 This prompted another revision which, for
example, dropped the condition of economic feasibility from the
town's commitment to low and moderate income housing, but did not
include a specific number of units to be built on the Umbrello
site.92 On October 6, 1980, the BoS adopted the revised statement
of policy.93 The most important provision was an agreement to make
every reasonable effort to devlop the 14.5 acres
8888, comments of Catherine McHugh.
89~
90Middlesex News (Sept. 1980).
92~
9 3 Letter from Ann F. Sutherland, Chairman, Lincoln Bd. of
Selectmen, to Joseph Flatley, EOCD (Oct. 7, 1980), enclosing
"Statement of Policy of the Town of Lincoln," (OCt. 6, 1980) by
the Bd. of Selectmen.
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of the Umbrello parcel...into housing units, using
then existing ZONING BY LAWS to create greater than
normal housing density including a reasonable number
of low and moderate income housing units; any such
proposal to reflect the housing goals agreed to by the
Town of Lincoln in the (regional area-wide housing
assistance plan]....any such proposal to be presented
to Town Mee ng within 12 months from the date of this
memorandum.
The other relevant local boards (CC, HC, PB) passed resolutions
supporting the policy statement and pledging their best efforts to
implement it. 9 5
In a letter of October 23, Joe Flatley expressed that although
he was not entirely satisfied by the town's statement he felt, "it
represents a positive step forward, and demonstrates good faith on
he part of Town Officials to meet those needs ['the broadening of
housing opportunities']." 9 6 On the basis of the town's policy
statement, EOCD recommended that the Self-Help grants be given final
approval, effectively releasing the funds to the town. 9 7 However,
the Flatley letter informing the town of this action included the
following warning:
Future applications for Self-Help funding will be
evaluated against the good faith efforts of the Town
95 Resolution by the Lincoln Planning Bd. (Oct. 9, 1980),
resolution by the Lincoln Housing Commission (Oct. 6, 1980),
resolution by the Lincoln Conservation Commission (Oct. 16,
1980).
9 6 Letter from Joseph L. Flatley, Administrator of Policy
Development, EOCD to Robert Lemire, Chairman of the Lincoln
Conservation Commission (OCt. 23, 1980).
9 7 Letter from Byron J. Matthews, Sec'y of EOCD to John H.
Bewick, Sec'y of EOEA (Oct. 23, 1980).
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to follow through on the policies and procedures
identified in the Statement. Of particular importance
will be the Town's effort to develop the Umbrello
parcel for a reasonab e number of low and moderate
income housing units.3 8
In early 1981, the Housing Commission presented a proposal to
develop six acres of the Umbrello parcel into 30 units of mostly
moderate income housing. 9 9 At a town meeting on March 27, 1981, 314
residents voted in favor of the proposal with 193 opposed. 1 0 0
However, because a two-thirds majority was needed to approve the
proposal,101 the proposal was rejected. On March 30, 1982, Joe
Flatley wrote EOEA to recommend that the funding for the Umbrello
parcel of $44,000 be rescinded. 1 0 2 EOEA followed this recommenda-
tion and in a sternly worded letter stated:
The unfortunate Town Meeting action will also
have an extremely negative effect upon all future
requests for Self-Help assistance unless Lincoln more
adequately accommodates its fair share of low and
moderate income housing. I trust, and am confident
that all concerned will continue to work toward a
balanced program of housing growth.103
In retrospect, Robert Lemire--then chairman of the Lincoln
9 8Letter from Joseph L. Flatley, n. 96 supra.
9 9 Boston Globe, March 28, 1981,
100
1 01 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40A §5 (West 1979).
1 0 2Letter from Joseph L. Flatley, Ass't Sec'y EOCD to Joel
Lerner, Director, Division of Conservation Services (EOEA)(March 30,
1982). The funding for the Adams parcel had already been disbursed.
103Letter from Joel A. Lerner, Director, Division of Con-
servation Services (EOEA) to John Q. Adams, Chairman, Lincoln
Conservation Comm'n (April 1, 1982).
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Conservation Commission--believes that the funding inducement did
little to alter the town vote. 1 0 4 The amount of money in question
was just too small to make a difference. If anything, Lemire
claims, the state intervention strengthened local opposition to the
housing.105
In June of 1981, the housing proposal was brought before a town
meeting again. 1 0 6 Local officials unanimously supported the
proposal.107  State funding for this parcel was no longer an issue,
but the agreement that the local officials had previously made was a
major issue. 1 0 8 Some accused local officials of changing their
views of the proper use of the Umbrello piece in response to the
state's withholding funds for the Adams parcel and thereby in effect
attempting to bypass town meeting. 1 0 9 One resident asked, "On what
authority did [the selectmen] make that decision without resurveying
the neighborhood and resurveying the town?" The audience
applauded. 1 1 0  In defense, the local officials responded that they
had no intention of tying the town's hands. Lemire stated, " No way
would we proceed with the acquisition of Adams Woods if the funding
1 0 4 Telephone interview with Robert Lemire, n. 67 supra.
105
10 6  Journal June 18, 1981, at 1.
107
1081
109
110
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was linked to a commitment to build housing on the Umbrello
land."ll The housing proposal was defeated 245-194.112
The Umbrello parcel is to this date being held by RLF and no
housing has been built upon it. 1 1 3 Lincoln has not applied for any
state discretionary funding since the Umbrello grant was rescinded.
Ouestions An-d Issues Raised (Lincoln) :
(a) The interagency relations at both the state and local
levels appeared to work quite smoothly. Moreover, the state asked
for and received a lot, including a specific commitment to work
towards developing the parcel. So what in the end went wrong? Was
the result inevitable given the need to obtain town meeting
approval? What are the implications for attempting to achieve local
reform through obtaining the commitments of town boards?
(b) Even if we take for granted that all that could be
obtained was the commitment of local officials, to what extent did
Lincoln officials do anything that they were not going to do anyway?
How were the state's actions constrained by the nature and extent of
the incentives it had to offer?
(c) To what extent, if any, did the town's commitments
embodied in the policy statement amount to a contract?
(d) Is the town's lack of reapplication for state funding
111.Ll... at 19.
11 213. at 1.
1 1 3 Telephone interview with Robert Lemire, _ee n. 67 supra.
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due to its belief that such funding would be denied or to its lack
of need for such funding? Each of these explanations raises serious
doubts as to the effectiveness of the 215 incentives.
2) Reading: Quick Agreement, .But .TQ What End?
An August 6, 1982 letter from Joe Flatley informed the Town of
Reading that its ch. 805 water systems grant was being withheld
pending the town's signing an agreement with EOCD outlining a
strategy to broaden housing opportunity within the community. 1 1 4
The letter stated, "The Town can specify whatever actions it deems
appropriate, so long as those actions will stimulate additional
housing." 1 1 5 The town's executive secretary responded to Flatley in
a letter dated August 16, 1982.116 He stated, "I was shocked and a
bit upset upon receipt of this letter as the Town has consistently
applied for housing funds and has been denied." 1 1 7 The rest of the
letter documents the efforts the town has made toward subsidized
housing:
- 114 units elderly housing (2 years old)
- 80 units of elderly housing (several years old)
- 74 units of elderly housing (recently awarded)
- 55 units of federally subsidized low income housing
(built)
- 50 units of federally subsidized low income housing per
1 1 4 Letter from Joseph L. Flatley, Ass't Sec{y EOCD, to
Marvin Rosenthal, Chairman, Reading Bd. of Selectmen (Aug. 6,
1982).
115
1 1 6 Letter from John W. Agnew, Jr., Executive Sec'y of
Reading, to Joseph L. Flatley, Ass't Sec'y, EOCD (Aug. 16, 1982).
1171d
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year (applied for over each of the last four years and
denied)
- Application for state funding to convert larger, older
homes into multi-family housing (recently denied by EOCD)
- Two similar Federal grants to convert existing housing to
elderly and low income housing (still pending)
- 8 units of housing for retarded adults (recently awarded)
- Inquiries recently made to EOCD concerning ch. 705
scattered-site, famjj housing funding (told no funding
available this year).
Summing up this record, the letter concludes, "Under the
circumstances I feel the Town has actively pursued and is trying to
address housing needs and I certainly would hope that your
restriction on the 805 water systems funding would be lifted."1 1 9
In a follow-up letter, Flatley acknowledged that EOCD was
unaware of some of the town's efforts, e.g., the applications for
additional federally subsidized family units. 1 2 0 He went on to note
that, "Nevertheless, our statement that Reading appears to be
unreasonably restrictive is based on a clear imbalance between
subsidized elderly and family developments in the Town." 1 2 1 Flatley
was further concerned that Reading had not applied for ch. 705
scattered site family housing over the last three years,
118I. The federally subsidized housing was rental assistance
subsidized under the so-called "Section 8" program authorized by the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, §8 3.-.e n. 76 supra.
119
1 2 0 Letter from Joseph L. Flatley, Ass't Sec'y EOCD to John W.
Agnew, Jr., Exec. Sec'y of Reading (Aug. 19, 1982).
121L EOCD was drawing a line between housing built through
mortgage subsidies and housing built through rental assis-tance
subsidies. Exactly why EOCD feels this distinction is significant
is unclear.
31
though he admitted that this might have been due to the fact that
the town had grant applications pending elsewhere. 1 2 2 He proposed
that the town still sign an agreement with EOCD. Flatley's
description of the agreement was as follows:
The Agreement acknowledges Reading's housing efforts and
affirms the Town's commitment to continue working to
ensure broadened housing opportunities in the community,
particularly for lower income families. The Agreement
makes clear the fact that Reading is not unreasonably
restrictive and also strengthen's [sic] the Town's
position ln applying for other state discretionary
funding.13
A draft agreement was enclosed.
The Reading Selectmen executed the agreement without
objection. 1 2 4 They agreed that the town would apply for 705
funding and "actively support whatever steps are necessary to
ensure the local 705 program is implemented in an orderly and
expeditious manner." 1 2 5 They further agreed to "support those
zoning amendments that allow accessory apartments, additional multi-
family housing, and housing at increased density, where
appropriate, as proposed by the Planning Board." 1 2 6 The Planning
Board and the Housing Authority passed resolutions supporting the
122
1243gg Letter from John W. Agnew, Jr., Exec. Sec'y of Reading,
to Joseph L. Flatley, Ass't Sec'y EOCR (Sept. 30, 1982).
1 2 5 Memorandum of Agreement Between the Executive Office of
Communities and Development and The Town of Reading (Sept. 20,
1982).
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Board of Selectmen's agreement and pledging their "best efforts to
support the implementation of that Agreement." 1 2 7 On the basis of
the agreement, EOCD recommended that the town's 805 water systems
funding be approved. 1 2 8
Ouestions And Issues Raised (Reading)
a) This case demonstrates the bluntness of the present trig-
gering mechanism. EOCD was not aware of the unfunded applications
that had been made to HUD and did not even attempt to factor in any
restrictiveness on the part of the town outside of the subsidized
housing area. Nor was the presence of rental assistance deemed
significantly relevant.
b) The lack of controversy as to what the agreement should
include bares the underlying nature of that agreement.
- to what extent did the agreement constitute an enforceable
contract?
- to what extent could/did the selectmen bind themselves?
- to what extent could/did they bind other local bodies?
- if there was a contract, were the town's "promises" unilateral
or were they made conditional on EOCD's "signing off" or
even upon receipt of the grant?
- to what extent, if any, was the state bound by the
agreement?
3) Topsfield: Bargaining In Action
EOCD notified the town of Topsfield that a ch. 805 water
systems grant was being withheld because of the absence of
127JA
1 2 8Letter from Byron J. Matthews, Sec'y EOCD, to John H.
Bewick, Sec'y EOEA (Oct. 4, 1982).
33
subsidized family housing within the town. 1 2 9 A draft agreement
was also sent to the town, and a meeting was scheduled to discuss
the matter further. Attending the meeting were the Board of
Selectmen, the Planning Board, a representative from the local
housing authority, and John Loehr from EOCD. 1 3 0 The Chairman of
the Board of Selectmen did most of the talking for the town.
Before the meeting began, the housing authority representative
tried to impress upon Loehr the scarcity of developable land within
the town due to a substantial amount of wetlands and state-owned
land.
Loehr opened the meeting by explaining a little about the
goals of 215 and how it worked. He noted that the review that
triggered Topsfield into the process was a simple one that was not
necessarily fair. When the preliminary explanation was over, Loehr
focused immediately on the agreement that would induce EOCD to
"sign off." Specifically, he emphasized the ch. 705 housing
program and the fact that the state was only asking the town to
"explore" this program when funding became available and to
"explore" the subject of affordable housing in general.
The town officials first asked for a clarification of the
1 2 9Letter from Joseph L. Flatley, Ass't Sec'y, EOCD, to Henry
Garten, Chairman of the Topsfield Selectment (Aug. 6, 1982).
130The meeting took place in the Bd. of Selectmen's conference
room in the Topsfield Town Hall on Dec. 13, 1982. The author sat
in on the meeting; all observations that follow were taken first
hand.
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relationship between EOCD's withholding of the 805 grant and "92
Washington St.," a proposed subsidized housing development
currently before the House Appeals Committee under ch. 774. Loehr
explained that the only relation was that the town's acceptance of
the project might be enough to induce EOCD to "sign off."
For most of the rest of the meeting, town officials emphasized
three main points:
- the lack of developable land within the town
- a recognition of a need for lower priced housing within the
town (especially for the young and the old)
- a general feeling that the town was an inappropriate place
for lower income people from outside due to the lack of a
jobs base within the town and the lack of a transportation
system to go outside it.
Loehr responded stressing the following points:
- other towns were in a similar position
- tailored solutions to each town's problems were encouraged
- the state was only asking for on the order of 4-5 units of
housing, with funding to come from the state.
Throughout, Loehr was caught between making the agreement
attractive to the town and at the same time ensuring that it had
real "teeth." The town specifically wanted to know if there
was a way that town residents could be given first preference to
any subsidized housing built. Loehr answered that a local
preference agreement was probably possible, though he personally
did not agree with the idea.
The town officials continued to argue that they recognized
the problem of no affordable housing within the town but were
impotent to make a change. They began to acknowledge, however,
that the state was not asking for very much. The head of the
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planning board stated, "You're [EOCD] basically asking for a
philosophical commitment." The Chairman of the Board of Selectmen
followed, "The numbers you are asking for seem modest; I welcome
the opportunity to get money for our young people." Discussion
began to focus on the particulars of the agreement and what would
follow.
No final agreement was reached at the meeting, but it ap-
peared that the parties were on the verge of one. Nonetheless,
there also appeared to be some incongruence as to what the parties
thought they were about to agree. Specifically, it was unclear to
what degree the town would be bound by the EOCD-sponsored site
selection process that would follow the town's application for 705
housing. 1 3 1 The town officials had clear ideas as to where they
wanted to put any subsidized housing (e.g., in the "business park"
district next to the expressway or in a former Department of Youth
Services facility no longer used by the state), and it appeared
that they believed they would retain full control over the site
1 3 1 Under current administrative procedures, applying for the
ch. 705 funding commits municipalities to a state administered
site selection process. While the locality is an "equal partner"
during the process, the state retains "final say" at the end.
The town could, of course, walk away from the housing funds and
incur any sanctions imposed. Interview with John F. Loehr,
Policy Planner, EOCD (April 12, 1982).
The ch. 705 housing program focuses on small-scale,
scattered site development or rehabilitation. It has become the
centerpiece of the 215 process. 1966 Mass. Acts ch. 705 (as re-
authorized).
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selection process. Ambiguity served to suppress potential con-
flict that could resurface later.
Topsfield recently signed an agreement with EOCD. 1 3 2 The
Board of Selectmen agreed "to affirmatively apply" for ch. 705
housing "when funding becomes available," as well as to "examine
its zoning by-laws and...consider the benefits of a diversity of
housing types and prices." 1 3 3
Ouestions And Issues Raised: (Topsfield)
a) This case presented the only observed example of face to
face bargaining. Note that the fact that the town officials were
on their own turf made them comfortable and perhaps more agre-
eable, but placed Loehr in a somewhat vulnerable and "outnumbered"
position.
b) The town sought out the specifics of what was needed to
free up their funding, a development that was encouraged by Loehr.
In one sense, then, the incentives clearly worked. But did the
desire to secure agreement overshadow and hence overcome the
substantive goals that were desired? What in the end did the
state gain from the bargain? If the town is able to obtain state
funded housing with local preference and local site selection, has
the 215 process done anymore than induce a town to look at
1 3 2 Memorandum of Agreement Between the Executive Office of
Communities and Development and the Town of Topsfield (Jan. 3,
1983).
1331,. The Board of Selectmen specifically agreed to "urge
the Planning Board to give serious consideration to innovative
zoning amendments that encourage more affordable residential
developments--such as 2 or 3 family quadraplex structures, or
accessory apartments."
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another state funding program (705) that is almost undeniably in
the town's self-interest?
c) At the same time that the town officials sincerely felt
that they were constrained from making real substantive change, it
was also apparent that they felt little responsibility for those
outside the town. Loehr was always on strongest ground when he
compared Topsfield to towns similarly situated.
d) Loehr emphasized that the town's coming to agreement
would free it from withholding problems in the future. In what
sense (legal, political, moral) was the state bound by this
commitment?
4) Lynnfield: Interagency Controversy Over ±h& Scope _oI 2,L
In a letter of August 6, 1982, Joe Flatley informed the
Chairman of the Lynnfield Board of Selectmen that a ch. 805 water
systems grant was being withheld because the town appeared to be
"unreasonably restrictive." 1 3 4 The applicant for the grant was
not a town-wide agency, but the Lynnfield Water District, which
serves approximately one-quarter of the town. Upon the urging of
the town, the Dept. of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE)--
the 805 funding agency--reviewed the question of the applicability
of Executive Order No. 215 to water districts.
In a legal memo of October 1, 1982, DEQE determined that the
pertinent language in 215--"to cities and towns"--did not include
13 4Letter from Joseph L. Flatley, Ass't Sec'y EOCD, to John
F. Donegan, Chairman, Lynnfield Bd. of Selectmen (Aug. 6, 1982).
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water districts. 1 3 5 The memo continues:
In addition, application of the Executive Order to dis-
tricts would not make a great deal of sense, as such
districts have no control or input into the housing
practices or policies of the cities, owns or portions
thereof whose residents they service. 6
Despite DEQE's judgment that 215 did not apply, EOCD continued to
press the selectment for an agreement. John Loehr set up a
meeting with various town officials on November 8 in an attempt
to further negotiations. The town officials apparently had no
intention of negotiating and used the meeting to vent their
hostile feelings toward EOCD. 1 3 7 EOCD responded by letter
stating that because of the town's unwillingness to cooperate,
"this office will be unable to make a favorable recommendation to
DEQE on the Town's '805' grant." 1 3 8
In a memorandum to DEQE dated December 6, 1982, Joe Flatley
challenged DEQE's determination that 215 did not apply to water
districts. 1 3 9 The memo reads in pertinent part:
In drafting the operative wording for Governor King,
EOCD purposely did not attempt to define the term "city
135Memorandum from Gloria Fry, Office of General Counsel,
DEQE, to Dave Terry, Division of Sewer and Water, DEQE (Oct. 1,
1982).
136
1 3 7 Interview with John F. Loehr, Policy Planner, EOCD (Dec.
7, 1982).
1 3 8Letter from Joseph L. Flatley, Ass't Sec'y, EOCD, to John
Donegan, Chairman, Lynnfield Bd. of Selectmen (Nov. 19, 1982).
1 3 9 Memorandum from Joseph L. Flatley, Ass't Sec'y, EOCD, to
Anthony D. Cortese, Commissioner, DEQE (Dec. 6, 1982).
39
or town" since local government, by its very nature, is
so fractionalized. "Cities or towns" are really an
amalgamation, or loose union, of various boards, commis-
sions, and authorities, each having separate and dis-
tinct responsibilities, but whose collective actions
constitute "local policy."
The purpose of the Executive Order is to withhold
funding, where warranted, from the city or town (i.e.,
the conservation commission, the housing authority, the
industrial development commission, the water district,
etc.) until the appropriate local boards and commiss ns
cooperatively develop an affirmative housing policy.i0
The dispute between DEQE and EOCD was recently resolved by
EOCD's acceding to DEQE's interpretation that 215 was inapplic-
able to the Lynnfield Water District. After recent interagency
negotiations, EOCD and DEQE have agreed to apply 215 to grants to
sewer and water districts that serve over 75 percent of a town's
population.141
Ouestions And Issues Raised: (Lynnfield)
a) To which funding applications and local agencies should
215 apply? The argument that 215 should not apply to water and
sewer districts is not easily contained. While a line can cer-
tainly be drawn distinguishing these districts from other local
boards, 1 4 2 one can still question whether these distinctions
should make a difference. Conservation commissions, for example,
140
1 4 1lInterview with John F. Loehr, Policy Planner, EOCD (March
24, 1983).
1 42Districts raise their own financing, are subject to
separate elections, and are often not geographically contiguous
with the municipalities they serve. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 41 §113 et seq. (West 1979), ch. 44 §9 (West 1981).
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may have little direct influence on general land use policy
within a town. Does it make sense and is it fair to withhold a
grant from a conservation commission at the same time the exact
same grant would not be withheld from a water district?
b) The interagency disputes at the state level highlight an
absence of a force directing or supporting 215's operation from
the top down, despite the form of 215 as an executive order.
5) Groveland: A Real Test
A letter of July 12, 1982 informed the town that its ch. 805
water systems grant of $207,000 was being withheld because the
town was deemed "unreasonably restrictive" in its housing prac-
tices. 1 4 3 The letter stated that the funds would be released if
the town came to a formal agreement with EOCD in the next six
months detailing its housing strategies. 1 4 4 The town--per its
counsel, David Watnick--responded with two strategies. First,
Watnick sent a letter to DEQE stating that under his interpreta-
tion of 215, a town must be given a chance to rebut the evidence
against it as a condition precedent to the withholding of
funds.145 Secondly, he wrote to EOCD asking for copies of such
1 4 3Letter from John A. Bewick, Sec'y, EOEA, and Anthony D.
Cortese, Comm'r, DEQE, to Richard Allen, Chairman, Groveland Bd.
of Water Comm'rs (July 12, 1982).
1441c
1 4 5Letter from David M. Watnick, Groveland Town Counsel, to
John A. Bewick, Sec'y, EOEA and Anthony D. Cortese, Comm'r, DEQE
(Aug. 6, 1982).
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evidence and to arrange a meeting with them toward coming to a
suitable agreement. 1 4 6
Secretary Matthews of EOCD responded with a long letter
detailing local opposition to subsidized family housing. 1 4 7
While the local housing authority had made efforts at securing
public housing in the past, violent and extended local protests
rendered these efforts fruitless. 1 4 8
Various people including State Senator Sharon Pollard and
William Slusher (town meeting representative and member of the
Merrimack Valley Planning Commission) unsuccessfully attempted to
bypass EOCD by dealing directly with Governor King. 1 4 9 Slusher
wrote to King stating that EOCD had created a "Catch-22" situa-
tion because "Groveland has opposed a major low-income housing
project because ba area lacked adequate water fgr fire protec-
tion."150
Matthews responded to Slucher's claim by stating that "any
objective view of the facts" indicates that the preferred
146Letter from David M. Watnick, Groveland Town Counsel, to
Byron J. Matthews, Sec'y, EOCD (Aug. 10, 1982).
1 4 7Letter from Byron J. Matthews, Sec'y, EOCD, to Earl
Sweetser, Chairman, Groveland Bd. of Selectmen (Aug. 19, 1982).
148
1 4 9Letter from Sharon Poliand, State Sen., to Edward J.
King, Governor (Oct. 13, 1982); letter from William E. Slusher,
Groveland town meeting represenative and member of the Merrimack
Valley Planning Comm'm, to Edward J. King, Governor (Sept. 6,
1982).
150
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explanation was not the real reason for the town's opposition to
the housing. 1 5 1 His letter concludes:
In conclusion, I would urge Groveland officials to
put the unpleasant events of the past behind them, and
to stop insisting that the town has no responsibility
for addressing the need for low-income family housing.
Continued efforts to place the "blame" elsewhere will
not get the town its water system grant. Once again, I
want to make clear that we stand re y to work with
Groveland to resolve this impasse.
Town officials accepted this invitation, and at a meeting on
October 20th, substantial progress was made toward reaching an
agreement.153
On February 3, 1983, EOCD signed an agreement with the town
whereby the selectmen agreed to apply for 705 family housing
during the next funding round. 1 5 4 Specifically, the commitment
reads as follows:
The Town, acting through the local housing author-
ity, will affirmatively apply for additional state
Chapter 705 scattered-site family public housing under
the next funding round, and will continue other state
and federal family housing assistance programs currently
in the Town. Furthermore, the Board of Selectmen will
actively support whatever steps are necessary to ensure
the local 705 program is implemented as needed. 1 5 5
1 5 1Letter from Byron J. Matthews, Sec'y, EOCD, to William E.
Slusher, Groveland town meeting representative and member of the
Merrimack Valley Planning Comm'n (Sept. 23, 1982).
152110
153Letter from Edward J. King, Governor, to Sharon M.
Pollard, State Sen. (Oct. 27, 1982).
15 4 Memorandum of Agreement Between the Executive Office of
Communities and Development and the Town of Groveland.
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In return, EOCD agreed:
to transmit a finding to the Secretary of Environmental
Affairs that the Town of Groveland is not at this time
unreasonably restrictive of housing, along with a recom-
mendation that the Town's appl tion for Chapter 805
funds be favorably acted upon.
In a cover letter returning the agreement to the town, EOCD
states:
Although it is not stated explicitly in this
Agreement it is our understanding that the various Town
Boards will work in a cooperative and affirmative manner
with the Housing Authority in applying for 705 family
housing, and will actively support whatever steps are
necessary to ensure the 705 program is implemented in an
orderly and expeditious manner.157
Ouestions and Issues Raised: (Groveland)
a) Groveland had a history of overt exclusionary conduct
and thus presents a real test for 215's effectiveness. Now that
town officials have signed an agreement, can/will they successfully
follow through on their commitments?
b) While Matthews was undoubtedly right in implying that
the "fire protection" justification was spurious, are there not
situations where the withholding of state funding could be counter-
productive to the cause of increasing the supply of affordable
housing?
c) Are there legal constraints on the type of agreement
signed by the town and EOCD?
156ij
1 5 7 Letter from Joseph L. Flatley, Ass't Sec'y, EOCD, to Earl
L. Sweetser, Chairman, Groveland Bd. of Selectmen (Feb. 7, 1983).
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6) Medway:1 21L and Chapter lIA overlap
A mixed-income, "turn-key" housing development was proposed
in Medway by a private developer acting on behalf of the local
housing authority. 1 5 8 On July 20, 1982, the local Board of
Zoning Appeals (BZA) approved the project with 22 conditions of
somewhat questionable intent. 1 5 9 The developer estimated that
these conditions would cost $336,400.160 An appeal was filed
with the state Housing Appeals Committee (HAC) on August 3, 1982,
but informal negotiations between the developer and the town
continued as well. 1 6 1
Meanwhile, the town was applying for a Public Works Economic
Development grant from the Executive Office of Transportation and
Construction (EOTC) to build an access road for local industry.
This application triggered the 215 review process. The EOTC
grant was given at least conditional approval on September 1,
1982.162 One month later, the town learned that the grant might be
158.32 Appeal from a Decision of the Medway -oning Bd. of
App. to the Housing Appeals Committee (filed Aug. 3, 1982).
159E.g., a condition that required a six-passenger elevator
for a two-story building that had already received a handicap
variance from the relevant state agency. For a list of the
conditions imposed, gas id..
1603-e Letter from Lorene Comeau, Project Director for the
private development, John M. Corcoran & Co., to Marvin Siflinger,
Area Manager, U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
(Sept. 20, 1982).
161,9g Letter from John M. Corcoran, private developer, to
Marvin Siflinger, Area Manager, HUD (Dec 1, 1982).
1 6 2Letter from Patricia M. Kennedy, Admin. Ass't, Town of
Medway, to James Carlin, Sec'y, EOTC (undated).
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withheld "due to a lack of low-income housing in Medway." 1 6 3 The
administrative assistant to the Board of Selectmen wrote EOTC
"that Medway is very responsive to the needs of low income
people." 1 6 4 She cited 10 units of Section 8, federally sub-
sidized, rental assistance housing within the town, as well as 31
people receiving rental assistance from the state. 1 6 5 She also
made references to the proposed "turnkey" development and stated:
The officials of Medway feel that we have done
everything positive regarding filling the needs of the
low income and should not be penalized for the small
minority of private citizens who are currently exercis-
ing their constitutional rights in our democratic system
to challenge the construction of this project.166
She noted that the selectmen were doing all they could to achieve
a "swift, amicable compromise." 1 6 7 This letter also noted the
benefits that would flow from the EOTC grant that was being withheld:
The Industrial Park that will benefit most directly
from our creation of this access road via the grant
funds will open up a labor force potential, both locally
and statewide, that should be a potent factor in the
prevention of dditional low income families due to
~l8unemployment.
16 3 Letter from Joseph L. Flatley, Ass't Sec'y, EOCD, to
James Jeffers, Chairperson, Medway Bd. of Selectmen (Oct. 15,
1982).
164322 n. 162 supra.
165
166i
167
16 8
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In a letter of October 15, 1982, Joe Flatley officially
informed the Board of Selectmen that the absence of low-income
housing developments within the town could "pose a problem with
respect to Executive Order No. 215.169 Flatley then made refer-
ence to the continuing negotiations between the town and the
developer, and informed the town pointedly:
If the outstanding issues can be resolved, the Town will
have clearly demonstrated its commitment to housing for
low-income families. Prior to our making a determina-
tion regarding Medway's Public Works grant, we would
like to meet with Town officials to review progress made
at the forthcoming meeting towards resojyng outstanding
issues regarding that housing proposal.
Negotiations progressed to the point where agreement was
reached on all but one of the conditions. 1 7 1 At about this time,
EOTC decided that the Public Works grant program was invalid in its
16 9cs& n. 16 3, s up ra.
170
1712P2 n. 161, supra. Note that the developer directly
credited EOCD with helping to narrow the issues. Letter from
Lori Comeau, Project Director, John M. Corcoran & Co., to John F.
Loehr, Policy Planner, EOCD (Nov. 24, 1982)("Your efforts to
resolve the Comprehensive Permit appeal, throught your communica-
tion with Medway officials and EOCD personnel directly involved
in that appeal, has resulted in narrowing the issues of 'real'
concern to the Town from the original 22 conditions which ap-
peared in the permit.")
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particular form,17 2 thus suspending the 215 process and the incentives
that it offered. The final issues could not be resolved and as of
March 24, 1983 the parties were still awaiting the decision of the
HAC. The town is aware of the fact that the longer the project is
delayed, the greater the probability that federal funding for the
project will be withdrawn. 1 7 3
Ouestions and Issues Raised-: (Medway)
a) The Medway case presents an interesting overlap between
Executive Order No. 215 and ch. 774. In the process it demonstrates
the potential for creative "networking" as well as the fragile depen-
dency of the 215 process on the availability of the funding incentive.
b) The fractionalization of local authority into several
different bodies is once more a major issue.
c) Do the economic development benefits associated with the EOTC
grant render its withholding an inappropriate incentive, or is this
precisely the case for such linkage?
1 7 2 The enabling act for the program was ambiguous as to
whether funds could be given directly to municipalities without
the approval of the Department of Public Works, an independent
agency included for administrative purposes within EOTC. Mass.
Gen Laws Ann. ch. 161C §4 (West Supp. 1981)
1 7 3 Interview with John F. Loehr, Policy Planner, EOCD (Feb.
3, 1983).
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CHAPTER I
LEGAL CONTEXT
This section will have three purposes. First, it will
attempt to assess the legality of the current executive order "on
its face." Second, it will examine legal constraints on how the
order is implemented. Third, along the way it will explore the
boundaries of the Massachusetts Constitution, allowing us to
assess how much could be achieved through statutory change.
A. Legality
While final conclusions as to legality are always suspect,
it does appear that Executive Order No. 215 is legal. More exact-
ly, it is extremely unlikely that anyone could successfully
challenge the executive order in court. Potential plaintiffs
will have a difficult time obtaining judicial review. Even if
this obstacle can be overcome, the practices mandated by the
executive order appear to be well within the broad authority
delegated to executive agencies in the spending of discretionary
funding. While this delegation of authority could be challenged
through the various theories discussed below, there remains a
glaring absence of case law overturning discretionary powers of
governors not in direct conflict with statutory mandates.
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Despite the relative ease with which these conclusions can
be made, this section will examine the legality issue in compre-
hensive detail. In order to ensure the fairness of our conclu-
sions as to the order's legality as well as to explore some of
the more interesting issues that can be raised, we will attempt
to present the strongest arguments that can be made in favor of
the order's illegality. The analysis should be read in light of
these initial conclusions.
1) Obtaining Judicial Review
Before we examine the substance of the executive order, we
have to address the procedural issue of how the order could be
challenged. The most likely challenge would be by communities
denied funding because of their growth policies. 1 7 4 Such
plaintiffs would face a significant obstacle to bringing suit,
namely that discretionary funding decisions are normally not
17 4Funds have not been finally denied to any town. One town
withdrew its application when it became angered at the initial
withholding. Other towns have been willing to go along with EOCD
because the state has not asked for much. 9Eg= discussion at p.
20 supra.
50
subject to judicial review.17 5 The case law could be distin-
guished, however. Plaintiffs would argue that the agencies were
not withholding funds pursuant to discretion committed to them by
the funding program enabling statutes, but pursuant to extraneous
concerns. 1 7 6 The actions of EOEA and EOCD in treating the growth
policy review as a separate step layered on to the initial deter-
mination of eligibility bolsters this argument. 1 7 7 Further,
1 7 5 School Committee of Hatfield Y- Board Qf Education, 372
Mass. 513, 363 N.E. 2d 237 (1977)(judicial review of school
building assistance funding denied). The relevant program
enabling statute--like the ones subject to 215--did not provide
for judicial review. Review under the Mass. Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) was not applicable because the denial of discre-
tionary funding is not "a final decision of any agency ig an
adjudicatory proceeding." Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 30A 9
1(1) (West 1981). Constitutionally mandated judicial review did
not lie because the existence of agency discretion negates the
prerequisite of a statutory entitlement. 363 N.E.2d at 238-0.
Note that federal due process itself may be irrelevant as between
the state and its municipalities. Williams y,- Mayor and City
Council,, 289 U.S. 36, 53 S.Ct. 431, 77 L.Ed. 1015 (1933).
17622 West Broadway Task Force, Inc. v. C.mi'r 21 tha Dept.-
&t CQmmunity Affairs, 363 Mass. 745, 297 N.E.2d 505, 509 (1973)
(dicta). While refusing to take jurisdiction in the particular
case, the court stated:
A charge of arbitrary or capricious action by the agency,
like a charge that the agency exceeded its "jurisdiction,"
could also present a plausible situation for appeal to an
equity court. Even in a field in chich the agency is
acknowledged to have latitudinous discretion, a court
would not be excluded if the agency appeared to have been
actuated by clearly inapposite or unreasonable considera-
tions. [citations omitted]
School Cmmittee of Hatf ield, n. 175 supra, cites West Broadway
as listing the exceptions to the general rule of no judicial
review of discretionary funding decisions. 363 N.E.2d at 240.
177At least for purposes of overcoming the procedural hurdle
of obtaining judicial review. The program enabling statutes may
still provide the strongest support for the 215 withholding
policies.
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statutes that require discretionary funding to be disbursed pur-
suant to promulgated regulationsl 7 8 themselves provide a route of
judicial review.17 9 The analysis of the legality of the execu-
tive order which follows assumes that this "procedural" obstacle
can be overcome. 1 8 0
2) An overview Qf 1hg substantive Legal Issues
Executive Order No. 215 entails the withholding of funds
appropriated by the legislature from municipalities found not to
meet certain conditions. The overriding legal question is
whether this withholding policy could properly be implemented
through an executive order or whether such executive action would
usurp the power of the legislature in violation of the Separation
1781979 Mass. Acts ch. 805, discussed infra at p. 69,
requires EOEA to "establish standards and guidelines for the
administration and disbursement of said funds." The agency itself
appears to read this phrase as a requirement that regulations be
promulgated. jC. n. 244, infra.
1793e& West Broadway, supra at n. 176 (jurisdiction lies
where the agency has ignored "a specific statutory command or
prohibition")(dicta). Were regulations promulgated, judicial
review would be triggered under the Mass. APA. Mass Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 30A §7 (West 1981).
180The two questions of course overlap; the clearer the
agencies are outside of their authority, the more willing a court
will be in accepting jurisdiction. Note that in dismissing the
complaint in School Emmittee aQf Hatfield, the court stated that
it did not meet the West Broadway exceptions based on its con-
clusory allegations. 363 N.E. 2d at p. 240.
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of Powers clause of the Mass. Constitution. 1 8 1 In particular, we
must ask the following questions:
- Is the imposition of such conditions on the disbursement of
funds within an independent grant of the executive authority
from the Mass. Constitution?
- If not, is it within a legislative grant of authority to the
relevant state agencies and/or the governor?
- Even if the imposition of such conditions would be otherwise
authorized, doe Tt conflict in some way with the Mass. Home
Rule Amendment?8
- To find a legislative source of authority, are we forced to
rely on a delegation that is unconstitutionally broad?
The use of gubernatorial executive orders has increased
dramatically in the past few decades. 1 8 3 Between 1941 and 1947,
99 exective orders were promulgated, all of which traced their
authority to the emergency powers granted to the governor under
1 8 1 Mass. Const. pt. I, art. 30 which reads as follows:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legis-
lative department shall never exercise the executive and
judicial powers, or either of them: the executive shall
never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or
either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to
the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
1 8 2 Mass. Const. Art. of Amend., art. 89, amending Art. of
Amend., art. 2.
1 8 3 For a comprehensive report on the use of executive orders
in Massachusetts, agg Legislative Research Council, Gubernatorial
Executive Orders (April 3, 1981)(hereinafter, the LRC report).
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the so-called War Powers Acts. 1 8 4 No executive orders were
issued between 1947 and 1950, the date of the passage of the
Civil Defense Act. 1 8 5 All of the 34 executive orders issued in
the decade 1950-59--as well as many of the orders issued after
that time--based their authority on the explicit statutory powers
given to the governor by the Civil Defense Act. 1 8 6 Beginning in
1960, however, governors began to issue executive orders citing
statutes that did not explicitly grant the power to issue such
orders, citing powers generally conferred by statutes or the
constitution, citing the governor's status as the "supreme execu-
tive magistrate," 1 8 7 or citing no authority at all. 1 8 8 In the
1841941 Mass. Acts ch. 719, as amended by 1943 Mass Acts ch.
3; 1942 Mass. Acts chs. 13, 18; 1945 Mass. Acts ch. 155. Three
executive orders cited additional statutory authority as well.
LRC report, supra n. 183, Appendix A (Index of Mass. Guber-
natorial Executive Orders, 1941-80) 123-153.
1851950 Mass. Acts ch. 639, as amended by 1951 Mass. Acts
chs. 434, 460, 531, 547, 580; 1952 Mass. Acts ch. 269; 1953 Mass.
Acts chs. 491, 500, 532; 1955 Mass. Acts chs. 25, 607; 1956 Mass.
Acts chs. 401, 560; 1957 Mass. Acts ch. 684; 1958 Mass. Acts chs.
180, 425,{; 1962 Mass. Acts chs. 350, 743, 767; 1964 Mass. Acts
ch. 740 (by initiative); 1968 Mass. Acts ch. 579; 1970 Mass. Acts
ch. 112; 1978 Mass. Acts ch. 478; 1979 Mass. Acts ch. 796.
1 86LRC report, supra n. 183; Appendix A, 123-153.
1 8 7 Mass. Const. pt. II, ch. II, §1, art. 1.
1 8 8 LRC report, supra n. 183; Appendix A, 123-153. Most of
these executive orders dealt simply with matters of state agency
organization, such as the establishment of executive commissions
and task forces. LRC report at 82. A few were of a more regula-
tory nature, se e.g., Executive Order No. 130 (1976) which
restricted the awarding of state contracts to firms participating
in boycotts ordered by foreign powers (a reaction to Arab boy-
cotts against Israel); Executive Order No. 190 (1980) regulating
the use of off-road vehicles on public lands.
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decade 1970-79, 103 executive orders were issued of which only 10
even cite reference to any specific Mass. statute as
authority. 189
Executive Order No. 215 is typical in citing as its author-
ity "the authority vested in [the governor] by the Constitution
and by the statutes of this Commonwealth." 1 9 0 To analyze the
legality of the order, then, we are forced to examine all
possible sources of authority. 1 9 1
3) Independent Constitutional Authority
A governor's authority stems from three types of sources.
The first type are those powers delegated to the governor by the
legislature. These are discussed below in subsection (b). The
second are those specific powers explicitly granted by the Mass.
Constitution, e.g., the power to convene the legislature. 1 9 2
None of these powers gives direct authority for the issuance of
executive orders or is even faintly relevant to land use or
1 8 9 LRC report, supra n. 183; Appendix A, 123-153. Citing
legislative authority, of course, does not establish that
authority.
190304 Mass. Admin. Reg. 28.
1 9 1 Little has been written as to the use and legality of
gubernatorial executive orders. In addition to the LRC report,
supra n. 183, jggp Comment, Executive Orders _Qf _tbe Wisconsin
Governor, 1980 Wis. Law Rev. 333 (1980); Comment, Constitutional
And Statutory Bases -f Governor's Emergency Powers, Mich. L. Rev.
290 (1965); Note, Gubernatorial Executive Orders as Devices fI
Adminstrative Discretion and Control, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 78 (1964);
F. Swindler, , Executive Powers in State And Federal Consti-
tutions, 1 Hastings Const. L.Q. 21 (1974).
1 9 2 Mass. Const. pt. II, ch. II, §1, art. 5.
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housing issues. The third kind of authority includes those
powers inherent in the office of the governor. These powers are
the subject of this subsection.
Under the Mass. Constitution, the governor is the "supreme
executive magistrate." 1 9 3 Within this phrase the Mass. Supreme
Judicial Court has found the authority to issue executive orders.
opinion Q2f Lg Justices t.o th Council, 368 Mass. 866, 334 N.E.2d
604,609 (1975) (executive order establishing a judicial nominat-
ing commission upheld). However, while this case recogizes the
executive order as a legitimate means of implementing executive
prerogative, substantive authority must still be found for that
prerogative. In Opinion af 1-a-e Justices, the executive order
merely formalized the delegation of the judicial nominating
power, a power that is explicitly granted to the governor by the
Mass. Constitution. 1 9 4 Thus, we must still locate substantive
authority for the withholding of the state discretionary funding
in order for Executive Order No. 215 to be legal.
opinion Df ±ag Justices la Jag Senate, 375 Mass. 827, 376
N.E.2d 1217 (1978) recognizes an area of executive discretion in
the execution of the laws with which the legislature cannot
interfere. That case involved the constitutionality of a
proposed statute intended to curtail executive impoundment of
19312, pt. II, ch. II, §1, art. 1.
1941., pt. II, ch. II, §1, art. 9.
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funds appropriated by the legislature. In short, the bill was an
attempt to force the executive branch to spend all appropriated
funds in full. Thus, the case forced the question of whether
there existed any independent executive discretion in the
expenditure of funds duly appropriated by the legislature:
The crucial determination to be made is whether,
and to what extent, the act of expending appropriated
funds, or refusing to spend the full amount of approp-
riated funds, may be characterized as the Gove nor's con-
stitutional prerogative to execute the laws.iff
The case outlined the governor's role in the law-making process
including the ability to propose new legislation,1 96 the
general veto power, 1 9 7 and the selective veto power. 1 9 8 The
opinion also recognized that
[o~nce a bill has been duly enacted, however, the
Governor is obliged to execute the law as it has emerged
from the legislative process. He is not free to circum-
vent that process by withholding funds or otherwise
failing to execute the law on the basis of his vie s
regarding the social utility or wisdom of the law. 99
At the same time, the court recognized a constitutionally
1 950pinion ol _the Justices tQth Senate, 375 Mass. 827, 376
N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (1978).
1 9 6 Mass. Const. Art. of Amend., art. 63, §3.
197.1d.., pt. II, ch. 1, §1, art. 2.
198., Art of Amend., art. 63, §5.
1 9 90pinion _Qf jle Justices, 376 N.E.2d at 1221-2. N.B. This
case is cited only in how it bears on the issue of independent,
executive authority. Obviously, a case of impoundment of funds
presents a much stronger and more direct conflict with a legisla-
tive mandate than any withholding done under 215.
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based area of discretion committed to the executive in the
spending of duly appropriated funds:
The constitutional separation of powers and responsi-
bilities, therefore, contemplates that the Governor be
allowed some discretion to exercise his judgment not to
spend money in a wasteful fashion, provided that he has
determined reasonably that such a decision will not
compromise the achigvgment of underlying legislative
purposes and goals.
The line that the court draws is one between an attempt by the
governor to "substitute his judgment of the merits of a program"
and a "reasonable determination that the full legislative pur-
poses can be accomplished by spending less..." 2 0 1 Because the
proposed bill did not distinguish between these two situations it
was deemed unconstitutional.:2 0 2
Like the opinion legitimating the use of executive orders,
this case appears to create a much broader sphere of executive
authority than it really does. The opinion does not recognize
independent executive authority to enact social policy but only
some executive discretion to operate within legislative purposes.
It is clear that executive action cannot infringe upon valid
2001A. at 1223.
201id
202id
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legislative mandates. 2 0 3 But direct conflicts with legislative
mandates are not the only limitation on executive authority. An
arguable implication of opinion _Qf J Ih Justices ±Q .h Senate--as
well as direct holdings in other jurisdictions 204--is that the
governor has little if any independent constitutional authority
to implement substantive social policy. Executive orders that
attempt to adopt such a policy, therefore, would have to be based
solely on statutory authority and would be restricted to the
scope and intent of that authority.
20 3. Zass. .Bay Transp. Auth. Advisor y .B,. v. Zass. Bay
.Tran4U._,. AgUth.. 81 Mass. Adv. Sh. 403, 417 N.E.2d 7 (1981)(striking as unconstitutional the governor's attempt to take over
the regional transportation authority by executive order). The
defendants claimed that the executive order was a proper exercise
of the powers inherent in the office of the governor. .Id,. at 13.
The court rejected this argument holding that the governor could
not be executive order suspend the operation of the statute that
vested fiscal control of the authority in its advisory board. IA.,
(citing Mass. Const. pt. I, art. 20, reserving the power to
suspend the laws to the governor).
See also, O'Neill v_T~hmson, 114 N.H. 155, 316 A.2d 168
(1974) (executive order limiting the hiring of state personnel and
the purchase of state automobiles held invalid because it contra-
vened the legislative intent implicit in legislative appropria-
tions for such expenditures).
204.22 Buettel y. Walker, 59 Ill.2d 146, 319 N.E.2d 502
(1975) (constitutional provision giving the governor the "supreme
executive power" and the responsibility to execute the laws held
not to authorize an executive order requiring the disclosure from
those doing business with the state of campaign contributions to
state officials); Rap _2, Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 565,
375 N.E.2d 745 (1978) (executive order purporting to require
financial disclosure from and regulate the political activities
of state employees held invalid as going beyond the stated legis-
lative policy of the code of ethics statute); Full ilove 3.U Carey,
62 A.D.2d 798, 406 N.Y.S.2d 888 (App. Div. 1978) (executive order
requiring contractors doing business with the state to adopt
affirmative actions programs held invalid as not encompassed by
the state's anti-discrimination statutes).
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It cannot be seriously argued that Executive Order No. 215
does not manifest a substantive policy to encourage housing
development. The determinative question that follows is whether
the order is within the legislative purposes of the relevant
statutes. This question of statutory interpretation is discussed
below in subsection 4). The more difficult ancillary question
involves who should decide whether 215 is within the relevant
statutory authority; that is, how much deference should the
executive branch be given when the legislative intent is unclear.
This question will be addressed below in subsections 5) and 6).
4)Statutory Authority
Executive Order No. 215 can lay claim to legislative autho-
rization in three general areas: the organic statutes of the
relevant state agencies, statutes pertaining to local land use
and housing policy, and the enabling legislation for the various
funding programs to which the order applies. 2 0 5 The important
question is not the validity of the executive order as such, but
whether the relevant executive agencies could pursue the policies
2 0 5Note that this analysis is not applicable to programs
directly funded by the federal government, and not appropriated
by the state legislature. Beg n. 58 supra. The question of the
legality of attaching growth policy conditions to this funding
would be a question of federal statutory interpretation. While
the withholding policy would most likely be legal under the
relevant federal statutes, the issue itself is of little
consequence considering tht the federally funded programs apply
to cities that can meet EOCD's standards as a matter of course.
,9&& discussion at p. 132 infra.
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behind the order. 2 0 6 If authority for the policy of withholding
can be located within these statutes, it follows that the gover-
nor could order the agencies to pursue such a policy.207 We will
first examine the organic legislation for EOCD and EOEA--the
agencies most affected by the order--and then proceed to the
other possible sources of authority.
(a) agency organic legislation: EOCD was officially created
by 1969 Mass. Acts ch.704, the bill that created the various
"executive offices" directly under the governor. 2 0 8 The statute
specified the departments that would be included within the new
"umbrella" agency. 2 0 9 There are no general empowering statutes
for EOCD as such. For legislative guidance we must look to the
organic statute for the Dept. of Community Affairs (DCA), the
relevant department within EOCD.210
2062gg generally ShaD _V Butera, 22 Pa. Commw. 229 (1975),
where the court classified executive orders into three categories:
1) proclamations, 2) policy directives to executive agencies (not
enforceable as a matter of law), 3) orders implementing constitu-
tional or statutory provisions.
207The governor has direct control over the various execu-
tive agencies. The statutory scheme clearly recognizes that the
governor has near unbridled authority to hire and fire secretar-
ies of these agencies: "Each of said executive offices shall be
headed by a secretary, who shall be appoine b n seve at ±a1
pleasure 2. ±ae governor." Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 6A §3 (West
1982) (emphasis added). Moreover, "[ejach secretary shall act as
the executive officer At -be governor for accomplishing the
purposes of his office." 1A, ch. 6A §4 (emphasis added).
2 0 8 Now codified at Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 6A §1 et seq.
(West 1982).
209See jn, ch. 6A §8.
2 1 0 DCA's organic legislation is codified at Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 23B §1 et seq. (West 1981).
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The statutory section that generally empowers DCA identifies
DCA as the agency to be concerned with "programs of open and
adequate housing for all citizens of the commonwealth." 21 1 DCA
is given considerable procedural leeway in how to implement its
programs.2 1 2 Still, there is no open-ended authorization to set
its own programs and policies, not even in general terms. Nor is
there any authorization of general regulatory powers. This
absence is made more conspicuous by the presence of explicit
authorization of certain other specific powers. 2 1 3
The informing concept of the DCA organic legislation is that
the agency's authority will be organized around specific programs
authorized elsewhere. One statutory subsection mandates DCA to
"discharge the duties imposed on it by or pursuant to law in the
fields of housing...." 2 1 4 Included within this subsection is an
explicit statement "that nothing in this subparagraph shall be
construed in limitation of the other powers and duties of the
department." 21 5 This caveat notwithstanding, there remains an
2llSee, ch. 23B §3.
212Se e.g., i,, ch. 23B §3(f) (authorizing interagency
coordination).
213See e.g., i j, ch. 23B §3 (granting EOCD the power to
command certain kinds of information from municipalities and from
other state agencies).
21 4.Id...G ,., ch. 23B §3(i).
215
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absence of general authorization to set new land use and housing
policy.
The organic legislation for EOEA is codified as Mass. Gen.
Law ch. 21A. 2 1 6 As was the case with DCA, EOEA is given great
flexibility in implementing its programs through creative inter-
agency arrangements. 2 1 7 Unlike DCA, however, EOEA is given a
fairly open-ended grant of policy setting power.21 8 Moreover,
EOEA is given explicit authorization to "promulgate rules and
regulations necessary to carry out their statutory responsibilities." 2 1 9
2161,,, ch. 21A (West 1981).
217See e.g., ch. 21A §2 (18).
2 1 8Note the following four subsections of Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 21A §2 (West 1981) describing EOEA's statutory mandate:
(1) dt.&1Qp2 2D11213es l .s. a-d 2i.9".Ams for
carrying out their assigned duties;
(7) develop statewide policies regarding the acquisi-
tion, protection and use of areas of critical environmen-
tal concern to the commonwealth;
(8) develop And administer programs relating to re-
creation including the acquistion of land, development of
facilities, and the provision of advisory services to
municipalities and private organizations;
(9) promote lt best usage f land, water, and air to
optimize and preserve environmental quality by encouraging
and providing for, in cooperation with other appropriate
state agencies, planned industrial, commercial, re-
creational and community development. (emphasis added).
2191SI, ch. 21A §2(28).
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(b) land _ .policv statutes: One of the stronger candi-
dates to provide statutory authority for the executive order is
the Growth Policy Development Act (GPDA). 2 2 0 The act mandated
the development of a state-wide growth policy through an induc-
tive, bottom-up process. 2 2 1 It can be argued that 215 is based
on the policy generated by this process and is itself a mechanism
forseen by the statute. Two sections of the GPDA are particular-
ly relevant. Section 7 required the Office of State Planning to
submit a report to the legislative Growth Policy Commission which
was to include among other things:
(d) strategies for coordainating [sic] the activ-
ities of state agencies involved in the allocation of
state and federal funds for economic development,
capital improvements, open space preservation and
other activities relating to land use;
(g) a recommended growth policy for the common-
wealth, which shall reflect both local and regional
preferences and capabilities, as manifested in the
Statements and Regional Reports prepared pursuant to
this act, and issues of state concern.2 2 2
Section 8 required the Commission to issue a similar report to
the full legislature and the governor which was to include among
other things the following provisions:
(a) standards and, where appropriate, new mechan-
isms, instrumentalities and processes to guide growth
2201975 Mass. Acts ch. 704.
221L22 discussion at p. 7, supra,.
2221975 Mass. Acts ch. 704 §7.
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and development into those areas where they will be
most desirable to facilitate community revitalization,
to generate new economic vitality, to minimize adverse
environmental effects and to conserve open space and
natural resources;
(d) strategies for coordinating the activities of
state agencies involved in the allocation of state and
federal funds for economic development, capital
improvements, open space c ervation and other activ-
ities related to land use.
There are problems, however, with translating these statutory
roots into legislative authority for the order. The GPDA clearly
looked to other legislation to implement the policy that would be
derived; it did not itself authorize implementation. Moreover,
while the "consensus" policy was generated out of a legislatively
mandated process, it was not itself a statement of legislative
policy. The need for further legislation can be viewed as a
required stage of legislative ratification of any policy derived.
It could be argued that the failure of the passage of implementa-
tion legislation following the GPDA process can be seen as a
manifestation of legislative intent not to enact mechanisms such
as 215 or even as a repudiation of the policies generated out of
the process. This somewhat extreme interpretation is of course not
conclusive, as legislative inaction can never be conclusive. 2 2 4
2231&., ch. 704 §8.
224.eg Director .gq Civil Defense y, Civil Service .gum.g'n,
373 Mass. 401, 367 N.E.2d 1168 (1977) (executive order which
declared that employees of the state civil defense agency had
civil service status upheld on multiple grounds). Civil service
status was necessary to receive federal funding but was not
directly authorized by state statute. Various governors had
issued a series of temporary executive orders placing the workers
in the civil service but also asked the legislature for statutory
authorization that was never granted. Exec. Order Nos. 36
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The GPDA--as well as the program enabling statutes discussed
below--should be examined in light of the general scheme of
statutes relevant to land use policy. Though constrained by the
procedures and standards of the zoning and subdivision control
enabling acts, 2 2 5 land use policy is generally committed to local
governments. 2 2 6 The one major exception--1969 Mass. Acts ch.
774--tends to prove the rule. 2 2 7 The statute provides for the
overriding of local policy for certain specified types of low and
(1960), 38 (1961), 39 (1961), 41 (1961), 42 (1961), 42A (1963,
civil service status made permanent). The court found that
"there is good reason to hold that the Governor's had, and
properly exercised, delegated authority" in issuing the orders,
but specifically did not rest the decision on these sole grounds.
367 N.E.2d at 1172. The court went on the state that, "In the
present case, the failure of the legislature to respond to the
Governor's requests with a definite enactment cannot be taken as
a disapproval or a questioning of the executive orders; it is
just as combatible, and possibly more so, with approval of, or
contentment with the Orders." lA, Moreover, various actions of
the legislature could "well be taken as practical confirmation or
ratification of the executive orders even if the latter were in
themselves inadequate." Ld., at 1173. On the subject of possible
legislative ratification, see n. 262, infra.
On the difficulty of interpreting legislative inaction, see
generally, Diaz V. Eli Lilly _& Co., 364 Mass. 153, 166 n. 44, 302
N.E.2d 555, 563-4, n. 44 (1973) (citing Hart, H.M., "The Fallacy
of Legislating by Not Legislating," Legal Institutions Today and
Tomorrow, 45-48 (Paulsen, ed., 1959).
2 2 5 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40A §1 et seq. (West 1979), ch.
41 $§81K-81GG (West 1979), respectively.
226There are of course statutes that limit local discretion
within particular subject areas; 3g& n. 2, supra.
2 2 7 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40B §20-23 (West 1979). 3S.es
discussion supra p. 4.
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moderate housing development. 2 2 8 However, communities are in
effect exempted from this override if they are able to meet
certain conditions. 2 2 9 It could be argued that this statutory
regime evinces a legislative intent that municipalities be free
to set their own land use policy unless specifically limited by
statute.230
(c) progra enabling statutes: The specific program enab-
ling statutes are important in two ways. First they may provide
alternative sources of legislative authority for the executive
order. Second, they may limit or qualify the authority granted
elsewhere. We will examine the authorization statutes for two of
the more important programs to which 215 is applied: the so-
called "Self-Help" program for open space land acquisition 231
228
229E.g. if over 10% of units in the community are already
within the low or moderate income housing category. Zgg ch. 40B
20.
230This result parallels the mandate of the Home Rule Amend-
ment, Mass. Const. Art. of Amend., art. 89, amending Art. of
Amend., art. 2. Se discussion infra p. 71.
One could, of course, make the opposite argument: that the
aim behind 1969 Mass. Acts ch. 774 to override local policy in
order to induce more low and moderate income housing reveals a
similar statutory intent in other legislation. As a matter of
pure legislative intent, this argument seems more tenuous. Where
the boundaries of local autonomy have been so carefully delimited
in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, 40B, one would expect similar speci-
ficity elsewhere.
2 3 1 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 132A §11 (West Supp. 1981).
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(the subject of the original memorandum of understanding) and the
so-called "Water Systems" program for leak detection and water
systems rehabilitation. 2 3 2
The "Self-Help" program provides matching grants to munici-
palities for open space acquisition. The enabling legislation
for the program reads in pertinent part as follows:
The secretary of environmental affairs shall
establish a program to assist the cities and towns...in
acquiring lands.... He mAy, from funds appropriated to
carry out the provisions of section three [for state
acquistion of lands], reimburse any city or town for
any money expended by it in establishing an approved
project under said program in suc amount as hL shall
determine to h2 equitable in consideration DI antici-
pated benefits from suc roiects.... No reimbursement
shall be made hereunder to a city or town unless a
project application is filed...with the secretary
setting form suc plans And information as
secretary m~ay require An-d approved by him ..... 633
This statute appears to grant EOEA broad though not limitless
discretion in setting the standards of eligibility for Self-Help
funding. EOEA has codified its standards into a set of adminis-
trative guidelines; formal regulations were never promulgated.
The Self-Help program is administered by EOEA's Division of
Conservation Service with advisory direction provided by an inter
agency "Self-Help Advisory Committee." To be eligible at all, a
community must fulfill certain mandatory planning requirements as
2 3 3 Mass Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 132A §11 (West Supp. 1981).
23 4EOEA, Self-Help Project Selectionystem, Pub. #11334-4-
500-5-79-CR (1979).
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well as provide assurances tht it will uphold its share of the
funding. 2 3 5 The communities are then ranked through a point
system based on certain specified "demographic factors" and
"project quality characteristics." 2 3 6 These rankings are common-
ly known as a "priority list." Grants are preliminarily approved
based on the list, but ad hoc adjustments are made to ensure a
broad geographical distribution. 2 3 7 The municipality must then
pass DCA's 215 standards as well as those set by the Mass.
Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) concerning local affirm-
ative action plans. 2 3 8
The Water Systems program is based on a less broad grant of
authority. 2 3 9 The intent of the enabling legislation is clearly
2 3 5 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 132A §11; EOEA, Planning
Requirements far Municipal Participation in ±ag Federal Lan and
Water Conservation Fund An-d tje Massachusetts Self-Help Programs,
Pub. #12852-11-200-6-82-CR (1982).
2 3 6 EOEA, supra n. 234; Zgg also, EOEA, Self-Help Land Ac-
quisition Program Procedures, Pub. # 12036-5-500-8-80-CR (1980).
237 Interview with Joel Lerner, Director of the Division of
Conservation Services, Feb. 3, 1983.
2 3 8Executive Order No. 74 (1970), as amended by Executive
Order No. 116 (1975). This paper takes no position on the
legality of MCAD's withholding policies. It should be noted in
passing, however, that MCAD is given broad powers to fight dis-
crimination in the state's anti-discrimination statute. Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B (West 1982). Further, the Mass. Supreme
Judicial Court has held that this enabling act "states legisla-
tive policy that the act be 'construed liberally for the
accomplishment of...its purposes.'" Mass. _Co m'n Against
Discrimination v. Liberty Mutual Insurance, 371 Mass. 186, 356
N.E.2d 236, 239 (1976) (finding an implied power to order
subpoena decus tecum for MCAD investigations within the statute).
2391979 Mass. Acts ch. 805, as amended by 1980 Mass. Acts
ch. 81, 1982 Mass. Acts ch. 286.
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delineated in §1 of the act:
For _t1 Durpose developing gong programs Q
investigating And identifying sources Q loss 9 potable
water And .fr rehabilitating water suplv distribution
systems...there is made available the sum of ten million
dollars which shall b& expende by the cities, towns and
water districts of the commonwealth under the direction
and subject to the approval of the department of
environmental qmaitsen gnring [(DEQE] a department
within EOEA. Empnas a aea 240
The act requires DEQE to "establish standards and guidelines for
the administration and disbursement of said funds." 2 4 1 It then
specifies five criteria that must be used in establishing
eligibility for the ch. 805 grants e.g., "the amount of unac-
counted for water usage in a community." 2 4 2 The eligibility
criteria are explicitly not limited to these five. 2 4 3 Pursuant
to the statutory mandate, regulations were promulgated specifying
the criteria under which grant applications would be prior-
itized.2 44 DEQE added to those criteria specified in the
statute, but all of the criteria are directly relevant to local
water supply systems and water policy. 2 4 5 There is no mention of
land use or housing policy.
Two representative program enabling acts have now been
240d, (emphasis added).
241J,, ch. 805 §2, as amended.
242
243
2 4 4 Mass. Admin. Code tit. 301, §26.08 (1980), 298 Mass.
Admin. Reg. 43.
245
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described. Before we continue our statutory analysis, we must
consider the constitutional balance of power between localities
and the state in which the executive order controversy is
embedded.
5) Home Rul Considerations
With the passage of the Home Rule Amendment (HRA) in 1966,
Massachusetts moved to a regime of local home rule. 2 4 6 The state
retains the power to override local government policy, but this
power must be exercised through a statute that comports with the
conditions specified in the HRA. 2 4 7 This requirement as to the
form of the state intervention applies not only to direct pre-
emption of local authority by regulatory statutes, but also to
the coercive attachment of conditions to state funding under the
"spending power." 2 4 8 Executive Order No. 215 entails the adminis-
trative attachment of conditions to state grants with the express
purpose of influencing local policy. If these conditions have
been authorized by statute--that is, attaching the conditions
2 4 6 Mass. Const. Art. of Amend., art 89, amending Art. of
Amend., art. 2.
247E.g., a general law must apply to a class of no fewer
than two cities or towns. jd.. art. 2, §8. For an example of a
judicially recognized use of the override power, .ge Bd.. Qf
ADpeals _Qf Hanover yL Housing ADpeals .CQmILa., 363 Mass. 339, 294
N.E.2d 393 (1974) (upholding the constitutionality of 1969 Mass.
Acts ch. 774).
248Mayor t Boston _. Treasurer i Receiver General, 8 Mass.
Adv. Sh. 2351, 429 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1981) (invalidating local aid
disbursements because the legislature attempted to attach a con-
dition as to the hiring of police and firemen that applied only
to the City of Boston.)
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is within the discretion delegated to the agency--there would be
no violation of the HRA. 2 4 9 Thus, in one sense, the HRA creates
no additional doctrinal impediments to 215's legality; the deter-
minative question remains one of statutory authorization.
However, it could be argued that the HRA is still be important as
it relates to the issue of statutory interpretation and the
question of whether such authority exists in the first place.
The Home Rule Amendment in effect created a sphere of local
autonomy free from state intrusion unless the legislature passed
a statute curbing local authority. Courts have been careful to
preserve this balance of power by refusing to find state pre-
emption except where there has been a clear statement of an
intention to preempt or the object of the state statute could not
be achieved in the face of the local action. 2 5 0
Analogous reasoning could be applied to judicial review of
statutory authorization for state funding used to influence local
policy. It is helpful to consider a spectrum of state funding
24 9Note that the enabling acts themselves comport with the
HRA.
250Bloom 
_, City Qf Worchester, 363 Mass. 136, 293 N.E.2d
268 (1973) (ordinance establishing a local human rights commission
upheld in the face of the state's anti-discrimination statutes);
see also, Lovequist v. Conservation LCom!n, 379 Mass. 7, 393
N.E.2d 858 (1979)(local wetlands protection by-law upheld in the
face of the state wetlands protection statute and the state
zoning enabling statute); Grace v..W.f Town _Qf Brookline, 379 Mass.
43, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979)(local anti-condominium conversion by-
law held not in conflict with three different state statutes).
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programs that differ in the amount of statutory specification of
the criteria of eligibility for the funding. At one end are the
pure statutory entitlements where the statute specifies the
conditions under which the funding must be granted or specifies
the only conditions under which it can be denied.251 Administra-
tive agencies could not attach other conditions to this funding
without violating the HRA. 2 5 2
Moving along the spectrum toward less specification and more
administrative discretion, we come to funding programs which have
criteria of eligibility specified or clearly implied by the
251This definition of entitlement is taken from Note, Statu-
tory Entitlement An-d .ag Concept Qf Proverty, 86 Yale L.J. 695,
696 (1977).
2 5 2 Cf. Mayor Qf Boston. supra n. 248 (state aid to locali-
ties). See also, Op. Att'y Gen. (Nov. 20, 1973) (concluding that
Executive Order No. 74 (1970), n. 238 supra, would be invalid as
applied against local school districts). Specifically, the advi-
sory opinion dealt with the question of
whether the Dept. of Education may legally require, as a
condition of school construction grants, that local
school authorities include in all school construction
contracts a provision requiring affirmative action in
regard to the employment of minorities.
The Attorney General stated that through the action of HRA, the
construction of schoolhouses appeared to be commited to "the
control of the cities and towns, subject only to the standards
and requirements of the General Court." While the legislature
had passed a statute outlawing discrimination by local govern-
ments,
[t~he Executive Order appeared without any accom-
panying legislation binding municipalities and
agencies thereof, and, at the present time, the leg-
islature has not imposed any such affirmative action
plans on local authorities.
Jd. After deciding that none of the arguably relevant statutes
helped save the executive action, the Attorney General ruled that
the Executive Order could not be applied against local school
districts. This opinion is somewhat confusing in that the Attorney
General avoided the question of whether the executive order as a
whole was authorized in the first place.
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statute, but have the exact standards of eligibility left to
agency discretion. 2 5 3 Because of this agency discretion recip-
ients could not be said to possess a pure statutory entitlement.
Still, it is clear that agencies would not be authorized to
withhold funds by attaching conditions outside of the statutory
criteria of eligibility. Put another way, the legislature
intended all who met the statutory criteria to be eligible, no
matter the exact standard used to measure these criteria.
It is seldom so easy to decide which criteria are and are
not authorized by statute. Courts therefore must locate the
boundaries of agency discretion by implication. Normally,
the agency action should be accorded a strong presumption of
2 5 3 That is, the agency is given discretion within the indiv-
idual criteria of eligibility. See, e.g., Opinion o-f j-he
Justices t;Q .the House tQ Representatives, 368 Mass. 831, 333
N.E.2d 388 (1975) (ruling that an amendment to the state general
relief program was valid on its face despite an absence of a
specific standard of eligibility to the program). Important to
the court's decision was the fact that:
[allthough the relevant statutory section includes no
description of those who are eligible, there can be no
doubt that the only test for those not declared to be
ineligible is financial need.
33 N.E.2d at 393.
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validity, 2 5 4 even with the risk that some deemed eligible by the
legislature would not receive funding. But different rules could
apply in the home rule context. It could be argued that agencies
should not be allowed to use discretionary funds to induce local
action unless the action sought is a criterion of eligibility
that can be clearly inferred from the program enabling
statute. 2 5 5 The more difficult the inference, the more it should
be avoided.
As we move further down our spectrum, the discretion granted
to agencies becomes so broad that it is clear that the legisla-
ture intended the agency to have the authority to determine which
conditions of eligibility it will impose. 2 5 6 The existence of
such discretion could be seen as running afoul of the Home Rule
Amendment, which created a sphere of local autonomy free from
state intrusion save by clear statutory preemption or conflict.
2542-g-j e.g., White Dove, Inc. _v... Director -o- _the Division dQ
Marine Fisheries, 80 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1043, 403 N.E.2d 1169, 1173
(1980) (regulation governing tuna fishing upheld). The court held
that "there is a presumption that the regulation does not exceed
the statute which is as strong as the presumption that a statute
squares with the Constitution." Id. (citation omitted). The
court also stated that "respect is owing to the agency's own view
that its regulation is within the statute." Id. This respect is
diminished somewhat in the present case because the main funding
agency (EOEA) did not treat the growth policy criterion as within
the enabling statute. Growth policy review was added as an extra
layer after eligibility was initially determined.
2 5 5This argument risks "proving too much." It could perhaps
be limited to situations where state agencies attempted direct
and specific changes in the policies of individual communities.
25 6The breadth of the delegation may raise independent
problems as well; a& discussion at p. 78 infra.
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Following this reasoning, agency discretion as to the use of
discretionary funding to induce local policy changes should be
limited by a rule of clear statement. 2 5 7
With this perspective, we can re-examine the representative
program enabling statutes. The Water Systems act is about midway
down the discretion spectrum. 2 5 8 While the criteria specified in
the statute are not meant to be exclusive of others, they do
serve to illustrate the type and range of criteria that the
legislature had in mind. Discovering growth policy considera-
tions as an implied criterion of eligibility requires a substan-
tial degree of inference. Even without any home rule concerns,
attaching growth policy conditions to the distribution of water
systems repair funding might be seen as withholding funds from
municipalities that the legislature deemed eligible for
funding. 2 5 9 Factoring in our home rule concerns, the argument
for the invalidity of attaching such conditions is strengthened.
The Self-Help program is further down the spectrum towards
the pole of total discretion. 2 6 0 The enabling act authorizes
257Such a rule need not invalidate the entire funding
program, only the imposition of conditions designed to induce
local policy changes when those conditions cannot be clearly
inferred from the statute.
2581979 Mass. Acts ch. 805 (as amended).
25 9This is true even though the expectations of these muni-
cipalities might not rise to the level of a statutory entitle-
ment.
2 6 0 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 132A §11 (West Supp. 1981).
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EOEA to spend the funding but does not require it to do so.
Further, the statute contains no specification of the criteria of
eligibility to be used. 2 6 1 Therefore, a stronger argument can be
made that the statute authorizes the imposition of growth policy
conditions. Note, for example, that the statute's authorization
to evaluate the benefits of a proposed open space project calls
into question the need for additional open space within the
municipality and hence, indirectly, its growth policy. Still, to
argue that a community's lack of affordable housing necessarily
implicates the merits of individual project applictions requires
a not in-substantial degree of inference. The determinative
question is whether the degree of relevance between an evaluation
of individual projects and a need to examine a municipality's
growth policy is strong enough to attribute the growth policy
criterion to the legislature, in the face of a home rule frame-
work that appears to require clear statements of legislative
authorization for administrative interference with local policy. 2 6 2
26 1The statute leaves it up to the Secretary of EOEA to
reimburse municipalities "in such amount as he shall determine to
be equitable in consideration of anticipated benefits from such
project...." .Id..
26 2Note that the link between open space projects and the
present standard of no subsidized family housing is considerably
weaker.
It could be argued that even if the withholding policy was
itself unauthorized, that it was ratified by legislative action,
to wit, reappropriation of the discretionary funding programs in
the face of the Memorandum of Understanding or the Executive
Order. Z=~ Director ot Civil Defense _. Civil Service .Comm'~n,
373 Mass. 401, 367 N.E.2d 1168, 1173 (1977) (alternate holding),
n. 223 supra. The relevant legislative action in Director 
Civil Defense was the legislature's "repeatedly making appropria-
tions that attracted Federal contributions dependent upon a merit
system being in effect" (the subject matter of the executive
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In order to find authority for growth policy considerations
as a condition of eligibility within the funding program enabling
statutes, we may be forced to rely on a delegation of discretion
that is unconstitutionally broad. If this is true, the statutes
should be interpreted so as not to authorize the withholding
policy so as to uphold their validity. 2 6 3
Massachusetts case law supports a broad delegation of legis-
executive order), as well as the passage of a statute that changed
certain temporary civil service positions to permanent ones
expressly to retain federal funding. Ld._. These actions have an
affirmative quality about them from which an approval of the
executive policy can be inferred. Such an affirmative quality
would not seem to be present when a legislature simply
reauthorizes a program to which the executive branch has attached
certain conditions.
2 6 3 CL, O'Shea y. City D Holyoke, 345 Mass. 175, 186 N.E.2d
608 (1962)(interpretations of statutes that render them
meaningless are to be avoided).
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6) Delegation Doctrine
lative authority in the appropriation-expenditure context. 2 6 4
The Mass. Supreme Judicial Court has taken note of the fact that
no matter how narrowly an appropriation bill is drawn, some
discretion is always left in the actual expenditure of the
appropriated funds. 2 6 5  Moreover, the court has stated:
..a.it is also clear that the General Court in the
exercise of its legislative power of appropriation has
a broad scope for determining whether it will describe
in detail the particular purposes for which money ap-
propriated shall be expended or, on the other hand,
will permit executive or administrative offers or
boards to exercise judgment and discretion within a
wide field in the expenditure of money appropriated for
a given object to I ccomplish the general purposes of
the appropriation.
The delegation doctrine is so seldom used to invalidate
264.n R Opinion .Q . e Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19N.E.2d
807 (1939)(reviewing the constitutionality of a proposed bill
that would have allowed for certain emergency expenditures while
the legislature was out of session). Money was to be appro-
priated into a general fund from where it could be transferred to
"items of appropriation for the purpose of providing for unfore-
seen conditions of an emergency nature...on the order of the
Governor, after written consent by a special recess commission."
I.j. at 810. While the court ruled the bill defective because of
the manner in which the recess commission was appointed, it
approved of the delegation of authority to the governor.
2651.. at 815.
266I; see also, opinion Q ±he Justices tQ 1The House 9
Representatives, 368 Mass. 831, 333 N.E. 2d 388 (1975)(ruling
valid an amendment to the state's general relief program despite
the absence of a specific standard as to who would be eligible to
the program).
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statutes that one might well question its practical validity. 2 6 7
Three observations are worth noting, however. First, finding
authority for growth policy as a criterion for eligibility argu-
ably involves a broader delegation of authority than that in the
leading cases where delegation has been upheld. 2 6 8 Second,
legislation such as the Self-Help enabling act is so vague that
arguably one cannot even infer a clear delegation of the author-
ity to set criteria of eligibility. That is, the boundaries of
the intended delegation are difficult to locate. It can be
argued that upholding broad agency discretion in such a case
would fundamentally shift the locus of state power from the
legislative to the executive branch. In effect, the executive
branch would be authorized to do anything not prohibited by the
267The only case in recent decades is Corning Glass Works v
Ann Hope, Inc., 363 Mass. 409, 420-423, 294 N.E.2d 354 (1973)
(holding invalide the "non-signor" provision of the state "fair
trade" statute as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority). This provision in effect allowed manufacturers to
set the price at which retailers could sell their goods. Though
the private nature of the delegation may have been central to the
court's concern, the case itself did not turn on this point.
26 8Note that Opinion af Jb Justices ±,o- lhg House 1a Repre-
sentatives, n. 266 supra, involved the delegation of setting the
exact standard to be used to determine eligibility and not the
criteria of eligibility themselves. Zee n. 253 supra. The
discretion that would be required to ground the authority for
executive order 215 in the Self-Help statute entails an inquiry
of a much broader scope. The comparable situation to that of the
welfare statute would be it if were clear from the Self-Help
statute that "nonrestrictiveness of growth was a condition of
eligibility. The only job left for the agency would be to fill
in the standard of what constituted "nonrestrictiveness."
Instead, the question posed by 215 is whether "nonrestrictive-
ness of growth" itself can be said to be a criterion of
eligibility.
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legislature, a sort of "agency home rule" that would seem to
violate the spirit if not the letter of the Separation of Powers
clause.
Last, while there is a general trend towards upholding broad
delegations of legislative authority, this trend is based on the
presence and feasibility of alternative means of checking agency
discretion. 2 6 9 Few of these means have been incorporated into the
215 process. The standards that EOCD uses in evaluating local
policy were never promulgated as regulations, a status that would
subject them to judicial review as well as certain procedural
requirements. 2 7 0 Further, individual determinations of in-
eligibility are not subject to judicial review.2 7 1 There
2 6 9Z41s e.g., Town A Arlington _a 3-d Q Conciliation & Arbit-
ration, 330 Mass. 769, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976), where in upholding a
compulsory arbitration statute in the face of a charge of an
unlawful delegation of legislative authority, the court emphasized
the presence of the following protections against arbitrariness:
ten specific standards listed in the statute, regulations promul-
gated by the agency to guide the arbitration proceedings, the fact
that arbitration would follow negotiation, mediation, and fact-
finding, and judicial review open to either party.
Siee also, Opinion Qfte Justices _to jlie House A Re resent-
atives, supra n. 266, where the court emphasized the general
standard articulated in the statute and the existence of judicial
review. .ee generally, 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§
3:14-:15 (2d ed. 1978).
270See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. cn. 30A §14 (West 1981). If 215
is based on valid authority, it is as a criterion of eligibility
under the various program enabling statutes. Some of these
statutes require the promulgation of the criteria of eligibility
as regulations (independent of any delegation doctrin concerns).
See discussion at p. 70.
271 a n. 175 supra. The delegation doctrine issue does not
appear to have been raised in School Committee ot Hatfield.
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are few independent checks on EOCD using arbitrary criteria or
using criteria arbitrarily. 2 7 2
B. Legal Constraints on thg Bargaining Process
Beyond the question of whether 215 is illegal on its face,
there are independent legal constraints on how the executive
order is implemented. Section A examined whether the funding
agencies could withhold the funds because of a locality's land
use and housing policies. But the withholding step is only half
the story. The animating mechanism of 215 is the bargaining
process that is triggered once the funds are withheld and the
agreement that ends the process. Two important questions follow:
- what are the legal constraints on the various actors in
the bargaining process?
- to what extent does the agreement constitute an
enforceable contract?
1) Town Government 1and Avenues 21 Reform
Because cities as a matter of course are able to meet the
requirement entailed by 215,273 only towns have been targeted by
2 7 2 Under the old building permit index used under the Memo-
randum of Understanding, EOCD gave communities an opportunity to
show special circumstances to explain why they did not meet the
regional standard. This separate review stage is no longer
given, but under the current standard it would serve little
purpose.
273Lg& further discussion at p.132 supra.
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EOCD. This subsection will trace the ramifications that flow
from the structure of town government.
a) Influencing lag town in it& enterprise capacity:
Executive Order No. 215 has the potential to produce change in
two major ways. First, the order attempts to change a town's
activities in its enterprise capacity, e.g., inducing local
housing authorities to apply for subsidized housing funds. There
appears to be no independent legal obstacle to this avenue of
change. The goal of housing authority legislation is to build
needed housing. 2 7 4 A simple agreement to apply for subsidized
housing funds would not amount to an improper invasion of the
discretion committed to local housing authorities. 2 7 5 Nor should
it lead to bad results; presumably, if there were not sufficient
need for the proposed housing, the housing funds would be denied.
b) Legal change (administrative proceedings): The second
major avenue of change attempts to remove legal impediments of
housing growth. If housing could be built as a matter of right,
there would be little need for state intervention. Legal change
can be further subdivided into two subcategories. The first
includes administrative approval of housing development,
27432 generally, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 121B §3 et seq. (West
1981).
2 7 5Nor would this in theory be inefficient as housing funds
would presumably be denied where there was insufficient need for
the housing.
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including such approvals as variances, 2 7 6 special permits, 2 7 7
comprehensive permits, 2 7 8 and wetland permits, 2 7 9 and involving
such agencies as zoning board of appeals 280 and conservation
commissions. 281
EOCD is limited in its ability to intervene in such proceed-
ings. An agreement by a local administrative agency to effect a
particular outcome in a quasi-judicial proceeding would clearly
violate that agency's statutory mandate and would entail an
authorized suspension of local by-laws or. 2 8 2 EOCD could still
attempt to influence local administrative action in less formal
ways such as letting local agencies know the consequences of
their actions. 2 8 3
c) Legal Changes (legislative action): The second sub-
category within the legal avenue of change is that of legislative
amendment--such as upzoning and allowing accessory apartments--
2 7 6 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40A 40 (West 1979).
2771d, ch. 40A §§2,9 (West 1979).
278 ch. 40B H§20-23 (West 1979).
279d,., ch. 131 §40 (West 1980).
280,d., ch. 40A H12 (established). 14 (empowered), 15
(procedures regulated) (West 1979).
281,, ch. 40 §8C (West 1981).
2 8 2 Presumably, affected landowners could raise constitu
tional objections as well.
2 83Local standards are soft enough to allow local officials
a range of "lawful" actions and outcomes. .g& e.g., the Medway
case study at p. 46 supra.
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and involves the town meeting, the board of selectmen, and the
planning board. 2 8 4 Changing local zoning by-laws requires a two-
thirds vote at town meeting. 2 8 5 The board of selectmen and the
planning board can influence policy development and help set the
agenda for town meetings, but they have little substantive
authority to effect change on their own or to bind the town.2 86
Ultimately, their role is advisory.
So far, EOCD has not attempted to exact commitments directly
from town meetings. Presumably, the agency believes town meet-
ings to be too unwieldy forces with which to bargain. Dealing
directly with town meetings is not inconceivable; for example, a
town could be given certain policy choices in ultimatum form, or
alternatively could simply be denied funding until certain
actions were met. The advisability of such an option will be
discussed later in the paper. 2 87 The question for us now is
whether such action would be legal.
One potential impediment to such action is the Home Rule
284Lg& generally, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 39 9 et seq.
(West 1981)(town meetings), ch. 40A §5 (West 1979)(adoption and
change of zoning by-laws and ordinances), ch. 41 §20 et seq.
(West 1979) (selectmen), ch. 41 §81A et seq. (West 1979) (planning
boards).
2851.., ch. 40A §7 (West 1979).
286_e~, n. 285, supra.
287L_e p. 166 infra.
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Amendment. 2 8 8 Our concerns for the preservation of local autonomy
against administrative intrusions increases as the agencies move
beyond simply withholding the funding to direct attempts to
influence the policies of singled-out communities. On closer
examination, however, these home rule problems dissolve. In
fact, the bargaining component of the 215 process is designed to
serve the local autonomy objectives behind the Home Rule Amend-
ment. 2 8 9 EOCD attempts to allow communities to formulate their
own "solutions" to meeting the nonrestrictive standard. If we
are troubled by the ad hoc quality of EOCD's "signing off"
decisions, our concerns stem from the lack of substance in EOCD's
standard of restrictiveness and not from any home rule
problems.290
Instead of dealing directly with town meetings, EOCD has
sought agreements from town officials to commit themselves to
2 8 8 Mass. Const. Art. of Amend., art. 89, amending Art. of
Amend., art. 2.
2899g& discussion at p.104, infra.
2 90 EOCD could not use a stronger standard in the bargaining
phase than the standard authorized by the statute to withhold the
funds in the first place. Moreover, if EOCD chooses to use a
weak or limited standard in the initial withholding decision, it
might be restricted to no stronger a standard in the bargaining
phase. Otherwise, communities that did not meet the initial
triggering standard would be held to a higher standard overall
than that applied to all towns. Perhaps this is one reason why
EOCD asks for little general housing policy reform in the
bargaining stage in the face of an initial withholding standard
that only looks to the presence of subsidized family housing in
the municipality.
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certain specified or vaguely defined policies. These agreements
appear to be legal, though an argument can be made that they
interfere with the independent discretion committed to town
boards by statute. Qualifiers that have been included within the
agreements such as "where appropriate" should solve any remaining
problems by reducing the officials' commitments to what they
should be doing anyway. 2 9 1 The more interesting question is to
what extent, if any, such agreements constitute binding legal
contracts.
2) Ihg Legal Status -Qt Jh Agreements
The agreements that have been signed have reached or at
least approached the form of enforceable, bilateral contracts.2 92
So far, none of the parties has treated them as such. EOCD
appears to desire the written agreements only to memorialize the
town's commitments in order to aid the reevalutation of the
town's efforts in the future. Nor does it appear that either
party as the legal authority to enter into such contracts. 2 9 3
With proper statutory authorization, a regime could be
created in which state agencies and twon officials could enter
2913g. e.g.,Reading case study at p. 32 supra. Note that
agreements by one town agency to be bound by the policies of
another may create their own statutory problems.
292.E= e.g., the Groveland case study in which the town
officials agreed to take certain actions and in return EOCD
agreed to remove its restrictions on the funding that had been
withheld, p. 43 supra.
2933ee e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40 §4 (West Supp.
1981) (specifically delimiting a town's powers to contract).
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into such binding contracts. 2 9 4 Upon failure of the town to
perform, the state would have a contractual cause of action, with
damages perhaps to be measured by the amount of the original
grant. If, on the other hand, the state rescinded funding claim-
ing non-performance, the town could sue on the contract. 2 9 5
C) Conclusio
Those seeking to challenge the legality of Executive Order
215 will face a substantial--though not necessarily fatal--
obstacle in obtaining judicial review. Even once this obstacle
is overcome, the withholding policies of 215 can claim authority
from a variety of potential sources. Arguably, the executive
branch as no independent, constitutional authority to promulgate
substantive social policy. Still, there are several, promising
sources of legislative authority, the strongest of which is that
of the funding program enabling statutes, which give the agencies
broad authority in the disbursement of the discretionary funding.
Under normal rules of agency law, courts can be expected to defer
to the agencies and find legislative support for their policies.
But when an agency adds to an existing funding program a layer of
review specifically designed to alter local policy within a
294Conflicts with the Home Rule Amendment could probably be
solved by specifying the relevant standards in the statute. The
necessity or desirability of such an option is, of course, a
different question. Note that noncompliance would be extremely
hard to show, se discussion at p. 111 infra.
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regime of home rule, courts could be stricter in their interpret-
ation of statutory authority. Last, while the delegative doc-
trine is moribund, it is not yet dead and could provide another
argument against the legality of the order. Opponents of 215
would face a difficult though perhaps not impossible task in
challenging the legality of the executive order. 2 9 6
Notwithstanding the ostensible legality of 215, the struc-
ture of town government presents EOCD with legal as well as
practical obstacles to the implementation of the executive order.
To date, EOCD has been able to sidestep these problems by seeking
only the weakest forms of commitments from the towns: nonenforc-
eable agreements by town officials to support the adoption of
certain policies "where appropriate" and agreements to apply for
state housing funds for "on the order of four to five" units of
family housing "when funding becomes available". Enforcement
depends entirely on the threat of withholding future funding. 2 9 7
Pursuing more direct routes would appear to require statutory action.
2 9 5 0ne wonders, for example, whether Lincoln officials could
have prevailed arguing that they had substantially performed
their end of the bargain. Egg Lincoln case study at p. 26
supra.
296Aside from the relative weakness of its case and the
associated costs of suit, there are undoubtably other reasons for
towns not suing. The communities do not want to pique state ad-
ministrators who could hide their displeasure in low rankings on
other criteria. Moreover, the state has asked for little sub-
stantive action in return for its "signing off."
2973em discussion at p. 154 infra.
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CHAPTER ll
Tla Goals Q .le Process And Strategies Q Intervention
This section will examine the main goals that 215 attempts
to serve and how the process is structured to achieve these
goals. The goals behind 215 are relatively simple. What are
complex are the mechanisms designed to effect these goals and the
assumptions on which these mechanisms are based.
A. Tae Goals Behind 2,U
l) Housing Growth
The leading goal behind the executive order is the produc-
tion of new and especially less expensive housing. 2 9 8 This goal
is really a composite of two related subgoals: an increase in the
amount of housing built and a reduction in the price of housing.
The first subgoal will be examined in this subsection, the second
in the one that follows.
The mechanism by which an increase in housing supply is
supposed to occur is not spelled out, but can be reasonably
inferred. As to public housing, the withholding of the state
2 9 8The opening paragraph of the preamble to the order
stresses the need to increase the supply of affordable housing
within Massachusetts. 304 Mass. Admin. Reg. 28
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discretionary funds is intended to induce communities to apply
for and/or accept housing it would not have otherwise. But
assuming that subsidized housing funds themselves are limited,
215 can do little to increase the overall supply of public
housing. The real effect of 215--if any--is to alter where
subsidized housing is built. 2 9 9
The situation with private market housing is much more
complex. Optimally, 215 is seeking to induce changes in local
policy--e.g., upzoning, allowing accessory apartments, etc.--that
would allow for more housing to be built. But two questions
immediately follow. To what extent are communities willing to
allow an increase in the supply of housing and to what extent is
housing supply constrained by regulation in the first place?
(a) Housing su~plv and .th local olity: When confronting
the issue of housing exclusion, it is tempting to fall back on
evil motives and irrational behavior to explain the phenomena.
While such motives may play some role, local attitudes and
actions can be explained fundamentally as the product of rational--
if not necessarily altruistic--behavior. Homeowners compose the
great majority of a suburban town's polity and therefore control
local policy. 3 0 0 These same homeowners face a direct and
299222 discussion at p. 101 infr
300Seventy percent of suburban households live in homes they
own. Ellickson, R.C., Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 86 Yale L.J. 385,406 (1977). As Ellickson points
out, if the model of control by the majority is true anywhere, it
is in smaller municipalities. l&ck, at 405.
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powerful incentive to maintain and to increase the value of their
homes, normally their most significant capital investment.
Keeping a lid on the supply of housing serves this goal by
raising the price of all housing. 3 0 1 Restricting new development
is also, of course, important for other reasons, e.g., to
preserve the qualities of the town that drew the homeowners there
in the first place. The preservation of these amenities, in
turn, maintains the value of their homes; the economic and
301Restricting the supply of new housing not only bids up
the price of new housing but the price of housing already built
as well. As Ellickson observes, if suburbs are equally desirable
to consumers, isolated restrictive policies by some communities
will do little to raise the price and hence value of homes. 86
Yale L.J. at 400. Home buyers will simply purchase housing built
elsewhere. This assumption tends to ignore the cumulative effect
of many communities acting almost as if in consort. Further, as
Ellickson himself acknowledged, suburbs are not indeed fungible
goods. In fact, restrictive policies themselves increase a
community's desirability by retaining amenity value for those
lucky enough to live there.
The simple economic analysis done in this paper is not meant
to deny the difficult complexities of real housing markets. The
simplicity is maintained not only for the sake of brevity and
clarity but under the belief that a return to first principles is
sometimes necessary to escape confusion "among the trees." For a
classic examination of some of the complexities of housing
markets, (93 W. Grigsby, Housing Markets and Publi Policy
(1963).
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noneconomic factors reinforce each other. 3 0 2
On top of the private disincentives, there is the public
disincentive of the fiscal impact of the new development. Other
things being equal, residents are likely to oppose development
that has associated service costs outweighing associated tax
30 2The aim of preserving property values has been recognized
as a legitimate exercise of the police power. 3&& e.g., Blades
v. Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E. 2d 35,43 (1972) ("The whole
concept of zoning implies a restriction upon the owner's right to
use a specific tract for a use profitable to him but detrimental
to other properties in the area, thus promoting the most appro-
priate use of land throughout the municipality, considered as a
whole.") Note that the goal of preserving property values
through zoning has roots at least as far back as the Standard
Zoning Enabling Act. Advisory Committee on Zonin U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act R3 (rev.ed.
1926).
The aim of preserving property values has an allure of
legitimacy because it carries along with it connotations of net
social losses of a nuisance character. But in most cases there
are no net losses at all; new housing normally increases the
overall value of property within a municipality. What courts
have in effect upheld is the use of delegated state power to
preserve the individual wealth of those who already own a home
within the community. There is no a priori justification of the
privilege of a guaranteed market price for one's home, and its
legitimacy should be challenged. JSg also, Joseph Skillken & ECg.
L. City of Toledo, 528 F.2d 867, 880-881 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated
and -ramanded, 429 U.S. 1068, 97 S. Ct. 800, 50 L.Ed.2d 786
(1977), prior decision adhered to Qn remand, 558 F.2d 350 (6th
Cir. 1977).(reversing an order of the lower court requiring the
rezoning of certain property to allow for the development of low
income housing). In sharp criticism, the Sixth Circuit stated
the trial court's mandate would have had the following results:
Low cost public housing could move into the most
exclusive neighborhoods in the metropolitan area and
property values would be slaughtered. Investment people
who labored hard all of their lives and saved their
money to purchase homes in nice residential neighbor-
hoods and who never discriminated against anyone, would
be faced with a total change in their neighborhoods,
with the values of their properties slashed.
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revenues.303 Much has been written about the effects of this so-
called "fiscal zoning." 3 0 4 In response, many states have adopted
financing reforms to help cure these effects. 3 0 5 At least some
of these reforms have been substantial enough to tip the balance
and make classic "fiscal losers" such as apartment buildings
fiscally desirable. 3 0 6 But these reforms appear only to have
taken one argument away from opponents of new development; they
303Conversely, municipalities can be expected to attempt to
attract development such as "light industry" that brings in a
high tax base but relatively low service costs.
304For a classic though now somewhat dated analysis of
suburban opposition to multiple family housing on fiscal zoning
grounds see Babcock, R.F. & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and .the
Apartmen Boo m 111 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1040, 1062-1065 (1963). Note
that Babcock & Bosselman argue that communities pursue cost-
revenue studies to justify "a predetermined course of action."
Citing and quoting from Mace, Municipal Cost-Revenue Research in
.= Unite States, 71-123 (1961). A similar conclusion was
reached in Brantman, Cohen, and Trubek, Measuring ±.te Invisible
Wall: Land Usee Controls And _t1e Residential Patterns .Qf the
Poor, 83 Yale L.J. 483,484 (1973).
Alleviating the fiscal zoning issue is still seen as a
fundamental step in opening up the suburbs, 3&e e.g., Housing f.-Qr
All Under Law, at 533-534 (R.Fishman, ed. 1978) ("The fiscal
pressures on local jurisdictions are usually so great tat the use
of land use controls to increase the local tax base and limit the
costs perceived to be associated with lower income housing is
often irresistable.") Some courts have held fiscal zoning con-
cerns to be illegitimate. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. __,
.T22nship .Q1 Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11. 283 A 2d 353 (Law Div.
1971) ("Fiscal zoning per se is irrelevant to the statutory
purposes of zoning.")
305In Massachusetts, for example, the distribution of local
aid is structured so as to increase funding for municipalities
with higher numbers of children. Therefore, types of housing
associated with school age children do not present the same kind
oscal drain they may have presented in the past. 9ee discussion
at p. 148 infra. Another example of fiscal reform is "tax base
sharing" which has been implemented for the Twin Cities area
pursuant to 1971 Minn. Laws Extra Session ch.24.
3 0 6 In Massachusetts, multifamily housing appears to at least
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have not created local willingness to accept new housing. In
other words, though most of the public debate has focused on the
public disincentives to housing development, these factors are
probably grossly overshadowed by the private disincentives dis-
cussed above.
There are some forces within the town that countervail these
disincentives. First of all, while residents are--not
surprisingly--not looking out for the interests of outsiders,
they would be expected to look out for the interests of some of
the non-homeowner residents. This expectation is borne out in
the frequently voiced longing for more affordable housing for
"our children." 3 0 7  Second, many residents may have developable
land they wish to sell or develop. Freeing up land use
regulation may allow them to increase their profits. However,
the effect of this countervailing force is problemmatic because
land owners would only want to free up the regulation on the land
that they themselves own. Loosening regulation generally may be
pay its own way due to the presence of the local aid formula.
The association of this type of development with fiscal drain may
still be important to the extent that it is engrained in the
public psyche.
307Ste e.g., Topsfield case study at p. 36 supr As the
price of housing goes up, more and more people are frozen out of
the market, including the children of voting residents and local
apartment dwelling voters. Therefore, as the problem gets worse,
the perception of the need for affordable housing as a local
issue should increase. This change in perception may offer
increased opportunities for local reform, at least to the point
where the interest of local home owners takes over again.
Note that some communities have enacted pro-development
legislation that favors their own residents. 3q& Sturges y. Town
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directly counter to each individual land owner's interest by
lowering the amount he can exact from the market, as well as
being undesirable for other reasons. Last, communities should be
willing to accept growth to the extent that the disincentives are
outweighed by the associated benefits such as added jobs and an
increased tax base. But communities can be expected to be
selective in the type of housing they are willing to accept. For
example, a municipality might be willing to accept new industrial
development because of the desirability of nearby jobs and a
higher tax base, but might at the same time attempt to exclude
any housing development that would otherwise be induced by that
development.
Upon this analysis restrictive housing policies in the
suburbs should come as little surprise. But this very fact
should not be slid over too quickly; its existence itself is of
paramount importance. We cannot begin to address the housing
shortage problem without questioning for whom is it a problem?
For many suburban homeowner-voters the housing shortage is not
only not a problem, it is highly desirable.
(b) Housing sulv and local land ag regulation: One might
well question the extent to which the amount of housing built is
constrained by local regulation. Freer regulation undoubtedly
leads in the direction of increased housing supply, but the
_f Chilmark, 320 Mass. 246, 402 N.E. 2d 1346 (1980) (upholding a
"youth lot by-law" which created an exception from the town's
minimum lot size requirement for applicants under 30 years of age
who had been residents of the town for eight consecutive years).
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amount of any increase may be so small as to be negligible. 3 0 8
Recent history has demonstrated the dramatic impact that interest
rates have on the housing market. 3 0 9 Engrained housing tastes
are also an important, though often overlooked, determinant of
the housing market. 3 1 0 These demand side influences may so
overshadow the role of regulations as to reduce it in effect to a
determinant of where new housing will go and not how much will be
built.
The fact that gains in the housing supply through regulatory
reform may only be possible "at the margin" does not mean that
such reform is not an important aim. If the quantitative impact
of such action is ultimately small, it is significant precisely
because it is within the power of state and local governnment.
The relevance of the low magnitude of gains possible is that we
308gg G. Hack & G. Polk, Housing Cost and Governmental
Regulation: 1L Regulatory Refnor Justified by What t2 Ilom Know
(draft of unpublished Lincoln Land Institute paper, 1981) (a
survey of the literature on the impact of regulation on housing
costs). Hack and Polk conclude that the impact of regulation and
hence the prospects attainable through deregulation have been
grossly esaggerated in the popular press and that serious studies
have shown them to be relatively small.
3 0 9 The recent severe recession in housing production is
directly traceable to high interest rates. gg e.g., Egan et
al., "Sinking Foundations: Builder's Losses Mount as Prolonged
Slump in Housing Continuing Problems of Unsold Homes and High
Interest Rates Cause a Mood of Despair," Wall 21ti (Nov. 9,
1981) at 1. Hack and Polk, supra n. 11, at i, note that a
reduction in the mortgage interest rate from 14 to 13 percent on
a conventionally financed $65,000 home is equivalent to a
reduction in the price of the home of approximately 9 percent.
310 For example, large lot zoning can only constrain housing
supply to the extent that developers would not build on large
lots in the absence of regulation.
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must examine the costs of any attempts at overcoming the major
obstacles that must be faced with particular scrutiny.
2) Reducing Housing Costs
An increase in the amount of housing built should itself
help reduce the cost of new housing as well as that of housing
already built. But as we have seen, there are significant
political obstacles encountered in trying to increase the supply
of housing within a municipality. This forces the question of
whether or not and to what extent housing costs can be decreased
without increasing the supply.
Regulations increase the price of new housing not only by
restricting its supply, but also by increasing the quality of
what is built. 3 1 1 To the extent that increases in quality are not
recaptured as consumer benefit, "dead weight losses" occur. 3 1 2
Another example of such a dead weight loss is the cost of
procedural delay. 3 1 3 The existence of these dead weight costs
appears to present an attractive solution to reducing the price
of new housing.
There is significant disagreement as to the magnitude of
311E.., homes are larger, granite curbing is supplied, and
so on. The word "quality" is not used to signifiy preferability,
only an increase in resources expended.
3 1 2 See e.g., Ellickson supra n. 300 at 396-397.
31 3Procedural delay increases the price of housing by in-
creasing the carrying costs of developers. But note that the
added costs produced by delay must be netted against what is
gained through procedural review before they can be labelled
"dead weight."
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these dead weight costs. 3 1 4 One central problem in measuring
them is estimating how much deregulation would alter the type of
housing built. 3 1 5 This problem is not merely practical, it is
314.a generay, Hack & Polk n.308 supra. Hack and Polk
conclude that while the popular press and many studies assume a
large impact of regulation on housing costs, more detailed
analyses and the few empirical works that have been done point
toward much smaller impacts. Accord, R. Silverman, Housing far
All Under Law: .Tb Limits of Legalist Reform, 27 UCLA L.Rev. 99(1979).
Important studies that have been done include the following:
Burns & Mittelbach, "Efficiency in the Housing Industry,: in
Report _f 1he President's Committee .n Urban Housing (v.II
1968), 75; Dowell, "The Effect of Land Use and Environmental
Regulations on Housing Costs," in Housing Policy for -th 1980's(R. Montgomery & D. Marshall, eds. 1980); Johnston et al., "The
Costs of Excessive Local Development Regulations on Single Family
Housing," (unpublished paper 1979); New Jersey Dept. of Community
Affairs, Land Ua Regulation: The Regulation: Tb Residential
Land SupDl (1972); Peterson, lsi Influence _Qf Zoning Regulations
on Land and Housing Prices (Urban Institute Working Paper No.
1207-24, 1974); Sagalyn & Sternlieb, Zoning and Housing Costs(1972); Schwartz et al., Thb Effect jf Growth Management _Q AgN
Housing Prices: Petaluma. California (1979); Seidel, Housing
Costs and Government Regulations: ConfrontinIlg t Regulator Maze(1978); Solomon, Thie Effect Df Land flR And Environmental
Controls on Housingj A Review (Joint Center for Urban Studies
Working Paper No. 34, 1975); Urban Land Institute and Gruen,
Gruen, and Associates, Effects (f Regulation .n Housing Costs:
xo Case Studies (1977); Urban Land Institute and Rice Center for
Community Design and Research, lTas Cost 2Q Delav D-up. Z Q Govern-
ment Regulations in 1a= Houston Housing Market (1979); U.S. Dept.
of Housing and Urban Development, Final Report DI the Task Force
on Housing Costs (1978); U.S. General Accounting Office, Iihy Ar
RM House Prices ZD High. ILQM Are They Influenced by Government
Regulation, And CAn Prices Bg Reduced? (1978).
For an excellent bibliographic source j22 Keating, Annotated
Bibliography: Reducing the Development Costs of Housing," in U.S.
Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Reducing ihm Development
Costs .Qf Housing:. Actions fr State And Local Governments (1979),
139.
3 1 5 That is, to what extent does the public desire the same
level of quality anyway. Some tastes such as large lot zoning
are probably so engrained that existing patterns would change
little, at least in the short term. Some development standards,
however, border on the irrational and provide so little consumer
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theoretical as well. Consumer preference is not exogenously
determined, but is dependent in part on market conditions. 3 1 6
Even if the dead weight costs are substantial, however,
removing them does not in and of itself assure that the savings
will be passed along to housing consumers.317 In a free market,
at least some of the cost savings are likely to be passed
along. 3 1 8 But it must not be forgotten that these dead weight
costs--however irrational or inefficient they may be in
themselves--serve the locally desired goals of restricting
housing supply and of raising housing prices. Pruning these dead
weight costs may simply quicken the search for other ways to
accomplish the same purposes. 3 1 9 If supply is constrained to the
benefit that developers can be expected to ignore them under
deregulation. Prominent in this category are certain subdivision
standards which after being chosen arbitrarily years earlier,
acquire an untouchable status over time. 3g& generally, G. Hack,
Rationalizing SIt Development Regulations (unpublished paper
1981).
A study by the National Association of Home Builders looking
at nearly 84,000 single family homes built in 1973 concludes that
builders were not using less expensive contruction methods when
allowed to do so. Cited in U.S. General Accounting Office, n.
314 supra at 37. Whatever the merits of this study, note that by
definition it excludes one cost saving method likely to be pur-
sued where allowed: the building of multi-family housing.
316That is to say, consumers are not omniscient or entirely
rational, and that their tastes are determined partly by what the
market has to offer.
317Savings are passed along, by definition, to the extent
that price reductions exceed quality increments lost.
318It is reasonable to assume that housing demand is not
perfectly inelastic.
31 9These other means could include direct controls on growth
or the imposition of new dead weight costs.
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same level that it was before the dead weight costs were removed,
the cost savings are likely simply to be captured by developers
and/or land owners. While this substitution may be good for
society as a whole,320 it will not directly lead to lower priced
housing. Theoretically, the "pure rent" reaped by developers and
land owners could be recaptured through development exactions or
other techniques, but these methods can be expected to face
substantial political resistance of their own.321
3) Fairer Distribution Qf Meg Development
Even if 215 cannot induce a greater amount of housing over-
all or a reduction in the price of housing that is built, it may
be able to affect where new development ocurs. The second major
goal of the executive order is to seek a "fairer" distribution of
new development, regardless of how much housing is produced.
Closely coupled to this concern for equity is the idea that
certain arrangements or distributions of housing are substantive-
ly preferable to others, e.g., that public housing should not be
concentrated in any one area.
The goal of "fair share" distribution of housing rests on
two underlying assumptions. The first is that housing develop-
320At least when growth is directly regulated instead of new
dead weight costs added.
321Moreover, public recapture does not mean that the money
collected will be distributed to those frozen out of the housing
market. A likelier scenario is intrajurisdictional redistribu-
tion from the owners of undeveloped land to other residents in
the form of lower taxes or increased services.
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ment is a "cost" thereby necessitating equitable distribution. 3 2 2
Our analysis of the various local disincentives to growth bears
out the truth of this assumption. The second is that municipali-
ties, for whatever reason, are unequal in their capacity to
exclude growth,323 thereby necessitating state intervention.
This assumption is probably also valid, though the causes of the
differentials are not entirely clear. 3 2 4 However, significant
obstacles remain to effectuating the goal of a fairer distribu-
tion of new housing development. For example, this goal is still
dependent on inducing local growth where it would otherwise not
occur, and thus must still overcome the local opposition to
increased housing supply discussed above.
Of course, lay voters may not be fully aware of the role
served by dead weight costs. To the extent that this is true,
appealing to the need to get rid of such costs may be an
effective way of increasing the housing supply and reducing costs
further.
3 2 2 The executive order itself states that communities with
restrictive policies "have imposed development costs inequitably
on other communities...." 304 Mass. Admin. Reg. 28. Exactly
which costs the order is referring to is unclear.
3 2 3 Note, if the only goal was to achieve intermunicipal
equity, the solution would be to equalize municipalities'
abilities to exclude housing development. To some limited extent
this is done through free planning advice and services from EOCD.
3 2 4 Presumably, communities differ in the resources they can
draw upon both in terms of professional services that can be
volunteered to local boards and of ability to pay for outside
services. Moreover, residents in some areas may "require"
certain kinds of development--e.g., development that produces
jobs --within close proximity while wealthier residents living
elsewhere can afford to live further away. That development in
turn induces secondary housing development that cannot be
entirely stopped. Different "tastes" for different levels of
growth could also, of course, play some role.
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Moreover, the success of this second goal is also dependent
on the state's ability to determine what is an equitable distri-
bution of housing development. The substantive content of "fair
share" is far from obvious. 3 2 5  In practice, EOCD has attempted
no comprehensive answer to this issue, but instead goes after
those communities that appear obviously restrictive. 3 2 6 The
motives behind this strategy are soundly based in the inherent
political difficulties that face a final answer to the "fair
share" question. 3 2 7 But because there has been no open political
resolution of the issue, EOCD is left to fight its battles with
little ammunition. Except in the case of extreme or overt exclu-
sionary behavior, EOCD is left to argue that a community is being
restrictive without a politically accepted or informed definition
of restrictiveness.
This is not to say that a resolution to the issue must take
the form of a definitive formula allocating so many units per
town.32 8 Indeed, the beauty of the 215 process is its ability to
sidestep this need by invoking "hard standards" only to trigger a
process solution to the problem. But neither the "hard trigger"
nor the softer standards necessary to frame the bargaining
process have been resolved in an open political process necessary
to generate their wider acceptance.
325a= discussion at p. 118 infra
3263g2 p. 19 supra
3272.g2 p. 125 infra
3281_
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4) Autonomy ad Initiative
Executive Order No. 215 attempts to effect its two main
positive goals discussed above while preserving certain key at-
tributes of the former system of no state intervention. The most
important of these is the preservation of local autonomy. The
order attempts to induce local action that will increase housing
development without specifying what form that action should take.
This strategy is based not only on defusing local resistance, but
also on the theory that only the localities know what specific
actions are best for themselves. Local initiative is not only
tolerated, it is encouraged. 3 2 9
There is a tension between the goal of local autonomy and
the structure of the 215 process. Faced with the withholding of
state funding, local officials focus immediately on what they
have to do in order to obtain that funding. Thus, while these
officials resent the state intervention, when they are in the 215
process they are looking for the state to tell them what they
must do. 3 3 0 Local autonomy is not funnelled into a set of posi-
tive local initiatives but is preserved merely in the town's
reserving the right to turn down the funds all together. In a
sense, the short-term, action-oriented nature of the order backfires.
Perhaps when and if the state is able to press for more
3292S2 Lincoln case study at p. 21 supra.
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substantive local reform. Local initiative and more explicit
bargaining will be stimulated. When that point is reached, there
may be some assurance that the induced local actions will have
some effect on the "bottom line," an increase in the supply
and/or a decrease in the price of affordable housing in the
locality. At present, the deference to local autonomy merely
reflects and/or is equivalent to an abdication of state
oversight.
B. Strategies Qf Intervention
Intervention strategies designed to overcome the powerful
local incentives to restrict housing growth can be classified
into three categories. The first includes appeals to altruistic
behavior and so-called "consciousness raising," and might be
deemed "the conversion approach." The second seeks to identify
techniques to mitigate local concerns while still providing
housing. When pursued by a body outside of the town, this
strategy might be deemed the "educative approach." Lastly, there
is the "directive approach," the political imposition of external
interests. Executive Order No. 215 attempts to encompass all
three of these approaches.
1) Conversion Approach
The withholding of funds induces the localities to at least
stop and listen to what the state has to say. Through this
opportunity, the state hopes to instill upon the towns a sense of
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responsibility for those outside town borders.331 While this aim
is laudatory, one can well doubt its efficacy when used alone.
When combined with the other strategies, appeals to altruistic
behavior tend to get lost amidst the town's search for what it
will have to do to obtain the release of its funds. A fair
evaluation of 215 in practice indicates little real stress or
reliance on the conversion approach. 3 3 2 At best, any
"conversion" will occur only as an incidental by-product along
the way.
2) Educative Aproac
The withholding of funds also gives the state the opportun-
ity to "educate" the localities as to ways that housing can be
provided with less disruption and cost. So far, EOCD appears to
have concentrated its efforts on this educative approach. On the
public housing side they have been able to point out the immense-
ly attractive benefits of the 705 scattered-site subsidy
programs. 3 3 3  On the private market side, EOCD has stressed
"innovative" techniques--such as allowing accessory apartments--
3 3 1 Interview with Joseph L. Flatley, Ass't Sec'y of EOCD
(October 19, 1982).
3 3 2 EOCD has expressed the hope that labelling communities
"exclusionary" will embarrass them enough to induce some change
in policies, a sort of negative version of the conversion
approach. Interview with John F. Loehr, Policy Planner, EOCD
(Feb. 3, 1983).
3331966 Mass. Acts ch. 705, aee n. 131 supra.
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that produce new housing units with little disruption.334
The educative strategy rests on the assumption that because
of lack of resources, "inertia," or some other reason, a
locality is unable on its own to perceive what is in its best
interests The role of the state is simply to help the town image
the full range of options before it. While the underlying
assumption undoubtedly has some validity, the educative approach
may be useful only "at the margin." That is, a town's lack of
vision can only be used so far in explaining the restrictiveness
of town policies. At some point, a town's self-interest diverges
from the action desired by the state, a fact the educative
strategy cannot overcome. For the reasons discussed above,
townspeople may not want additional housing no matter how
attractively it is packaged. The overall rationality or
desirability of the various "innovative" planning techniques
should not blind us to the fact that a town ultimately will only
accept what is in its self-interest. The educative approach may
still be important precisely because it is non-controversial.
However, if the state wants to induce more than a marginal level
of new housing, it will have to "bite the bullet" and rely on the
third strategy.
3) Directive Aproach
The directive approach is based on inducing a town to take
certain action it would not have done otherwise, even if it were
334a2e e.g., Reading case study, supr p. 32.
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fully capable of understanding its own interests. This strategy
can be subdivided into two subcategories. The "mandatory"
approach takes the relevant choice out of a town's hands all
together. The "incentive" approach leaves the choice within a
town's hands but alters the town's self-interest that informs
that choice. Structurally, these two subcategories are not as
different as they might first appear; after all, an incentive is
merely a mandatory condition on something that would have other-
wise been unburdened. They may differ, of course, in other
regards such as their political acceptability and effective-
ness.335
Executive Order No. 215 is structured on the incentive
model. The state is willing to give towns funding if they accept
certain conditions. A rational town will accept the funding only
if the associated benefits of the state funding outweigh the
costs of accepting the state's conditions. This is bargaining in
its truest sense.
While 215 appears to be based on the directive approach, it
has been used very little in this manner. Instead of trying to
obtain a substantive quid pro quo for the funding, EOCD has used
the withholding of funds principally to create the opportunities
to hold the town's attention in order to pursue educative ends.
One could well ask whether the educative goal could perhaps be
335The directive approach and its two subcategories are
examined in detail in Chapter V, infra.
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served in a better, more direct manner. 3 3 6 The presence of
ostensibly coercive state intervention may be counterproductive
by stimulating local defensiveness that interferes with an town's
ability to perceive its self-interest.
The more interesting question is whether 215 has the
capacity to serve the directive approach. Three shortcomings are
readily apparent. EOCD has not shown an inclination to take a
hard-line stance with the towns. There are, in turn, several
possible explanations for this attitude. The legality of the
order may be sufficiently tenuous so that EOCD feels constrained
from asking too much. 3 3 7 So far, the towns have found it easier
to comply with the little the state has asked than to challenge
the order in court. Other potential explanations include a
possible lack of real support from the governor's office during
the King administration, an implicit acknowledgement that EOCD
did not have a well thought through, non-arbitrary program on
which to take a stand, and a simple desire to avoid confronta-
tion. The second major shortcoming is that even were EOCD to
take a hard-line stance, it is highly questionable whether the
incentives that can be offered are enough to induce real
change.33 8 Last, there is a whole set of questions raised as to
whether 215 is functionally designed to effect such change.
336_eg discussion at p. 171 infra
337Bgt aee the legal analysis in Chapter II, supra.
3383gae discussion at p. 147 inf.ra.
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To address these issues, we must examine more closely the
implicit functional model on which the executive order is based.
So far our analysis has focused on the town as a single
entity without focusing on its constituent parts. EOCD
characterizes town government as a "loose amalgamation" of
various boards and agencies that together generate town policy.
The executive order is implicitly based on the theory that the
agencies most directly responsible for setting land use and
housing policy will feel pressure from the agency from which the
funding is being withheld, thereby in effect recreating a single
entity with which the state can deal. The history of 215 to date
bears out the validity of this theory. 3 3 9 Town agencies have
w-orked remRrkably closely with each other to do what had to be
done to oot.n their funding. 3 4 0 The case of Lynnfield where the
agency applying for the funding served only one-quarter of the
town is probably the exception that proves the rule. 3 4 1
The real deficiences lie elsewhere; the relevant local
agencies themselves have little authority to effect substantive
change. As was noted in Chapter II, most of the communities that
would be affected by 215 have town governments in which major
policy changes must be done through a two-thirds vote at a town
339In one sense, however, this assumption has not been put
to a real test. Were EOCD to ask for real substantive changes in
local policy, local "turf" battles may begin to be observed.
3 4 0 See e.g., Lincoln case study at p. 23 supr
341Lg. n. 142 supra
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meeting. 3 4 2 Thus, opponents of any change need only to must one
third of the vote at a town meeting in order to defeat the
proposal. The governing bodies of a town are merely the machin-
ery by which the agenda of local policy is normally set. 3 4 3
Therefore, 215 can at best influence local policy and not direct-
ly change it.
The success of the executive order is also dependent on the
parties fulfilling what they have promised. So far, no one
appears to have envisaged the signed agreement as a binding
contract enforceable through specific performance or other-
wise. 3 4 4 The only enforcement mechanism that appears to be
available to the state is the threat of reprisal against the town
in future funding rounds. 3 4 5 But measuring a town's good faith
compliance with an agreement is more difficult than it might
first appear, especially when the agreements are so vague or
ambiguous. Moreover, turnover in local goverment has the
capacity for letting each succeeding administration "off the
hook." As long as the measure of a town's policies is based on
future promises and not past performance or at least enforceable
and specific agreements, the state is limited in its ability to
identify noncompliance.
3 4 2 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40A §5 (West 1979).
3433g& n. 285 supra
3443eg discussion at p. 87 supra
345For a discussion of the viability of this mechanism, see
p. 154 infra.
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C. Conclusions
On a first look, Executive Order No. 215 appears extra-
ordinarily attractive. Without the necessity and difficulty of
getting a statute passed, EOCD has devised a scheme that appears
to preserve local autonomy while inducing communities to agree to
policy reforms that will themselves induce real substantive
change toward solving one of our most important state problems.
A closer examination, however, makes us realize that our initial
assessment was too good to be true. While the overall, incentive
based, process-oriented theory behind 215 may be sound, the
executive order possesses neither the legal structure nor the
fiscal "bite" necessary to make it effective. Meanwhile, EOCD
continues to argue for 215's viability, measuring its success by
the agency's ability to exact paper agreements from town
officials with insubstantial authority agreeing to do little if
anything that was not in the town's best interest anyway. The
costs of the program include not only direct costs such as
person-hours invested,346 but also the delusion that the state
has a program in place producing real change.
In order for a 215-process to have any hope for success, a
full rethinking of the issues must be done followed perhaps by a
3 4 6 0ne of the problems with the executive order is the lack
of person-hours invested. In the past, only one administrator
has spent approximately one-third of his time implementing the
order. Still, many total local person-hours have been expended,
a factor to which EOCD is perhaps not particularly sensitive.
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statutory solution. The remainder of this paper will attempt to
provide some of that necessary rethinking.
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CHAPTER.lY
Housing Allocation Formulae
One mode of state intervention is the assignment of housing
growth by region through housing allocation formulae. This chap-
ter will examine the problems associated with such an approach
and will consider the degree to which such formulae are a neces-
sary componenet of land use reform.
A. Housing Allocation And Fair Share
In the late 1960's and early 1970's there was a great burst
of interest in the problems of exclusionary zoning. 3 4 7 One
response to this problem was the concept of "fair share," the
belief that each community should be responsible for meeting its
fair share of regional housing needs. 3 4 8 The term "fair share"
is most commonly associated with judicial opinions invalidating
certain zoning practices that served to exclude lower income
347Zag e.g., Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary
Zoning, Equal Protection, and Ih.l Indigent,, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 767(1969). For a contemporaneous view of this burst of interest,
ee Babcock & Bosselman, Exclusionary Zoning: Land 1eg Regulation
an Housing in the 1970's (1973). For a comprehensive discussion
of exclusionary zoning litigation up to 1979, agg J. Blumstein, A
Prolegomenon to Growt Managemen and Exclusionary Zoning Issues,
43:2 Law & Contemp. Probs. 5 (1979).
348je e.g., Babcock & Bosselman, supra n. 347, at 102-104.
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housing from the suburbs. 3 4 9 But courts have not attempted
rigorous definitions of a region's fair share. 3 5 0  Instead,
courts have used fair share as a conceptual basis to validate the
striking of obviously exclusionary practices.
22e e.g., the followng leading cases: Southern Burlington
County NAACP . Township 2Qf Mount Laurel, (Mt. Laurel I) 67 N.J.
151, 336 A2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed 423 U.S. 808 (1975)
(zoning ordinance held invalid to the extent that it precluded a
municipality from providing its fair share of the regional
housing burden); Berenson . ToQwn1 Re Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102,
341 N.E.2d 236, 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975) (in an appeal from a
denial of summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action
concerning the validity of an ordinance prohibiting multi-family
housing, the N.Y Ct. of Appeals layed down the standard that "in
examining an ordinance [a court] should take into consideration
not only general welfare of the residents of the zoning township,
but should also consider the effect of the ordinance on the
neighboring communities.") Township af Willistown _, Chesterdale
Eajss Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A. 2d 466, 468 (1975) (ordinance
which allowed apartment construction in only 80 acres out of
11,589 total acres held invalid as not providing for "a fair
share of the township acreage for apartment construction.")
350See e.g., Surrick 
_y, Zoning Hearing Ed ., 476 PA. 182, 382
A.2d 103 (1977)(though often cited as establishing a fair share
"formula", Surrick lays down only the most general of decision
rules). Presumably courts have felt that they were not the
proper government bodies to answer the difficult question of the
specific content of fair share. Egg e.g., Oakwood -at Madison
Inc. .,u -T-2nship of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 499, 371 A.2d 1192(1977)("the basic underlying problem [of determining fair share]
is far better addressed by administrative action than litiga-
tion.")
Note that the tL. Laurel, court appears to have believed
that local, regional, and/or state agencies were prepared to take
on this task. In Oakwood At Madison the court took note of a
fair share allocation scheme that was being drafted by the State
Division of State and Regional Planning pursuant to Executive
Order No. 35 (April 2, 1976) 371 A.2d at 1217, n. 37. In the
face of this administrative effort the court held that "the
factors that make up the Mount Laurel doctrine are simply too
complext and too interwoven with social, political and economic
issues to permit judicial resolution...[and] need not be
resolved." Southern Burlington County NAACP _. Township Sf ZL
Laurel Laurel 1L, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A. 2d 390, 437 (1983)
(discussing the holding in Oakwood At Madison). But the State-
wide Housing Allocation Plan was never finalized and the
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Several state and regional governments have pursued the task
of developing specific, "fair share" allocation schemes. 3 5 1 Like
the court decisions, these legislative attempts tend to focus on
low and moderate income housing. 3 5 2 This emphasis may be mis-
placed for a number of reasons. By narrowing the issue to one of
the siting low and moderate income housing, the need to reform
land use regulation generally is suppressed. Put another way,
the focus on such housing may have the ironic effect of legitima-
ting the overall regine of land use regulation. Further, this
focus also tends to demarcate low and moderate income housing
from other housing, reinforcing our stereotypes that the residents of
legal authority for this effort was rescinded by Executive Order
No. 6 (May 4, 1982). In its recent, long-awaited opinion re-
examining the "fair share" doctrine, the New Jersey Supreme Court
acknowledged the extreme difficulty of the task of defining a
municipality's "fair share". ht;. Laurel U at 436-441. Still,
the court embraced judicial determination of this issue and set
forth some of the procedures and standards to be used. .id.
3 5 1 For an overview of housing allocation formulae
implemented or proposed by 1974 see D. Listokin, Fair-Share
Housing Distribution: Will .i ope tbe Suburbs _tQ Apartment
Developnent?, 2 Real Estate L.J. 739 (1974); for a discussion of
the California system se2 C. Burton, California Legislature
Prohibits Exclusionary Zoning: Mandates Fair Share, 9 San Fern.
V.L.Rev. 19 (1981); see als 1969 Mass. Acts ch. 774 (arguably a
crude fair share allocation scheme) and the proposed Mass.
Balanced Growth & Development Act, n. 34 supra. A fair share
formula was developed for the state in 1973, but this formula was
never implemented to induce localities to accept their designated
share; see w. Apgar & A. Solomon, Housing Needs, Progrda~m ad
Policies igr th Commonwealth ._f Massachusetts (report prepared
for the Dept. of Community Affairs, Jan. 15, 1973).
Surprisingly little work has been done to evaluate the
effect of programs that have been implemented. Note that the
effectiveness of such programs depends on the strength of the
enforcement mechanisms and/or incentives offered to accompany the
formula allocation.
35 2Some fair share programs attempt to allocate all low or
moderate income housing, other programs focus only on low or
moderate income subsidized housing. S2e, Listokin, n. 351 supr
at 743.
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such housing must be somehow different from us. These problems
would be overcome if municipalities could be induced to produce
substantial amounts of low or moderate income housing, but one
can well doubt whether this is true. 3 5 3
Some states have begun to rethink the issue of "fair share"
in terms of all housing development and not just in terms of the
attempt to remove barriers to the siting of lower income
housing. 3 5 4 The proposed Balanced Growth and Development Act was
just such an attempt. 3 5 5 This chapter focuses on attempts to
allocate all new housing development; the term "fair share" is
used hereinafter to refer to regional responsibility for housing
growth in general and not just the development of low and
moderate income housing.
35 3Localities may not be the appropriate level of government
to which to assign the duty of producing housing for the poor.
While communities can and should undertake land use reform
generally, they may be limited in their ability to ensure the
production of market housing that poor people can afford. Many
commentators have fixed upon inclusionary zoning as the solution.
see e.g., Burton, n. 351 supra. But inclusionary schemes should
not be viewed as some sort of panacea. Note that for incentive
inclusionary systems to be effective, the overall zoning in a
community has to be sufficiently restrictive to create a market
for bonuses offered. The economic incidence and effectiveness of
mandatory inclusionary schemes is also problemmatic. The danger
of inclusionary systems is their ability to obscure their real
economic impacts.
Instead of adding new layers of regulation to attempt to
cure the effects of old ones, deregulation might be preferable
solution. 3ege generally, R. Ellickson, .Thle Irony _Qf "Inclu-
sionary" Zoning, 54 So.Cal. L.R. 1167 (1981).
354.Se e.g., California's attempt to mandate that local land
use decisions be consistent with a local plan that includes a
housing element making "adequate provision for the housing needs
of all segments of the community." Cal. Gov't Code §§65302(c)
(housing element), 65860, 66473.5, 65300.5 (consistency require-
ments) (West Supp. 1980). 3_eg further discussion of this
California approach in n. 417 infra.
355Se n. 34 supra.
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B. The Problems Associated with Housing Allocation Formulae
1) Formulation Problems
Housing allocation schemes are based on a planned allotment
of housing development to the various municipalities within a
region. The first step is to define the applicable region. This
line-drawing is in turn based on theories of metropolitanism
under which a region is defined as an urban area with the subur-
ban and exurban fringe economically, socially, and physically
linked to it. 3 5 6 Obviously the real map does not fit the region-
al planner's ideal, making the line-drawing process a messy
business.3 57 Moreover, the criteria chosen to set the boundaries
of the regions are in no sense predetermined. The variety of
possible criteria reveals a variety of possible regions and thus
a variety of corresponding regional responsibilities. 3 5 8
Further, the entire theory of metropolitan regionalism is subject
to challenge, especially as suburbs become increasingly self-
sufficient. Acceptance of the idea of regional responsibility
for regional needs depends on the perception of regions as
"natural" units. The problem of defining individual regions
could be bypassed, however, by designating the entire
3563_e &Lg, Apgar & Solomon, n. 351 supra.
35 7 For an interesting though somewhat dated study of
Massachusetts regions examining everything from road and highway
networks to general hospital service areas, -gg Dept. of
Community Affairs, Massachusetts Regions (1971).
3 5 8Note that EOCD used three different sets of regions under
the building permit index. Sg.e discussion at p. 132.
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state as the applicable region. 3 5 9
Once the regions have been drawn, the next step is to
determine the "need" for new housing within each region for a set
period of time. A projection is made of the net new home-owners
for that period based on extrapolations of current demographics,
estimates of net migration, and behavioral assumptions about
household formation. 3 6 0 This figure is then added to the number
of units that are determined to need replacement over the time
period to yield the net regional need. In 1980 EOCD estimated
that there was a need for 440,000 new dwelling units before 1990
for Massachusetts as a whole. 3 6 1 This enormous need is explained
by the "baby boom" generation reaching homebuying age coupled
with a decrease in the average household size. 3 6 2
While most of the population projections are probably sound
if the regions are drawn large enough, the assumptions as to
35 9This was in effect the approach that the proposed
Balanced Growth and Development Act took, though regions still
played a role in the allocation of housing to individual
municipalities.
3 6 0This is the method that underlies the state's estimation
of housing need. Bgj EOCD, Housing Massachusetts: Meeting Jhag
Needs .tQht 1980's 7 (1980). A somewhat more sophisticated
model to estimate housing need based on similar principles can be
found in Frieden, Forecasting jba Nation's Housing Needs:
Assessing -e Joint Center's First Efforts, Joint Center for
Urban Studies Working Paper No. 30 (Feb 1975).
361This figure includes 350,000 units of net need and 90,000
replacement units. EOCD,I Housing Massachusetts 1, n. 360 supra.
This report was recently updated by EOCD, Housing Massachusetts:
Meeting Ilae Needs .QI lae 1980's: A Progress Report (1982).
Housing need figures were not changed.
3621
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human behavior--such as household size--are subject to unpredict-
able fluctuations. 3 6 3  It is therefore invalid to project
present trends very far into the future. Further, any system
that attempts to synchronize fair share numbers with housing
policy will require frequent manipulations and adjustments.
There are theoretical problems as well. To what extent is
there an exogenous concept of "need" and to what extent is this
concept determined by the marketplace? The desire to form inde-
pendent households--a principal component of housing demand --is
intimately related to the price of housing. As the price of
housing decreases, more subsets of existing households can be
expected to desire to be on their own, increasing the number of
households, and hence the "need" for housing. Increasing the
supply of housing is therefore somewhat like widening a road,
which itself leads to increased traffic flow.
In a perfectly free, ideal marketplace, there is no place
for concepts of "need." The proper amount of housing will be
determined by the invisible hands of supply and demand. But the
pure marketplace model fails for two reasons. First, because of
housing and land use regulation--not to mention hidden
subsidies--we obviously do not live in a perfectly free market.
36 3 Indeed, the decrease in household size is one of teh
major components of present "need" outstripping supply. ggt
Frieden, n. 360 supra at 16 (acknowledging systematic errors in
earlier housing demand projections due to an overestimation of
household size).
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Second, housing is one area that society has deemed should not be
ruled by the laws of supply and demand. In the words of neo-
classical economists, housing is a "merit good." In lay terms,
many people are simply not wealthy enough to afford the level of
housing the society would like them to have. Rejecting the pure
market model, however, does not cure the problem of determining
how much housing should be produced, i.e., the regional "need."
The third and final step is to choose criteria by which the
housing "need" will be allocated, the housing allocation formula
that measures a community's "fair share". Few concepts are as
facially compelling as "fair share" which has the illusion of
being self-contained and self-executing. In reality, the
substantive content of "fair share" is far from obvious and
entails difficult political choices. One obvious choice would be
to allocate the growth evenly among communities in the region. 3 6 4
This approach takes no account of differences between communities
and is likely to produce an allocation of growth that will be
perceived as inefficient, unfair, and undesirable. 3 6 5
Municipalities differ in their capacity to accept new growth
(fiscal capacity, presence of jobs, etc.), their past performance
36 4Even this choice represents a variety of options. That
is, should growth be allocated evenly per municipality, per
municipality population, per municipality area, or per some other
ostensibly neutral but politically charged criterion?
365Lgg J. Rose, Fair Shar Allocatio Plans: Whic Formula
Will PacifY th Contentious Suburbs, 12 Urban Law Annual 3, 12-13
(1976); see also Listokin, n. 351 supr at 744-745.
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in accepting development, and their desirability to the
population of housing consumers. More sophisticated fair share
formulas attempt to take account of these factors. 3 6 6
During the drafting stages of the Balanced Growth and Develop-
ment Act, a study was done at MIT examining the allocational
effects of two alternative fair share formulas. 3 6 7  In all fair-
ness to the study, it was not meant to produce a definitive
formula, only to test the "sensitivity" of different
approaches. 3 6 8 The first formula included two factors: a
measure of the municipality's past growth and a measure of its
fiscal capacity. 3 6 9 The past growth factor was used as an
indicator of consumer preference. 3 7 0 The formula was designed to
366,dL Rose and Listokin illustrate the variety of criteria
that have been proposed or enacted. B.e& also G. Lefcoe,
California's Land Planning Requirements: The Case iar
Deregulation, 54 So.Cal. L. Rev. 447, 486-487 (1981).
The fair share formula developed for Massachusetts in 1973
focused on the following four factors: the local growth in low
and moderate paying jobs over te previous ten years, the number
of low and moderate paying jobs within the vicinity of the muni-
cipality, fiscal capacity, and the housing needs of current
residents. Eg& Apgar & Solomon, n. 351 supra.
3 67 J. Liepins & Angelito Santos, A Report on Two Models fgr
Allocating Housing Growth in Massachusetts: la Response ±,Q -a
Growing Housing Shortage, (unpublished draft, Feb. 1980).
36 8Welles, supra n. i8 at 68.
36 9Liepins & Santos, supra n. 369 at 2-4. The exact formula
was as follows:
Fair Share Growth Index = ((0.4 x average annual number of
building permits issued 1970-1974) + (0.6 x average annual
number of building permits issued 1975-1978)) x (0.85 + (0.01 x
(equalized valuation per capita - total net debt per capita - tax
paid per capita))).
3 703. at 2.
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continue present growth trends but to skew more growth into
municipalities that were fiscally strong. Fairness was based on
consumer preference tempered by one measure of a community's
capacity to accept new growth.
The second formula also used a past growth factor, but to
opposite ends. It was designed to funnel more growth into muni-
cipalities that had accepted less growth in the past. 3 7 1 Past
growth was thus used as a measure of a community's restrictive-
ness and not of consumer preference. Fairness was based on
evening off growth rates over time.
These two examples--as simple as they are--poignantly demon-
strate some of the conflicts inherent in a theory of fair share.
Each of the various factors is difficult to measure in itself,
and there is no set formula as to which factors should be chosen
or how they should be weighed against each other. These problems
are not merely technical; they are inherent in the concept of
fair share 37 2 and stem ultimately from the contradictions in the
socio-economic-political environment in which the debate is
imbedded. Fundamentally, our system is based on notions of
3 71.I... at 4. If a municipality had an annual growth rate
for the years 1970-1978 of between 0.4% and 2.4%, it was assigned
a growth index equal to this past rate. If the municipality had
grown at less than 0.4%, it was assigned a growth index = 1.4 -
the square root of (1.4 - the past growth rate). If it had grown
at greater than 2.4%, it was assigned a growth index = 1.4 + the
square root of (the past growth rate - 1.4).
3723Se Lefcoe, n. 366 supra at 487. Lefcoe argues that many
of the criteria relevant to the issue of "fair share" contradict
each other.
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private wealth, market allocation of the proper level of goods
and services, and local determination of land use policy. At the
same time we adhere to the belief that some things are or should
be morally entitled and to the legitimacy of state-wide goals
such as housing for all. Understandably, though somewhat
arrogantly, we want it all. The difficult task that faces land
use reform is the mediation of the conflicting goals and value
structures. The distinctive feature of fair share is that it
attempts not merely to mediate them but to resolve them.
2) Implementation Problem
Even if a fair share program can be agreed upon, there is no
assurance that such a formula can be successfully implemented.
Projecting "x" d.u. for Town A does not assure that those units
will be built. 3 7 3 First, there is a basic problem of translating
the numbers into regulatory reform to match them. 3 7 4 Second,
local opponents of growth may be able to slow development in
373See e.g.,, the .kLL,. Laurel -1 court's simple but trenchant
comment: "Courts do not build housing nor do municipalities."
Zt. Laurel .1, n. 349 supra, 336 A.2d at 734.
37 4Chapter III notes the complex and subtle relationship
between land use regulation and the amount of housing built.
Note also that the state can probably be expected to underassess
the fair share determination for relatively restrictive
communities due to the same pressures that caused it to
underassess equalized valuations of local property values of
relatively wealthy communities for the purposes of state aid
calculations. .CL Town _Qf Sudbury v. Eomm'r 9_,t Corporations and
Taxation, 366 Mass. 558, 321 N.E.2d 641 (1974).
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other ways despite the reform. 3 7 5 Third, housing will be built
in a specific location only if there is sufficient demand for
that housing in that location. If municipalities are given the
authority and/or are encouraged to curb further growth once they
have met their fair share, the mismatch between fair share
allocation and consumer preference could reduce the supply of
housing. 376
C. Weighing tle Options.
The problems associated with fair share formulas may not
render them unworkable. But these problems do force us to weigh
the costs and the benefits of the fair share approach. The
concept of fair share is so attractive because it appears to
offer both a justification for state intervention and an
objective and rational basis for structuring that intervention.
As we have seen, however, there is no a priori content to fair
share. Any formula will not be deduced from first principles but
will have to be battled out in the political arena. At the same
time, through its assignment of specific numbers to specific
locations, the fair share approach is symbolically the most
intrusive form of intervention. The political resistance that
will be generated is likely either to scuttle the efforts before
implementation or skew them during implementation. Note that the
3 7 5 Local opponents of housing growth may be able to block
development through other legal avenues--such as state
environmental review--or through extra-legal means.
3 7 6 This might have been one of the ironic effects of the
proposed Balanced Growth & Development Act, n. 34 supra.
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MIT study that was done during the drafting of the Balanced
Growth and Development Act was considered so potentially
explosive that its findings were in effect given "top secret"
status. 3 7 7 Considering the implementation problems that exist
even once a formula is chosen, we are led to reexamine our real
concerns and the question of whether they can be met through
other means.
1) Real Concerns
What then are our real concerns? What specifically is wrong
with certain municipalities adopting exclusionary policies? Once
concern is that such policies tend to restrict the supply of
housing and raise its price. Our discussion in Chapter III noted
that this effect is probably overstated. 3 7 8 More importantly,
this problem does not necessarily point to a fair share solution.
If providing more and cheaper housing is the primary goal, a
solution that attempts to allocate housing to specific locations
may be counterproductive. 3 7 9 The main impact of exclusionary
policies is on the spatial distribution of housing and it is to
this impact that the fair share effort is addressed.
There are three kinds of disparities that are created along
3 7 7 Welles, n. 18 supra, at 69. As Welles points out this
treatment seems inconsistent with the espoused theory of open
plitical debate that underlay the policy formulation process.
378g discussion at p. 98 supra.
379A system of deregulation that allowed housing to be built
where demanded would better serve this goal.
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the way. The first catgory is that of "amenity disparties."
Exclusionary communities are able to reserve to themselves
certain amenities such as open space and low traffic volumes.
Development is in turn induced elsewhere causing the reduction of
amenities in those areas.
The second category is that of "fiscal disparities."
Exclusionary communities are thought to exclude development that
brings with it fiscal costs exceeding revenues. 3 8 0 Beyond the
public economic disparities, there are also private, "wealth
disparities." Even where new development pays its own way in
fiscal terms, it may reduce the value of existing housing.
Exclusionary regulations empower property owners to perpetuate
the value of their homes and hence their wealth.3 81
The last category--that of "social disparities"--can also be
further subdivided. One component relates to the social mixture
associated with the skewed spatial distribution of housing.
Exclusionary regulations is believed to prevent the free
380g~g discussion at p. 93 supra.
38122 n. 302 supra.
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intermixing of races and classes. 3 8 2 But there is also a second
component that deals with the loss of individual mobility. 3 8 3 The
fact of exclusion is important by itself, independent of whatever
mix of amenities, races, and so on that each community has to
offer.
It should be pointed out that fair share--or even local
policy reform in general--may not be necessary or sufficient to
cure these discrepancies. It would not be sufficient because some
discrepancies would continue to exist even were all local housing
policies dictated by the state. It is not necessary to the extent
that these discrepancies can be thought of as problems of
redistribution independent of the pattern of growth. To some
extent these disparities could be overcome by compensation
schemes--e.g., state subsidies of local amenities--linked not to
3 82The data clearly bears out the segregation in fact though
the economic segregation is much less pronounced. Eg& A. Downs,
Opening LV _the Suburbs 187 (1973). The degree to which this
segregation is a direct result of land use regulation and/or the
degree to which land use regulation should be used to remedy it
are still the subject of some controversy. Compare Downs
(strongly advocating for the encouragement of economic
integration of households) with Ellickson n. 300 supra at 506
("There is little to recommend policies designed to encourage
that each neighborhood has a mixture of all housing types (and
hence all income groups.)")
383It is this concern that the legal system has a difficult
time classifying and has given such labels as the "right to
travel". See e.g., Construction Ind. Ass' vn. C ity .Df Petal u.ma
375 F. Supp. 574, rev'd 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) (invalidating a growth control
ordinance as an infringement on the constitutional "right to
travel.") The difficulty of classifying this problem stems from
the difficulty of integrating the reality of an absence of
individual freedom in a system that espouses such freedom as a
fundamental norm.
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prospective growth policy but to indicators of present
congestion. Fiscal disparitis could be alleviated through changes
in the state aid formula, wealth disparities through changes in
the tax system. Even the social disparities could be remedied to
the extent that wealth is equivalent to opportunity. Non-
residents could simply buy their way into exclusive communities.
There are two major problems with this characterization.
First, while it is instructive to engage in such discussions of
redistribution in the abstract, this analysis obviously does not
reflect political reality. It is still fair to make the following
conclusions, however. We should not fool ourselves into thinking
that land use reform--no matter what form it takes--is some sort
of panacea. On the other hand, the reform of local policies may
be one way of curing some of the various disparities that concern
us. Lastly, many of these disparities can be addressed without
resorting to fair share.
The second major defect with our reasoning so far is the
static character of the analysis. In fact, the rate of growth in
each community may be as important as the level of growth. If the
rate of growth outstrips the capacity of the municipality to
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accept the growth, wasteful inefficiencies result. 3 8 4 The
existence of these costs is the "market failure" justification of
growth policy planning.
It must not be forgotten that the consensus that emerged
from the Growth Policy Development Act process was a mandate for
controlling growth. 3 85 Fair share was as much incidental to the
push to contain growth as it was an important goal in itself. The
question remains to what extent fair share is necessary to
achieve these planning ends. To answer this question we should
consider the options available.
2) Options
At one extreme is what we might call the "hard fair share"
model, under which the fair share allocation is mandated by the
state or alternatively is directly linked to the release of the
incentives offered. This approach was incorporated into the
proposed Balanced Growth and Development Act. 3 8 6 At the other
extreme is what might be called the "fair is fair" model. This
model attempts to remove barriers to the housing market without
384Congestion and overtaxed resources occur in growth areas
and underutilized resources and sprawl in restrictive areas. It
is difficult to separate out the problem of too rapid growth from
that of inefficient spatial distributions of housing. On this
latter subject see Real Estate Research Corporation, The Costs 2Q
Sprawl (1974); D. Keyes, Channeling Metropolitan Growth. in What
Direction. Towar Which End? 43:2 Law & Contemp. Probs. 239
(1979); Tolley, Graves & Gardner, 2hm Urban Growth uestion, 43:2
Law & Contemp Probs. 211 (1979). A full examination of this
issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
3852-e discussion at p. 9 supra.
3863_& discussion at p. 11 supra.
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trying to determine its spatial distribution. It would be coupled
with a compensation scheme to reimburse municipalities for the
impact of development. Though this approach is more
comprehensive, it is less intrusive in the sense that it does not
single out communities and does no attempt to dictate how much
growth each community should accept. Instead of trying to
outguess the market, it attempts to use the market. This approach
focuses ultimately on the question of what is legitimate
regulation.387
In between these two poles are "hybrid fair share" models,
which entail a partial resolution of the fair share issue. For
example, a community's past record is compared against what it
"should" have been, but the state review is of the locality's
prospective policy without an attempt to tie that policy to a
specific numerical quota. This approach was in fact the one used
by EOCD under the "Self-Help" memorandum of understanding. 3 8 8
Towns were triggered into the review process by a numerical
standard but were evaluated ultimately under soft standards
applied to their prospective promises. The formula in effect
established "prima facie" violations of fair share
responsibilities. Moreover, a final resolution of the content of
fair share was avoided in another way. The numerical standard was
3 8 7 Oregon has adopted a form of this approach, 222 p. 142
infra.
388Lgg discussion at p.15 supra.
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not absolute but relative. Municipalities were compared against
each other instead of some calculated "need."
Let us examine the "Self-Help" approach more closely. This
method compared the percentage growth of a community (over a ten
year period and adjusted by a subsidized housing bonus) to the
adjusted percentage growth of the region in which the community
was located. 3 8 9 The town that grew at the regional average thus
would have a growth index equal to 1.0 Towns with an index below
a set floor--which varied from .75 to .80--were triggered in to
the review process. 3 9 0
There were in fact three sets of regions used and therefore
three growth indices. 3 9 1 A community had to fall below the floor
on all three indices to trigger the withholding and review
process. 3 9 2 Urban areas were excluded from the regions. In
effect, then, suburbs were compared against other suburbs. 3 9 3 The
3 8 9 Interview with John F. Loehr, Policy Planner EOCD (Dec.
7, 1982). The exact formula was as follows:
1970-79 local build'g permits + sub. housing bonus
total 1970 local housing units
INDEX = --------------------------------------------------------
1970-79 regional build'q permits + sub. housing bonus
total 1970 regional housing units
The subsidized housing bonus = 3 x's the number of subsidized
units built.
390
391.I.. The three sets of regions were the Regional Planning
Agency regions, the Housing Needs Regions drawn from Apgar &
Solomon, n. 351 supra, and a new set of regions drawn by EOCD
based on a somewhat subjective evaluation of the location of
major highways, distances from regional centers, town character,
etc.
392
393
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implicit theory that underlies this formulation is to isolate the
effects of restrictive regulation by grouping together
municipalities of presumably similar desirability facing similar
growth pressures. 3 9 4 In many ways this model is similar to the
second model in the MIT study of fair share formulas but with no
resolution down to a specific numerical quota. A hard fair share
model is based on the assumption that similarly situated towns
should grow at the same rate. EOCD's growth index test was based
on the assumption that similarly situated towns should grow at
rates not too disparate from each other.
Though such a hybrid version is less comprehensive than the
"fair is fair" model, it may well create less political
resitanc3. In fact this approach appears to blend the political
advantages of both exLrme versions. It both plays communities
off against each other, like the hard fair share model, and
avoids specific allocations of growth, like the "fair is fair"
model. Further, comparing towns agains each other may provide
enough of a bais to distinguish which towns should be allowed to
control growth directly.
EOCD's growth index test was structured so as to have a
clear bias toward leniency. The minimum floors were set quite
low, three sets of regions were used, and municipalities were
given an opportunity to show special circumstances as to why
their index came out so-low. Providing individual review is
desirable if the associated administrative costs are not too
394How sensitive this approach is to "micro-climate"
variations in demand and growth pressures remains to be tested.
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high, but a more balanced approach is needed to uncover towns
with restrictive policies despite their passing the growth index
test. One solution might be to give housing consumer groups
administrative standing to show special circumstances why the
growth index came out too high. Moreover, towns with high growth
indices should be rewarded. The more competition that can be
created between municipalities, the less important the conflict
between municipalities and the state will become.
There are some administrative problems with EOCD's version
of the hybrid approach. Building permit information was used
instead of units constructed because EOCD felt it to be a better
measure of a community's permissiveness toward new housing. EOCD
rejected the building permit index all together when they
discovered almost no correlation between building permits granted
and housing stock constructed data taken from the census. 3 9 5 This
data collection problem does not appear insurmountable. No matter
which measure EOCD chooses, it has the power to require
communities to submit such data to it. 3 9 6 To the extent that
communities are not aware of such information there will be
administrative costs in obtaining it, but these costs are
probably outweighed by the benefits of having each community
aware of exactly how much growth is occuring.
3 9 5 Interview with John F. Loehr, Policy Planner, EOCD (Dec.
7, 1982).
3 9 6 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 23B §3 (West 1981).
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Another problem is the fact of great fluctuation in the
amount of new construction per year in any one place. 3 9 7 One
cannot take the number of units built as a measure of
restrictiveness unless this figure is averaged over a significant
period of time. But the longer the period of time, the less
meaningful the figure is as a measurement of current policy.
Weighted averages help, but do not eliminate the problem. The
existence of these fluctuations may itself provide a reason to
base review on a municipality's policies and not on a numerical
standard.
Our last task is to examine the current standard that EOCD
uses in the administratiion of Executive Order No. 215: the
presence of subsidized family housing within a community. The
standard is not without some merit. The lack of any subsidized
housing within a community may be important in itself and it may
give some indication of the community's restrictiveness in
general. Moreover, the standard is objective and "hard." Still,
the standard remains extremely narrow and arbitrary. For example,
the standard takes no account of the relative amount of
subsidized family housing. A large community with minimal
397Note for example that in the decade of the 1960's
building permits issued per year for Boston varied from 1,292 to
9,930, and for Springfield from 135 to 1,572, the two
municipalities for which one would expect the least variation.
The highs and lows of various municipalities did not correspond
well with time indicating that the variations were caused by
other factors in addition to the general economic environment.
Ega Mas. Dept. of Commerce and Development Lew Home Building in
Massachusetts: 1961-1271 (1972).
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subsidized housing which meets the test may be more restricitve
than a small community with none. Further, the standard makes no
attempt to factor in the presence of rental subsidy programs
though one could well argue that such programs might be a more
desirable solution to the housing problem. 3 9 8 Lastly, a
community's absence of subsidized housing may in fact say very
little about its restrictiveness of housing in general.
Considering the fact that subsidized housing funds are in such
short supply anyway, one could well question this emphasis.
D. Conclusion.
A solution based on a housing allocation formula to
determine each community's "fair share" is extremely attractive,
but entails political problems that may preclude its adoption or
effectiveness. It attempts a final resolution of goals and value
structures that may defy final resolution. But all is not lost.
Our real concerns that led us to fair share may be able to be met
in other ways. For example, impediments to growth can be attacked
without attempting to allocate specific growth to specific areas.
The disparities that still occured might be able to alleviated in
other ways. To the extent that some numerical standard is needed
to accompany the authorization of direct growth controls, fair
share models can be tempered into various soft alternatives. A
numerical standard could be used to determine prima facie
3 9 8 See J. Yinger, State Housing Policy for the Poor (dis-
cussion draft of unpublished paper; Aug. 1982).
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violations, while a municipality's policies are ultimately
evaluated against more flexible standards. Or communities could
compared against each other without mandating how much growth
each community should accept. Lastly, housing consumer groups
could be given some form of administrative standing to ensure a
more balanced debate.
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CHAPTER _Y
Intervention Options
In Chapter III, we stressed the importance of the "directive
approach" to local policy reform, the inclusion of external
interests in local decision-making. 3 9 9 Executive Order No. 215
is modelled to serve the directive approach but has not--and
perhaps could not have--been used in this manner. The directive
approach was itself subdivided into the mandatory approach
(taking certain choices out of local hands) and the incentive
approach (changing a locality's self-interest). This chapter
will attempt a more sophisticated assessment of the range of
options available to the state under the directive approach.
A. Altering Local Discretion
Under this approach, the problem of exclusionary regulation
is viewed as stemming from the amount of discretion granted to
local governments. The solution, then, is to pull back some of
the authority delegated to municipalities and/or constrain its
use. An extreme version of this approach would be to take land
use policy out of the hands of local governments completely and
399Egg discussion at p. 107, supra.
138
make it solely a state issue. This option will not be considered
below because not only is it of questionable desirability, it is
outside the range of political possibilities. 4 0 0 The real
question is how to achieve certain state objectives while living
within a regime of local discretion.
1) static model: changing th-e rules D-f -tb- game
One solution is to amend present enabling legislation to
provide for standards limiting local discretion. This approach
returns to first priniciples in its questioning of the legitimate
scope of regulation. Local discretion is to be retained within
an acceptable range of standards. Zoning enabling acts, for
example, could be amended so as to prohibit, say, three acre
zoning or to limit the conditions under which it could be
imposed. Subdivision control legislation could be amended so as
to limit the street width that could be imposed or to prohibit
requirements of, say, granite curbing.
Some such limitations have been enacted. The Mass. Zoning
Enabling Act, for example, explicitly precludes municipalities
400Not even Oregon, a state much more amenable to strong
state intervention in land use planning, has gone to this
extreme. For a discussion of the Oregon system ag& p. 142 infr.
Perhaps the most extreme override was enacted by New York in the
creation of the Urban Development Corporation (UDC), which was
given the power in effect to override local zoning for the
development of low and moderate income housing. 1968 N.Y. Laws
ch. 174, N.Y. Unconsol. Laws ch. 252 §1 et seq. (Consol. 1977).
The UDC enabling act was later amended to modify this override
power by giving communities the power to veto proposed UDC
development in residential areas within their borders. 1973 N.Y.
Laws ch. 446, N.Y. Unconsol. Laws ch. 252 §15(5)(Consol. 1977).
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from restricting the interior area of a single family home. 4 0 1 A
recent amendment to the subdivision control enabling statute
prohibits communities from applying stricter road and street
standards to new devlopment than that "commonly applied by that
city or town to...its publicly financed ways located in similarly
zoned districts within such city or town." 4 0 2 Still, calls for
this type of reform are relatively scarce and examples that have
been enacted are even scarcer. 4 0 3 Three explanations are
possible. The first is that this approach is just too simple,
not sophisticated enough to capture the hearts and minds of
planning reformers. The second is that this approach is
considered too blunt, that is, that it does not leave enough room
and flexibility for legitimate local discretion. The last is
that it is simply too difficult politically, that people and
interest groups do not want to face up to the question of what is
an illegitimate regulation.
4 0 1 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40A §3 (West 1981).
4021981 Mass. Acts ch. 459, amending Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41
§81Q. There have as yet been no judicial interpretations of this
extremely ambiguous requirement. Note that this requirement may
in effect by rendered meaningless by the fact that most
communities currently do virtually no road building of their own.
Interview with Donald Schmidt, Adminstrator of the Office of
Local Assistance, EOCD (April 5, 1983).
403Many such bills are in fact filed each year, but gain
little support in the face of strong "home rule" ideology. Two
examples of bills that were filed but failed to garner sufficient
support are an act that would have prohibited minimum lot sizes
above one acre except upon special showing of public need and an
act that would have prohibited discrimination against pre-
fabricated housing. Interview with Donald Schmidt, Administrator
of the Office of Local Assistance, EOCD. (April 5, 1983).
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2) Dynamic9 models
It is possible to confine local discretion without resolving
the question of what regulation is illegitimate. These dynamic
models are based on procedural determinations of legitimacy. A
bypassing of the final resolution of the question may also bypass
the impediments to reform associated with the static model.
b)review model: Under this model, local regulations are
subject to review by a state body. Courts currently have this
power, but because of the lack of standards in enabling statutes,
they are essentially limited to consitutional review.40 4 Because
of the presumption of validilty normally granted to local
legislative acts, 4 0 5 this review in effect amounts to no review
at all by all but extremely activist courts. 4 0 6 In
4 0 4 0ne commentator has argued that the delegation doctrine
should be applied to zoning enabling statutes. Payne, Delegation
Doctrine in _he Reform _Q Local Government Law: .e Exclusionary
_Zoning, 29 Rutgers L. Rev. 803 (1976).
405See e.g., Crall v Lg.minster, 362 Mass. 95, 102, 284
N.E.2d 610, 615 (1972) ("every presumption is to be made in favor
of [municipal by-laws' and ordinances'] validity, and that their
enforcement will not be refused unless it is shown beyond
reasonable doubt that they conflict with the applicable enabling
act or the Constitution.")
4063geg n. 351 supra. Massachusetts courts have not been
interventionist despite the early date at which they recognized
the problem of exclusionary zoning. 3oe Simon ... Town Qf
Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942) (one acre zoning
upheld, but strong dicta arguing that the zoning power cannot be
used for exclusionary purposed); see also Aronson IL. Town _Q
Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964)(zoning by-law
requiring 2-1/2 acre minimum lot size and 200 foot minimum lot
width held invalid).
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Massachusetts, zoning by-laws must be approved by the attorney
general.407  In theory, the attorney general would be applying
the same standards a court would use. In practice, the
requirement of attorney general approval might hold towns to
stricter standards, and certainly amounts to some increased state
oversight.408
The presumption of constitutional validity could be reversed
by statute,40 9 thus inducing increased judicial intervention, or
legislatures could adopt statutory tests of legitimacy, for
example, disavowing local regulation that unduly raises the cost
of housing. This method would be structurally similar to the
static model but with softer standards of legitimacy.
Oregon has given a state adminsitrative agency the power to
review local land use policy. 4 1 0 One of the administrative
standards promulgated is that local policy should "encourage the
availability of adequate numbers of housing at prices reasonably
commensurate with the financial capabilities of Oregon
4 0 7 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40 §32 (West Supp. 1981), ch.
40A §5 (West 1979).
4 0 8 Interview with Donald Schmidt, Administrator of the
Office of Local Assistnce, EOCD (April 5, 1983).
40 9California has in fact taken such a step. Cal. Gov't
Code §65302.8 (West Supp. 1982)(switching the burden of proof to
municipalities and requiring certain findings when they adopt or
amend "a mandatory general plan element which operates to limit
the number of housing units that may be constructed on an annual
basis.") One commentator doubts this new provision will produce
any substantive change. Lefcoe, n. 366 supra at 485.
4101973 Or. Laws ch. 80.
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households." 4 1 1 Pursuant to this standard, the state agency has
invalidiated such local actions as a proposed downzoning and a
conditional use permitting procedure which had standards that
were considered too vague. 4 1 2
b) political model: This model works on the theory that if
the results of a political process are consistently skewed to
favor certain interests, counter interests should be given a
stronger voice in the political process. One example of this
approach would be to give housing consumer groups administrative
or judicial standing to challenge local regulation. 4 1 3 These
groups are otherwise de facto excluded from local decision-
41 10AR 660-15-000, Goal 10 (1974), as adopted by the state
agency, the Land Conservation and Development Comm'n.
4 1 2 Note, LCDC Goal l-u Oregon's Solution ±Q Exclusionary
zoning, 16 Williamette L. Rev. 873, 877, 879 (1980), citing
Seaman y, Cit 2f Durham LCDC No. 77-025 (April 18,
1978)(upzoning found to violate Goal 10) & Denial of Acknowledg-
ment of Compliance, City of St. Helens Comprehensive Plan (Aug.
11, 1978)(approval standards found too vague).
413Executive Order 215 does allow for virtually any
party to present evidence that a community is unreasonably
restrictive of new housing growth, but this practice has never
been actively encouraged nor would it be of much help given the
standards of restrictiveness which EOCD has used. 3g& EOCD,
Local Housing Policies And State Development Assistance: A Guide
-to Executive Or der KQ. 2,U (1982).
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making. 414
Another example would be to amend the zoning enabling act to
authorize zoning amendments by a simple majority vote. But the
effects of such a change are far from obvious. Under some
circumstances, this change would tip the balance in favor of pro-
growth forces. 4 1 5 But the overall effect of such a statutory
amendment might be to increase the control of those wishing to
exclude development. 4 1 6
c) conditional authority model: Another approach is to
condition local authority on a functional test of legitmacy. One
example would be to authorize direct local control of growth but
to suspend such authority once the community fell below a certain
numerical standard. Automatic suspension of authority seems a
more workable approach than that of the proposed Balanced Growth
414Even where housing interest groups have been incorporated
it is doubtful that they can demonstrate the requisite "injury in
fact" to obtain judicial standing. ELf Sav tb Bay, Inc.v,
Dept,.&f Public Utilities, 366 Mass. 667, 322 N.E.2d 742 (1977)
(standing of organizational plaintiffs ruled doubtful under
applicable statute not here relevant).
Other states have loosened their standing requirements. EL
Laurel l, n. 349 supra reserved the question of "organizational
standing." 336 A.2d at 717 n. 3 (1975). That same year, the
N.J. legislature passed the Municipal Land Use Law which included
extremely liberal standing provisions. Based on these new
provisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court has approved standing to
sue on B.. Laurel grounds for "any organization that has the
objective of securing lower income housing opportunities in a
municipality." Hit Laurel II, n. 350 supra,, at 483.
415Zeg Lincoln case study at p. 27 supra.
4 1 6 That is, while the requirement of a two-thirds majority
entrenches the status quo of zoning, moving to a simple majority
system might allow more situations in which zoning could and
would be more restrictive.
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and Development Act which authorized growth management once a
town agreed to accept its fair share. 4 1 7
A functional test of legitimacy can be formulated in other
ways, e.g., it can be based on the type/price of the housing
built. Chapter 774 is essentially an enbodiment of this
approach. 4 1 8 Local regulation is deemed illegitimate if it
prevents the development of low income housing. There may be no
reason --other than political ones--to stop this theory at
subsidized housing; it could be extended to include all low and
moderate income housing whether public or private. This approach
would give developers the incentive to search for ways of cutting
housing costs and could be structured so as to pass most of these
cost savings on to housing consumers. 4 1 9 This tack could be
linked to a concept of fair share, i.e., a municipality would
417The numerical standard could be derived from a "hard fair
share" housing allocation formula or from a comparison of a
municipality's growth rate against the regional average. Egg
discussion at p. 130 supra.
Note that California has adopted a scheme that could be
called a hybrid of the review and conditional authority models.
Local land use regulation must be consistent with a "general
plan" which includes a housing element making "adequate provision
for the housing needs for all segments of the community." 3g& n.
354 supra. While the local plans are subject to state review, no
sanctions were specified for communities whose plans did not pass
muster. For an optimistic view of the prospects of the
California program, ee Burton, n. 351 supra; for a sharp
critique of the approach, aq Lefcoe n. 366, supra.
418= discussion at p. 00 supra.
41 9For example, ceilings could be set on the sales and
resales of new housinng like those established through
inclusionary zoning schemes.
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retain full authority once it a met a numerical quota, but this
may not be necessary or desirable.
B. Altering Local Interest
Under this approach, local discretion is not seen as the
problem. Rather, the problem of exclusionary regulation is
viewed as stemming from the fact that communities face a strong
disincentive to grow. The solution is to alter a municipality's
self-interest by removing the disincentives and offering
incentives. There are two major subcategories of incentives:
those tied directly to growth and those tied to policy changes
expected to produce more growth. The questions we must ask of
each are what sorts of incentives are appro-priate and how much
is needed to make the incentive effective?
1) Incentives Tied Directly .Qa Growth
There is no inherent reason that incentives need be tied to
policy reform. Incentives could, for example, be tied directly
to indicators of past growth through, for example, changing the
formulae through which local aid is distributed. Once the
formulae were reset, there would be no need for procedural review
of local policy. Municipalities would be afforded the maximum
degree of flexibility in setting their own policies, but would
have to pay the fiscal price for doing so.
Setting the formulae initially, however, raises difficult
political problems similar to those encountered in trying to
agree on a fair share formula. During the legislative debate on
the local aid formulae, each legislator will be forced to
consider whether his or her municipality will gain or lose under
the various proposals. These pressures may well preclude
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statesmanlike conduct than may be necessary to link local aid
with growth.420 Moreover, changing the formulae in this way
would somewhat diminish their predictability, a quality highly
desired by local officials. 4 2 1
How high would economic benefits have to be set in order to
induce changes in local policy? As long as the local polity
retains full control over local policy, we are led back to the
initial reasons why local residents oppose growth. For
compensation schemes to have real effects on policy, enough
voters must be induced to "switch sides" to change the outcome.
For this switch to occur, these people will have to be
compensated for the full "costs" of development to them. As was
stated earlier, 4 2 2 these costs entail much more than any net
fiscal loss to the community. The most important elements are
the loss in private value of extant homes and the loss in
amenities. Unless enough of these costs are compensated,
economic reimbursement cannot be successful as an incentive.
There is also a question of whether people will understand
the incentives even if they are set high enough to work. This
question can be given some perspectve by asking whether the
current local aid formula is pro-growth or anti-growth.
420This problem parallels that of trying to decide on a
"fair share formula".
4 2 lInterview with Joseph L. Flatley, Ass't Sec'y, EOCD (Oct.
19, 1982).
4229gg discussion at p. 91 supra.
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The presence of local aid helps mitigate the impact of new
development which has perceived fiscal costs outweighing expected
revenues. 4 2 3 Still, the present formulae taken on their own
terms are neither strongly pro-growth nor anti-growth. That is,
given the present local aid formulae, it is not clear whether
pro-growth policies will increase or decrease local aid per
capita in a community. 4 2 4 More importantly, the relationship is
423The largest drain on local budgets is school costs.
Developments that bring with them large numbers school ae
children would otherwise be considered highly fiscally
undesirable. The most important local aid formula--accounting
for almost half of total aid distributed--allocates aid in
proportion to the number of "weighted full-time equivalent
pupils" within a school district. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 70 §1
et seq. (West 1982). Development with school age children can
now more than "pay for itself".
42 4Note that the ch. 70 formula, n. 426 supra, includes a
"hold harmless" provision that guarantees communities 107% of
what they received in aid in 1978. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 70 §6
(West 1982). Thus, many communities cannot increase their ch. 70
local by accepting development with school age children unless
they accepted enough to outweigh the effect of the "hold
harmless" floor. In fact, until this "tipping point" were
reached, such development presents the same disincentives as if
no local aid existed by reducing funds available for other
purposes. The formula that was used up to 1978 favored wealthier
communities because it was based on a percentage reimbursement of
school expenditures. Thus, the "hold harmless" provision appears
to discourage the growth of family housing in wealthier
communities. 9eg generally, League of Women Voters of Mass.,
"Achieving Equitable State Aid for Education," Impact: 2-1/2, no.
41 (Jan. 1, 1983).
Note further that it would be more exact to use changes in
local aid per capita as the measure of impact of development on
local aid, though such estimates get rather complex for ch. 70
local aid. Another local aid formula manifests the following
relationship between local aid per capita and new development:
local aid per capita increases if the percentage change in
assessed valuation due to the new development is less than the
percentage change in population due to the new development.
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 58 §18C (West Supp. 1981).
148
so complex and non-obvious that the exact formulae used to
disburse local aid probably influences local behavior very
little. 4 2 5 People might sense the effects over time and feed
this information back into their attitudes toward growth, but
these effects are probably masked by other factors such as
reevaluations, changing tax laws, and changing service levels.
Therefore, without a strong pro-growth tilt coupled with a public
education campaign at both the state and local levels, it is
unreasonable to expect small changes in the local aid formulae to
have any substantial impact on local attitudes or actions. 4 2 6
There is another impediment as well, which holds true of all
the economic incentive options. The "costs" that new development
brings to a community are relatively fixed and long term. The
added benefit offered by the state to compensate for these costs
is subject to the winds of political change. Statutes can be
amended and state administrations can change; it is somewhat
harder to raze someone's home.
There does not appear to be great cause of optimism that
changing the local aid formulae could induce substantial change
4 2 5 Even though ch. 70 aid amounts to almost half of total
local aid, there are some 40 formulae in all. Their
complications are immediately apparent to anyone who cares to
unearth them.
4 26The link between accepting new development and obtaining
the monetary incentives could be made quite direct. Note a
scheme of "Municipal Incentive Grants," enacted in canada which
funnels a grant of $1,000 to communities for each specified type
of lower priced housing unit they accept. Hack & Polk, n. 308
suipra at 49.
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in local regulation. In one sense, however, the efficacy of
using these formulae as incentives is irrelevant to the
desirability of amending them. That is, compensation is an
important goal in itself whether or not changes in policy are
induced. Some losses such as efficiency losses caused by too
rapid local growth, of course, cannot be remedied through
compensation alone. 4 2 7
2) Incentives tie to local reform:
Alternatively, state incentives could be tied directly to
local policy reform and not to the levels of housing built.
(a) pure mone model: One form of this approach would be to
set aside a certain percentage of local aid money and channel it
to communities that met state growth policy standards. The main
benefit of this approach is to make explicit the link between the
incentive offered and the action that the state is attempting to
induce. The disadvantages are of four kinds. First, most of the
problems of the local aid formula approach are still present such
as whether the incentive can be set high enough to produce real
change.42 8 Second, the administrative costs of the program are
higher due to the added review of local policies. Third, to the
extent that communities can meet state standards without having
4272Se discussion at p. 129.
42 8The problem of increased unpredictability is even greater.
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to accept new growth,429 compensation will be less synchronized
to the real costs and disparities created. Last, this approach
probably has less of a chance of being enacted than changing the
local aid formulae. 4 3 0 There is currently talk of a local aid
set-aside for education. 4 3 1 Not only does this set-aside claim
priority over one for growth, its passage would probably preclude
the passage of a second one for any purpose.
b) discretionary funding: Another form of this method is to
tie the local policy reform to discretionary funding, which
brings us back to Executive Order No. 215. In what way is this
version different than the pure money model? That in part
depends on the degree of relatedness between the reform objective
and the funding programs to which it is to be linked. Take, for
example, the Self-Help open space acquistion program. While they
are not inherently linked, open space preservation is associated
in the public mind with exclusionary growth policies. 4 3 2 Through
4 29This discrepancy could be due to the ability of local
opposition to stop growth through other means or through a lack
of demand where housing was assigned.
430Note that a local aid set-aside was proposed during the
drafting of the Balanced Growth & Development Act and was
rejected almost immediately as politically unfeasible. Welles,
n. 18 supra at 74.
431le e.g., Lockman, "Dukakis says he'll work to improve
local-aid system," Boston Globe, March 6, 1983, at 21, col 5.
4 32The reputation of the town of Lincoln demonstrates this
association. Interview with Robert A. Lemire, former Chairman of
the Lincoln Conservation Comm'n (Feb. 13, 1983). The case of
Lincoln also demonstrates that open space preservation and the
development of low and moderate income housing need not be
mutually exclusive.
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open space preservation communities are able to retain amenities
to themselves, excluding others along the way. To some extent
such tactics are justified when a municipality spends its own
money. It does seem inappropriate, however, for the state in
effect to subsidize a locality's exclusionary policies.
Therefore, conditioning open space acquisition funding on the
restrictiveness of housing policy does appear rational.
The links to other grant programs are not as strong. Take,
for example, sewer construction funding and other true
"development related assistance." At first blush there appears
to be a strong rationality behind the argument that growth should
occur where such development funds are spent. 4 3 3 But the real
link is between growth and all sewers, not between growth and
those municipalities currently applying for state sewer funding.
Unless similar sanctions are retroactively applied to all
municipalities with sewers, conditioning such funds on housing
policy will be grossly underinclusive and perceived as unfair.
Further, it is important to consider the validity of
conditioning the discretionary funds not in the abstract but in
the political environment in which it occurs. Consider the pure
money model in which there is little symbolic link in the public
perception between bare dollars and growth policy. But such a
link would be created were a statute passed after extensive
4 3 3This would help ensure, for example, an efficient use of
the infrastructure built.
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public debate of the issue. Conversely, if state discretionary
funds are perceived to have been passed for other purposes, the
public perception of the strength of the link diminishes. To the
extent that this occurs, conditions imposed by executive fiat
will be perceived as arbitrary and coercive. The administration
will be perceived as holding the funds hostage because they
constitute the only leverage available, and any rational link
that might otherwise exist will be obscured.
These fine distinctions help distinguish between "sanctions"
and "incentives". Structurally, the two are identical. The
differnce exists in the public perception of the relative
coerciveness of the state action. When incentives are perceived
as illegitimate, they become sanctions. This legitimacy in turns
rests primarily on whether the policy has been generated out of
an open political process in which the localities have had a say
and secondarily on the perceived rationality of the linkage
between the incentives being offered and the reform being sought.
Public acceptance of the linkage also diminishes as the
importance of the independent goal behind the funding program
increases. Imagine, for example, if the state attempted to
condition hazardous waste cleanup funds on local housing policy.
This policy would not necessarily be irrational, but surely no
public would stand for it.
Making discretionary funds the incentive has another defect
as well. The effectiveness of the incentive is tied to the
availability of the funding and the existence of municipal need
for that funding. There is no comprehensiveness to this
approach; municipalities are only triggered into the process as
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they desire the funding and as they apply for it. Moreover, if
the threat of retribution in future funding rounds is the only
means of enforcement, the efficacy of this threat depends on the
future availability of state funding and future local need for
the funding as well as on the withholding policy staying in
effect at the time of both of these conditions are true. 4 3 4
As was true of the other economic incentives examined, one
can well wonder how much real change can be effected through the
level of incentives that can be offered. If a locality had to
replace the withheld funding, its tax rate would increase very
little. 4 3 5 But there are several important mitigating factors.
First, not all tax dollars are equal; marginal increases in the
rate of taxation are politically more significant than their
mathematically equivalent share of the existing tax bill.
Second, Proposition 2-1/2 has put explicit limits on increases in
434se e.g., Lincoln case study, p. 27 supra. Towns have
traditionally made application for discretionary funding on the
order of once every three to four years though this is expected
to increase due to recent large state appropriations. Interview
with John F. Loehr, Policy Planner, EOCD (April 15, 1983).
435Note, for example, that a town with an equalized assessed
tax base of $200 million could replace a $200,000 grant in 4
years with a tax increase of about 32 cents per $1000 of
equalized assessed (assuming an interest rate of 10%).
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the local tax rate and the local tax levy. 4 3 6 Third, when the
state is susidizing a large share of a local project the
attractiveness of that project to the municipality increases
dramatically, beyond the economic value of the state subsidy.
Therefore local proponents of the project will lobby extra hard
for those measures that will win release of the state funding.
Lastly, the projects to be funded may provide a more appropriate
and acceptable "medium of exchange" than bare dollars. A town
might be willing to make a trade of accepting more growth for
obtaining more open space even where cash of equal value might be
perceived as either insufficient or offensive as a bribe.
Manipulating local interest to the point where some vo ters
would switch sides in order to obtain the funding is not enough
to effect local policy reform. There is still a need for
bargaining and enforcement mechanisms to translate this
willingness into such reform. Consider the case of Lincoln,
again, where the proponents of the open space project were keenly
interested in doing whatever had to be done to obtain release of
the funding. These proponents, however, not only could not bind
the town as a whole, the perception that they attempted to bind
4361980 Mass. Acts ch. 580 (by initiative), as amended by
1981 Mass. Acts. ch. 782. Local property tax rates are limited to
an equalized rate of 2-1/2%. Tax levies are limited to 102.5% of
what they had been the previous year, though there is now a
provision that allows a further increase equal to the value of
new development multiplied by the tax rate of the previous year.
1981 Mass. Acts ch. 782 SSO.
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the town itself may have encumbered local policy ref orm. 4 3 7
The efficacy of conditioning discretionary funding on local
policy as an incentive mechanism may again be somewhat
irrelevant. Such linkage may still be important as partial
compensation for the disparities created by exclusionary
policies. In order for this compensation goal to succeed,
however, EOCD has to be willing to turn some grant proposals
down, that it attach conditions that municipalities are un-
willing to accept. When communities are excused without giving
up anything in return, the compensation goal is subverted.
Put another way, if the state is left without a position
from which to bargain, little real bargaining can take place.
Many of the state-local interaction under 215 have the appearance
of bargaining, but there has been little bargaining in fact. It
appears to have been an accepted fact that the towns eventually
would receive their funding. 4 3 8 What appears to be bargaining is
merely quibbling over the exact form of ambiguity to let the
towns off the hook. This situation is likely to continue because
it gives each of the actors the appearance that their goals are
being satisfied.
Another way of viewing the effort to condition discretionary
funding on local growth policy stems from deficiencies in the
grants programs themselves. While the funding programs look to
437Zgg discussion at p.28 supra.
43 8For possible explanations of this practice, se
discussionn at p. 109 supra.
156
the community's need for the proposed project, the relative need
for state funding for the project is statutorily irrelevant. The
situation is in reality worse because wealthy communities have
the resources to be able to put together winning proposals. 4 3 9
EOCD's efforts to link discretionary funding and growth policy
can be seen as an attempt to provide an economic type of needs
based test without saying so. Therefore, some of the concerns
behind conditioning the funds could be met through explicitly
adopting such a test and by providing increeased technical grant
writing assistance to the municipalities. One wonders, of
course, to what extent such measures are politically feasible. 4 4 0
C. Hybrid Solution
The alternatives of altering local discretion and altering
local interest wre not meant to be mutually exclusive. In fact,
combinations of the two approaches will be necessary as neither
one can be sufficient alone. Controlling local discretion cannot
4 3 9 The problem is in fact worse due to the fact that
wealthier communities have the resources to draft "winning" grant
applications. The town of Lexington, for example, was able to
receive $600,000 in Self-Help funding in one year for the
purchase of eleven separate parcels. EOEA implemented a partial
remedy to this problem in the Self-Help program through the use
of a "sliding scale" which decreases the percentage of state
reimbursement once a community has received specified amounts of
funding. See memorandum from Daniel L. Oullette, Planner in the
Division of Conservation Services, EOEA, to John A. Bewick,
Sec'y, EOEA (April 18, 1979).
4 4 0 That is, to what extent would representatives from many
communities vote for a change in state discretionary funding that
would ensure that their communities would receive little or no
funding.
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be sufficient, because when communities have a strong interest to
exclude growth, they will find alternate routes to achieve that
end. 4 4 1  Controlling a locality's self-interest is sufficient in
theory, but impossible to obtain in practice. As we noted
earlier, one strong inducement to exclude growth is the
preservation of private wealth. Full levelling of interest
between communities would require the levelling of wealth between
individuals.
There are various ways to combine the different approaches.
First, they could simply be enacted at the same time. For
example, state zoning standards could be adopted concurrently
with changes in the local aid formulae. Second, the approaches
themselves could be dynamically linked together. For example,
the conditional authority approach examined in Part A could
itself be used as an incentive mechanism. This is in fact the
approach that ch. 774 takes. 4 4 2 The statute offers localities
exemptions from preemption if they can meet the crude state
standards delineated therein. Expanding and fine-tuning the list
of exemptions could have the effect of strengthening the 774
441For a parallel discussion of the same problem as to the
siting of hazardous waste treatment facilities, ee L. Bacow & J.
Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste
Facilities: 2he Massachusetts Approach, 6 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
265, 272-275 (1982).
442Zgg discussion at p. 4 supra.
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approach instead of weakening it. 4 4 3
The need for a balanced "portfolio" approach can be
generalized further. Public policy-making is subject to the
phenomenon that underlying concepts come in and out of fashion.
The pendulum swings between alternate policy paradigms, from one
"idea in good currency" to its counter. 4 4 4 More often than not,
a scatter-shot approach is needed, but such approaches have
little of the "flash" that obtains academics and politicians
their jobs. Executive Order No. 215 can be thought of as the
result of such a pathology. It is so disappointing precisely
because it is so seductive and because it promises so much. But
one stroke of the pen cannot possibly overcome the interests at
stake. As structured and administered, 215 appears to be another
liberal program doomed to failure seemingly from the start. This
forces the question of to what extent such measures are passed
and continued because they appear to offer the best of both
worlds, the illusion of reform.
D. Conclusion
The directive approach that is necessary to effect sub-
stantial local reform can be further subdivided into attempts to
control local discretion and attempts to alter local interest.
44 3Such a change was proposed by the state at least as far
back as in City and 192W Centers, supra n. 20 at 79.
For a discussion of how such an amendment at ch. 774 might
be structured, agg B. Parker, An Alternative tg .CLh.,. 12A,
(unpublished paper, Feb. 1978).
4 4 4Seg Schon, Beyond g Stable State, 123 (1971).
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The first option questions the legitimacy of local regulation.
Measures of legitimacy can be set through the enactment of state
standards or through the enactment of various dynamic tests. The
second option seeks to induce local reform through the offering
of incentives. Where these incentives cannot overcome local
resistance to growth they may still be important as partial
compensation for the disparities created by exclusionary
policies. Both of these options should be used as neither one
can be sufficient on its own.
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CHAPTER 3U
Summary and Recommendations
This chapter will attempt to build on the analysis done thus
far and to give specific recommendations as to what actions
should follow. It will not posit some ideal form of state
intervention,4 4 5 but will rather propose an agenda of the
important issues that need to be addressed and ways these issues
should be approached.
A. 215 In Retrospect: An Institutional Perspective _Qn What
Went Wrong
The birth of Executive Order No. 215 is traceable to the
frustration of key policy-makers with the failure of the
legislative process to implement a comprehensive response to the
growth policy issue. The felt imperative to "do something" lead
to the search for ways to leverage available means. What emerged
was an administrative practice to withhold funding from
4 4 5 Aside from other obvious faults, such an approach would
be of little value. To have a chance of succeeding, an attempt
to solve the problem of local land use policy must, of course,
emerge from an open political process and not out of the head of
one outside observer.
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communities in the attempt to induce local land use policy
change.
The administrative practice of withholding funds borrowed
heavily from the incentive-based, process-oriented theory that
underlay the proposed legislative initiative. But the form of
the intervention as executive fiat and the reliance on available
means necessarily altered the essence of that intervention. 4 4 6
Yet there appears to have been a lack of reflexive thinking as to
what this transformation would mean. Some of the goals behind
the proposed Balanced Growth and Development Act were simply
broken out and given the particular imprint of the administrators
involved. There was little rethinking as to whether these goals
made sense on their own and little open debate as to their
particular form. The exact goals that 215 would be used to
achieve seemed to have been either ignored or suppressed.
There was also a marked absence of critical analysis as to
how the 215 mechanism could have worked, a fact which seems
surprising in retrospect given its inherent structural limita-
tions. Even if these limitation were not realized from the
start, they should have been apparent during the earliest stages
4 4 6 Note, for example, that the promulgation of the policy as
an executive order diminished potential public acceptance of the
state intervention. A program with systematic goals and
comprehensive application was transformed into one comprising
essentially one-on-one confrontations between the state agency
and selected municipalities based on criteria and goals
determined entirely by the agency. The reliance on available
means constrained not only the incentives the state had to offer
the towns, but also the form and scope of the actions that the
towns could offer in return.
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of its implementation. But after 215 was born, it began to take
on a life of its own. The initial goals behind the withholding
policy were partially suppressed by the new goal of justifying
its existence. Success became measured by the ability to exact
agreements from the towns and not by the substance of what those
agreements entailed; and bargaining-in-appearance masked little
bargaining-in-fact. Overall, the role of the executive order
could be said to be to uncover just enough conflict to impress us
how the order has succeeded when this conflict is purportedly
resolved through the state-local agreements. If this analysis is
correct, where should we go from here?
B. Whither 215?
1) Clarification _Qf Goals
One of the biggest deficiences in the 215 process is a lack
of clarification of the goals that the withholding of the
discretionary funding is intended to serve. The scope and
magnitude of the incentives that 215 has to offer are dwarfed by
the range of ends it has attempted to accomplish. At one time or
another, 215 was intended to be used or was in fact used to
attempt to achieve all of the following goals:
- raising of public consciousnss
- educating municipalities as to ways they can accomodate
growth with less disruption
- overcoming opposition to the siting of subsidized
housing
- lowering the cost of housing
- increasing the supply of housing built
- improving the efficiency of use of state funded capital
improvements
- preserving local control
- compensating municipalities for some of the impacts of
new housing development
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In attempting to serve all of these goals, the order risks
serving none of them.
This is not to say that the state should resign itself to
interventions that serve a single purpose. Indeed, one of the
most important roles of any planning intervention is to uncover
ways that conflicting interests can be mediated and multiple ends
can be achieved. But attempts to mediate conflict must be
tempered with a realistic assessment of what can be achieved
given the underlying structure of intersts and a clarity of
purpose that keeps track of the goals that should be served.
Where conflicts cannot be resolved, it is the planner's duty to
point this out. A pretense of successful conflict resolution in
such a situation is both self-deluding and destructive in its
suppression of other initiatives.
It is imperative that the state resolve which of the many
goals should be served and to focus on how the goals of highest
priority ca be served. Despite the self-evident character of
this imperative, it seems to have been largely ignored during the
formulation and implementation of 215.
2) General Land Rae Policy Reform
The impact of restrictive, local growth policies presents a
strong case for state intervention. The existence of uneven
patterns of growth results in inefficient use of resources and
significant intermunicipal inequities. Moreover, while the
effect of restrictive policies on the overall supply and price of
housing may be relatively small, it may still be significant in
light of the fact that it is within the control of government.
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Even where the state chooses not to influence the pattern of
growth directly, it is appropriate to channel state money where
growth occurs. The biggest irony of Executive Order No. 215 is
that it has not been structured or administered to achieve these
ends.
The executive order is based on an informal bargaining model
under which trade-offs made by the parties in interest are
expected to produce a fair, efficient, and politically acceptable
solution. 4 4 7 But for at least the following reasons, the
executive order appears to present a singularly inappropriate
situation for bargaining:
- the state is not offering enough to effect the desired
result
- local officials doing the bargaining do not have the
authority to produce the desired result
- noncompliance with any bargained agreement is difficult
to measure
- enforcement mechanisms present are of questionable
effectiveness.
Both sides to the bargaining appear to be conscious of these
deficiencies. The state feels constrained from asking too much
at the same time that the towns are willing to go through the
bargaining process--which is little more than a minor
bureaucratic delay--in order to obtain their funding. Any
initial goals of intermunicipal redistribution to compensate for
the impact of growth are subverted by EOCD's release of the
447See e.g., M. O'Hare, L. Bacow & D. Sanderson, Facility
Siting an-d Local Opposition (1983).
165
funding no matter the lack of substantive reform obtained.
"Bargaining" directly with town meetings through the
issuance of ultimatums by the state could solve some of these
deficiencies and might allow a direct test of the importance of
the others. Such a direct approach would undoubtedly produce
problems of its own. But query to what degree these problems--
such as increased confrontational character of state-local
interactions -- simply manifest conflicting interests that are
otherwise buried. Put another way, any reasons for rejecting
this direct approach may call into qustion what can be achieved
through a bargaining process in general.
In sum, an approach that is based on tying incentives to
future promises of local reform does not seem advisable. A
preferable alternative would be simply to tie the incentive or
compensation payments to the amount of housing development that a
community hag accepted and/or to the present state of its land
use policy. The need for bargaining would be obviated,
communities would simply decide how much growth to accept or what
policies to enact in the face of the incentives offered.
Undoubtedly, some municipalities would choose not the meet state
standards, but these municipalities would forfeit their claim to
the state payments. Other communities would at least receive
partial compensation for the impact of development.
The present bargaining scheme has at least the appearance of
measuring local action by the particular desires of the state
officials. A mode of state intervention based instead on
measuring local action against past performance and/or the
present state of the community's policies should be perceived as
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less arbitrary. With due investigation and drafting, flexible
standards could be formulated that checked agency arbitrariness
without precluding flexibility. The original EOCD building per-
mit provides a useful model for further study as a measure of
past performance. 4 4 8 The examples listed in the "what are some
examples of exclusionary zoning practices" section of the guide
to 215 provides a useful starting point for further investigation
of standards to measure the current state of a community's land
use policy. 4 4 9
3) Subsidized Family Housing
It can be argued that EOCD has in fact chosen which of many
possible goals the withholding policy should serve. From its
origins as an instrument of general land use policy reform, 215
has been narrowed into a device that attempts to site subsidized
family housing in communities that have none. This goal may of
course merit EOCD's narrow emphasis. But this emphasis should be
reviewed in light of the following constraints.
(a)local oposition still important: At its best, 215 can
prompt local housing authorities to make funding application they
44848& discussion at p. 90 supra.
4493E EOCD, Local Housing Policies and State Development
Assistance: A Guide j2 Executive Order Xg i 25 (1982).
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should have been making anyway,450 and gain an endorsement of any
proposed development from other local officials. The executive
order cannot itself locate subsidized housing where town meeting
approval is needed. 4 5 1 Moreover, to the extent that 215 is seen
as coercive, its application could increase rather than decrease
local opposition. Even where subsidized housing is developed,
local opposition may prevent its successful use. 4 5 2
This does not mean, of course, that state planners must or
should give in to local opposition. It does, however, force the
issue of how the state should best focus its efforts to use its
limited resources to achieve the most good.
(b) housing funds are limited: State housing subsidies are
limited in supply. 4 5 3 Because of this fact, 215 embodies a
substantive policy of where subsidized family housing should be
built rather than a policy that it should be built. The goal of
seeing that every municipality accepts some subsidized family
housing may remain preeminent, but this decision should be made
in light of the trade-offs that must be made. Specifically,
locating public housing where it will be successful may not be
450In fact, many communities are applying for subsidized
housing funds on their own, including some towns that were
triggered into the 215 process. e& e.g., Reading case study at
p. 30 supra.
451See e.g., Lincoln case study at p. 27 supra.
452See e.g., Groveland case study at p. 42 supra.
453There is a possibility that public housing would garner
increased fiscal support if successful sitings of such housing
increased.
168
congruent with the goal of effecting the broadest distribution of
such housing. 4 5 4
(c) alternative means -f accomplishing ih. same ends: The
public housing goals behind 215 could potentially be served
through alternative means. For example, there may be other ways
of "selling" the ch. 705 scattered site housing program to
municipalities. Further, incentives could be directly tied to
accepting subsidized housing development within a community
instead of being tied to the promises of local officials to
support such development.
EOCD has focused on the acceptance of subsidized, family
housing development within a community, while virtually ignoring
the presence of rental assistance programs. A full assessment of
the alternatives would have to address whether this emphasis
makes sense. If rental assistance subsidies engender less local
opposition, perhaps this says more about the relative
454Measuring the success of public housing is a difficult
conceptual and empirical question that this paper has no
pretensions of answering. We simply raise the question in an
attempt to show that the implicit locational assumptions behind
the administration of 215 are far from self-evident. Any
allocation of scarce resource must pay particular attention to
where the expenditure of that resource can do the most good.
Note that the wing of EOCD that adminsters 215 has sought to
ensure that applications for state subsidized, family housing
funds from communities that have signed agreements under 215 be
given priority over other applications. This seems but another
step to justify the 215 intervention by hiding its deficiencies.
Giving these towns priority could have the effect of preventing
public housing where it is most needed. It may also have the
perverse effect of withholding state housing subsidies from towns
unless they concurrently apply for other discretionary funding.
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desirability of rental assistance than the need to overcome
opposition to subsidized development.
C. Beyond 215
1) Statutory Incentive Qr Compensation schemes
Assuming they could be enacted, statutory incentive schemes
would have two significant advantages over administrative
approaches. First, they might be able to provide the level of
incentives and the legal structure to effect substantial local
change. Second, the public debate surrounding the passage of
such a bill could be as important as the substance of any
measures enacted. Administrative interventions such as 215
suffer a lack of public exposure from those communities that have
not been directly affected. Statutory enactments also carry with
them broader based political support and hence increased moral
weight than mere administrative promulgations.
But statutory incentive schemes based on obtaining promises
as to future local action would encounter similar problems as
215. A system linked instead to indicators of past growth or
measures of current policy would be preferable here as well. An
appropriate change in the local aid formulae would be one of the
simplest solutions, though perhaps one of the hardest to enact.
An amendment of the discretionary funding statutes to include a
test of economic need is also advisable.
2) Constraining Local Discretion
In at least some areas, the most effective form of state
intervention would be the addition of state statutory standards
as to what is legitimate local regulation. This area merits
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increased state consideration in spite of the controversies that
are likely to be created. State intervention could range from
the enactment of simple "hard" standards to that of more general
and/or more elaborate tests of legitimacy. One of the more
elaborate schemas would be to expand the scope of ch. 774 beyond
merely subsidized housing. Such a change would of course
engender substantial political opposition even if the statute
were changed to accommodate more local planning interests, but
warrants further study. 4 5 5
3) Education goals and statutory authorization
In Chapter III we discussed the goal of helping a
municipality image ways of perceiving its full range of
options. 4 5 6 The executive order attempts to serve this goal once
a community's attention is held through the withholding of the
relevant funding. But the confrontational setting may itself
impede the success of these efforts. This raises the question of
whether the educational goals could better be served in other
ways. One answer might be simply to authorize local action that
455Note that housing advocates might produce the most
opposition to an alteration in ch. 774. Compare the case of rent
control which virtually all commentators agree is an inefficient
means of subsidizing rents, but which remains in place because
the supporters of rent subsidies can obtain no guarantee of a
better program being enacted. With pro-housing forces opposing
changes that could possibly weaken it and anti-growth forces
opposing changes that could possibly strengthen it, ch. 774 may
present the most severe form of entrenchment.
45632 discussion at p. 106 supra.
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could reduce the cost of local housing or to accommodate growth
in less disruptive ways. The statement of authority may be as
important as any actual grant of authority; municipalities
already have broad authority but seldom are able to think in
terms of their full range of possibilities. One example of where
a statute has been enacted to help stimulate local imagination
and initiative is the amendment to the zoning enabling act
authorizing cluster development. 4 5 7 An example of such an
amendment that could be enacted is the authorization of floating
zones where normal zoning and subdivision standards would be
waived in favor of special design or performance standards. 4 5 8
4) Growth Controls
The issue of growth controls is treated separately because
of its importance and because it includes aspects of each of the
three subsections above. The state should strongly consider the
adoption of a growth control enabling act. Municipalities
already have the power to enact "time based" growth controls. 4 5 9
If this power were simply taken away, it is likely that
municipalities will continue to find ways of excluding growth
4 5 7 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40A §2A (West 1979).
45 8Such a scheme might also be accomplished by authorization
for restrictions on the sales price of housing built under the
scheme to ensure public recapture of cost savings, but the
economic incidence of this inclusionary zoning variation should
be given further study.
45 9E- e.g., Sturges y. Town _Q Chilmark, 380 Mass. 246, 402
N.E.2d 1346 (1980) (growth control by-law upheld).
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through the imposition of dead weight costs. Further, there are
important positive gains through allowing communities to control
growth directly. 4 6 0 Therefore, there appear to be few reasons
not to enact a growth control enabling act. The difficult
substantive question is what standards and mechanisms should be
used to ensure that the power to control growth is not misused to
exacerbate overall housing restrictiveness. Chapters D and E
touched on one possible answer, the automatic suspension of
growth control authority once a community's share of the regional
growth fell below a specified standard.
Perhaps a more difficult problem is the political question
of how to enact such a growth control enabling act in the first
place. Proponents of growth are likely to oppose such
legislation because of their fear of increasing local power of
excluding growth. Opponents of growth are likely to oppose
restrictions on a power they know they already have. Still, it
is not impossible to envisage the enactment of such a statute,
and the investigation of ways to organize political support for
this legislative change should be given high priority.
460A comprehensive growth management system could ensure
that no community accepted a grossly disproportionate amount of
growth as well as avoid the inefficience of too rapid growth.
agg discussion at p. 129 supra.
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CODA
The conclusions drawn in this paper may give scarce cause
for optimism. Note, for example, that there is little indication
that the environment for enacting legislative reform has
improved. Indeed, this problem may be far deeper than
legislative inertia or some other pathology of the legislative
process. It may simply reflect the conflicting interests
present.
Critical analysis of the interests at stake always bears the
risk of inducing fatalism or paralyzing disillusionment. But
what we lose in optimism, we gain in self-understanding. And
perhaps from these roots of self-understanding can ultimately
spring social reform. It is with this faith that we must
continue.
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